From Stagnation to Structure: Fixing ENS Governance

DAO-Wide General Discussion
3

I’ll list all the points I agree with first:

  • The current WG structure encourages entrenchment, we haven’t seen a new Steward, save for @daostrat.eth, since 2022.
  • Working Group calls and discussions aren’t driving meaningful decisions — instead, they feel like chores and politics.
  • As a Meta-Governance steward in 2024, I can attest to this and felt that trepidation often distracted me from serving.
  • The SPP is good, but the incentives push people to perform publicly for funding rather than pursue deep, innovative, technically challenging outcomes.
  • I agree that we need a stronger accountability mechanism for service providers and contributors, as well as a clear way to reduce conflicts of interest.

However, I challenge:

  • The notion that the DAO is an operating company. This is a category error. In effect, the DAO is a mechanism to execute code and allocate capital.
  • The notion that ENS Labs is exceedingly opaque. In competition, mum’s the word, and people should be read in to a project or program when they are formally granted access and briefed on a need-to-know basis.
  • The notion that an OpCo is sufficient to catalyze protocol development. Displacing ENS Labs doesn’t feel like the right approach. And an OpCo sounds eerily similar to @Limes ENS Admin Panel idea.
  • The notion that a new organizational structure will ameliorate the situation. We shouldn’t rely on picking better heroes. We should increase coordination amongst competent + devoted teams and build robust frameworks around emergent activity and clear accountability.
  • The notion that delegates should not or are not able to be involved in protocol development. In fact, the DAO should seek to grant greater voter responsibility to delegates by merit of their involvement and contributions to infrastructure.

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In general, I’m not into the idea of increased bureaucracy as a means to stimulate product growth and adoption. There is also concern for regulatory capture.

I believe a free-market approach is suitable, given that the appropriate incentive mechanisms are designed in alignment with the protocol’s raison d’être and its constitution.

Edit: I forgot to mention @Sov, @don.nie, @katherine.eth; sorry guys. I am myopic and forgetful sometimes.

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