One major issue with this is uni V3. with concentrated liquidity, the amount of $ENS one holds in an LP can fluctuate significantly trade to trade. I would agree with @daylon.eth here that If someone places their $ENS in an LP they have essentially agreed to sell their ENS. The complications of a solution may outweigh the benefit you’re attempting to achieve.
As for AAVE et al, again I’d argue user’s are giving up their rights to vote by depositing there. Especially so in this situation as the main reason a user would borrow ENS would be to gain voting privileges. It becomes a slippery slope designing voting power to a user who is attempting to lease out their voting power. Not sure why that is a desired capability.
I wrote a skeleton of an idea here which is an attempt to create a basis to build upon for incentivizing participation by both users delegating their votes, and delegates voting with the power of their “constituents”. The idea is to incentivize average users to delegate and earn, as well as incentivize delegates to both participate, engage, and perform actions to encourage more users to delegate to them. I believe it has a basis for creating an engaging organization, though the game theory of any incentive plan will require much deliberation and forethought to avoid as much collateral damage and unintended consequences as possible - though any amount of deliberation will still require constant adjustments and tweaking to guide the desired behavior.