I have been pondering about it for two days but haven’t had the time to formally propose this yet; I want to do a light TempCheck here first. Most corporate structures have an independent auditor (not accounts auditor) appointed directly by the shareholders and operates with full autonomy from the Board of Directors or the Executive branch. Such an auditing committee for a DAO,
a) will be elected by and answers to the Delegates and Delegates only (excluding the Directors, Stewards and Core team at TNL),
b) cannot be formed by members who are delegates,
c) cannot take any actions but only provide independent feedback on the governance, disbursement of funds, and ensure that by-laws are followed.
I had some more criteria that ensured the autonomy and independence of such a body but I seem to be forgetting (sorry I am swamped mentally beyond measure). I will edit more as they come to mind but feel free to tell me how you folks feel about it. It could be set up to absolve the Directors from conflict-of-interest cases by passing duties that lead to conflict to this committee explicitly.