I was also confused when i went to vote on snapshot. Personally i was voting for the first two proposals and against the last two because i dont see any harm in taking our time moving responsibility from a proven trustworthy team to an unproven DAO that only just ratified its constitution.
Moving forward in the future we need to use caution when creating a snapshot vote with conditions where people cannot accurately voice their opinions (vote against ).
All in all great post and i appreciate your effort and the teams in remaining accessible and engaged with the community in the forums.
Alright, that’s good, and definitely not what I expected. The way it is presented is the two options are “Agree” or submit a null vote. Which made it seem to me that only the Agree votes are tallied and that’s the result displayed. Maybe in the future it could be presented like you did in the poll for the retroactive airdrop, where each numbered issue of a proposal has an option for “Support,” “Abstain,” or “Oppose.”
I don’t think Snapshot currently has tri-states for individual options, each option is either selected or not. The actual data that you sign is just an integer array of which choices were selected, like [1,2,3,4]. So in order to allow people to vote on some options but abstain from others on the same proposal, we would have to have 2 options per issue, like:
Issue 1 (if selected vote Yes, otherwise vote No)
Abstain from Issue 1 (if selected ignore the above line, otherwise ignore this line)
I’m supportive of this proposal. If we’re seeing active engagement from the DAO and delegates should we consider increasing the minimum quorum? And at bare minimum implement the pr openzeppelin is working on.
I support, as caution is stressed. I think a very gradual (and pre-tested as much as possible) transfer of power to a fresh DAO is always good practice, especially for things that are over-arching. Should this have been the first proposal, many first-time DAO delegates face? Hard to say. I would like to see a timeline of how little power can be transferred at a time, and how long a timespan it can be done over, to take baby steps and make sure all works well as changes are made.
I feel that if Fire Eyes DAO is established enough so as to have already earned the trust of True Names, the ENS DAO here should have some sort of introduction to them, and likely more - some sort of posted CV as to who there are and what they bring to the table.
I’m likening this to establishing an HOA in America. If a HOA management company facilitates the establishment of an HOA for the neighborhood - that management company must be scrutinized. Their efforts are not ever benevolent or altruistic.
Hey @Nefty would like to formally introduce myself as a part of Fire Eyes DAO.
Fire Eyes DAO (also seen as _ ) is a community governance collective composed of @James@Callum, 0x_lucas and myself.
We’ve all worked deeply in web3 for 5+ years, primarily within the DAO ecosystem. In the past year, we’ve launched the Gitcoin token ($GTC) and the SuperRare token ($RARE) along with doing governance work for Aave (Aavenomics), Balancer (Balancer V2) and Rocket Pool (RPL V3). More on all these projects can be found here.
Our goal is to be a leading voice in decentralized governance and the democratization of public goods.
We’re thankful to have played a small role in the launch of the $ENS token, but are more excited to continue presenting actionable proposals to help further decentralize ENS into the hands of the community.
I’ll let @James chime in on the comments above. I’m personally in favor of this proposal and feel that our reputation speaks for itself as to intentions in which we bring these changes forward.
I think we kinda need to pass this, to really kick in DAO, you have to be taking some risks to move things forward, seems like in this case there is a very fine line between managing risk and really setting things in motion
I had a look at all discussion around this and I’m going to cautiously approve all 4 points, here are key considerations:
I strongly agree with everyone who voiced concerns over moving a lot of responsibility to ENS DAO at such early stage, without testing robustness and reliability of ENS DAO
That being said we need to make this move to give ENS DAO credibility, without transferring some real authority, it is not possible to give DAO this weight it needs to have in eyes of general public
@nick.eth@brantlymillegan are not having considerable reservations about approving all 4, thats not to say, that ENS DAO delegates should blindly follow core team’s guidance, however both of them are delegates now as well and as such their opinions should be taken into consideration
I’m supportive of the proposal, thank you for pulling this together.
The only question I had was what were the “response time” differences between the DAO and multi-sig in the event of a downstream compromise (e.g. Chainlink feed failure). Thanks!
p.s. unfortunately, I’m also away from my signing key, so won’t be able to vote within the window. Will resolve this ASAP.
I really appreciate all the lively discussion and questions. I think that bodes well for this DAO. I know that some people think it’s too soon for some of these proposals and while it may be, I think the best way to learn the best is by doing.
It is also a lot of responsibility, but that’s the great part about Web 3.0 code is contract and it’s all about creating trustless decentralized systems.
I’m part of the Bankless DAO and often it feels like we’re building a bus while driving down the highway at 65 mph. We’re forging new paths here so it’s going to be challenging and we’re going to make mistakes and that’s okay. We just keep talking and discussing and I think we’ll do just fine.
All four measures passed! Below is a copy of the email I just sent the multisig keyholders.
Hi Keyholders,
The day has arrived! You have probably noticed that the new ENS DAO just voted overwhelmingly to request the transfer of a set of key powers from the ENS multisig to the DAO:
Transfer all ETH and USDC held by multisig.ens.eth to the DAO’s timelock contract at wallet.ensdao.eth.
Call transferOwnership on the contracts at controller.ens.eth and 0xb9d374d0fe3d8341155663fae31b7beae0ae233a (the price oracle), passing in the address of wallet.ensdao.eth.
Call transferOwnership on the contract at registrar.ens.eth, passing in the address of wallet.ensdao.eth.
Call setSubnodeOwner on the root, passing in keccak256(‘reverse’) and the address of wallet.ensdao.eth.
Accordingly, I have submitted multisig transaction 27 for your approval. This is a multi-call with 6 actions:
Transfer 4369.256902770582850334 ETH to wallet.ensdao.eth (0xFe89cc7aBB2C4183683ab71653C4cdc9B02D44b7) as per #1 above.
Transfer 10,318,098.311236 USDC to wallet.ensdao.eth as per #1 above.
Call transferOwnership(wallet.ensdao.eth) on controller.ens.eth (0x283Af0B28c62C092C9727F1Ee09c02CA627EB7F5), as per #2 above.
Call transferOwnership(wallet.ensdao.eth) on 0x63FaF46Dadc9676745836289404B39136622B821 as per #2 above. This is the current price oracle address; note it differs from the address above, as the proposal mistakenly cited the original (Maker-based) price oracle, not the current one.
Call transferOwnership(wallet.ensdao.eth) on registrar.ens.eth (0x57f1887a8BF19b14fC0dF6Fd9B2acc9Af147eA85), as per #3 above.
Call setSubnodeOwner(keccak256('reverse'), wallet.ensdao.eth), as per #4 above.
Approving this transaction will transfer the bulk of the multisig’s responsibilities and control over ENS to the DAO; more details are available in the Snapshot proposal linked above. Note that it will not transfer ownership of the ENS root itself, which will remain the responsibility of the multisig for now.
It’s been a great pleasure working with you all and we would not have gotten here without you. Every one of you has been a crucial part of helping ensure ENS’s success, and you have my everlasting gratitude for that. I hope to see you participating in the future of the ENS DAO as it takes on the responsibilities you have held for ENS during its infancy.
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_