Appreciate the work of Blockful as a SP focused on enhancing governance security. However, we should also recognize that a strong governance structure does more than increase security; it determines how efficiently ENS is managed and defines the quality of its outcomes. Governance should therefore be emphasized as a vital topic.
Most of the suggestions are quite reasonable, with a few exceptions:
L-1: Routine Operations Require Full Governance Vote (No Optimistic Path)
I don’t see this as a major issue for ENS, since it does not have frequent on-chain votes like Aave or Lido. Additionally, I’m not sure how proposals can be cleanly separated into “low-risk operational” and “critical.” Drawing that line is difficult in practice and risks centralizing power in whoever executes those proposals.
L-2: Uniform Approval Thresholds for Unequal Risk
Again, I’m unsure whether it’s technically feasible to strictly and accurately hard-code proposal types and assign different thresholds to each.
That said, it is reasonable to require a higher threshold for core governance changes, since they affect the protocol’s liveness rather than merely its direction.
However, higher thresholds reduce flexibility and give minority groups the power to freeze governance. For that reason, I would consider reducing the 66% threshold for large treasury moves.
I’m also not aware of any DAO currently implementing this model seamlessly, so I remain somewhat conservative on this proposal.
M-3: Implement Vote Mutability
This is a strong and accurate recommendation, and I believe its scope should be extended to token holders as well.
Token holders should always retain the right to override their delegate’s vote at any time. While this may not be exercised frequently, it must exist structurally to preserve true ownership of the protocol at the token-holder level, not the delegate level. This is a core sovereignty principle.
Additionally, token holders who have not delegated their tokens should retain the right to vote directly once a proposal goes live.
Finally, I would suggest looking into Aragon’s Escrow Curve model. It increases the influence of long-term participants while allowing multiplier and duration limits to prevent excessive centralization among whales or insiders.
This could simultaneously improve governance security and participant quality. I suspect mechanisms like this will eventually become standard in DAO governance design.