While I appreciate in earnest @James’ governance pastiche, I do not think we should conflate the Advisory Body’s mandate to inform the process with the power to legislate it.
It’s critical we maintain that boundary while we proceed with these deliberations. As stated in the OP, the purpose of this body is:
This is exactly why @mikemetagov has referenced what I believe is a vital benchmark in modeling the IANA transition—which in truth is what inspired the Advisory Body to begin with, after reading through ICANN’s bylaws.
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At this juncture, I believe the ENS DAO needs a vehicle to cross the governance chasm in order to earn legitimacy, and for that reason, I strongly align with MetaGov.org’s Option 1—with nuance.
First, we should respect @katherine.eth (OBO ENS Labs)’ procedural seniority in the matter of restructuring the Foundation Board, while at the same time acknowledging that the ENS DAO has matured into a multi-stakeholder organization (Service Providers, Stewards, Delegates, Contributors, etc.)
Second, this means we acknowledge ENS Labs’ sovereignty and incumbency in their decision-making process when it comes to structuring the board—with the expectation of a mutual acknowledgment of the sovereignty and right of self-determination of its counterparties.
To that end, the Advisory Body should convene and prioritize findings from the retrospective and sequence their implementation into an Advisory Framework and formalize that framework via DAO vote.
This process can run in parallel to the restructuring of the Foundation Board and SPP Committee, and in fact should be seen as a triage.