We’ve already established that it’s not practically enforceable, so symbolism is all you have.
Building a DAO that has disenfranchisement of its own voters as a core mechanic seems like an extraordinarily bad idea to me. Besides which, you would be trying to do so while those same accounts vote against it.
I don’t know what “releasing the votes delegated to the delegate” is supposed to mean.
It is really not the hard if you use anonymising services like Tornado Cash or a centralised exchange to create multiple accounts that are difficult to correlate based on onchain data alone. At which point you have to decide if you’re going to start disenfranchising people because they’re probably the same person.
Again, I don’t understand how any of this points to centralisation.
I also said that it will be 99% effective. You have not eluded to that point. Is 1% too big of a margin for you personally? (for reference)
If the voters are acting in bad faith, what choice does that leave the DAO? Plus, I am against disenfranchisement. I do not support it; I have said it already.
Undelegate the votes back to the ENS holders of the blacklisted delegate. In the same line, @keikreutler.eth wants to ramp-off for the same issues that we are discussing here; she has ~ 100,000 votes. What if she is not able to get in touch with her delegators? She should have the option of being able to press a button and recuse herself (and pay gas of course but this can be rebated by ENS Foundation if the delegate has a large enough vote count). How can she ramp-off? If a method is built into the DAO code for this specific feature, then surely a method can be coded to undelegate the votes back to the ENS holders if their delegate is blacklisted for unethical conduct.
How many delegates in the top 20/30/50 do you think will go through the trouble of what you described without anyone finding out with two clicks? They can barely get hold of their delegators. To tumble, they’ll need to ask their delegators to move their ENS, correct? Or am I missing something?
I see that you have issues against such checks and measures. I have taken note of them.
Everyone I have interacted with their twitter feeds the pronouns the used and so on. If you take a census I bet you would find women and LGBTQIA are underrepresented here you can’t tell me you think otherwise.
Imagine this scenario: Delegate X with 400,000 votes has been found to, say, fraud from the DAO. If you could implement the un-delegation (assume for a second) back to 3500 something wallets that delegate to you, how will you circumvent your loss of delegation power trivially?
Can you also please elaborate why it is impractical?
Disenfranchisement is defined as ‘the state of being deprived of a right or privilege, especially the right to vote’. In this case, the ENS token holders can vote by themselves. Their right to vote has not been void. Their votes remain intact and so does their right
A person won’t only need to open multiple accounts (trivial), but also somehow gain enough popularity for these multiple accounts so that people will delegate to them (nontrivial and almost impossible imo). Gaining the popularity and trust of voters like Brantly, she256.eth or you have is a super difficult thing to do.
The lack of a formal identity and reputation system doesn’t mean that all entities in the system have the same reputation.
Even if they manage to do it, it will be easily noticeable with naked eye and they can be blacklisted again for acting in bad faith. It is impossible to move hundreds of thousands of votes around of hundreds of delegators who wouldn’t come to your funeral unless you offered them free ENS
Simplest of all, I could coordinate privately by communicating several different addresses to people who want to delegate to me. These addresses can be set up with no on-chain connection.
If I’m only concerned about automated measures (not manual sanction), I can simply set up an ENS resolver that resolves to multiple addresses for my name.
Each delegation is a storage slot. Reassigning thousands of them requires changing thousands of storage slots. Further, introducing this functionality would require deploying a new ENS token and migrating everyone to it.
To reiterate, too, all of this depends on giving a committee of people the power to revoke peoples’ decisions about how to vote. I am not exaggerating when I say I would sooner leave the ENS DAO than see this implemented.
Telling someone “you may not nominate this person to represent you” is a form of disenfranchisement. So is revoking that decision for them because you think they made the wrong decision. Based on what we know about delegate “stickiness”, many will not notice this happen or reassign their votes, so in many cases this translates to “actual” disenfranchisement too, insofar as their votes are no longer counted at all.
All of this aside, does anyone believe this actually solves a real problem? US senators and congressmen have one vote each, but nobody really believes that moneyed interests don’t have an outsized influence.
I’ll remind you that you had 3% quorum for your vote. I’ll give you all my ENS if you pull this off even for 1000 of your 3500 delegators.
It’s good that we know where you stand in terms for your ideology toward ENS. I have mentioned that no committee is going to revoke anyone’s access. DAO will be given raw intel by the audit team and it is up to the DAO to decide what measures to take.
Seems like there is enough mass. Perhaps it is time for another proposal.
What’s the law in New Zealand about people with criminal record taking public office? It is not unreal to tell someone that you cannot choose a “criminal” to represent yourself.
You don’t need existing delegates to act; you just need to give a variety of addresses to new delegates. Your argument applies in full to the unlikeliness of getting people whose votes have been “unassigned” to assign them elsewhere, though.
Making it a decision of the whole DAO doesn’t make it any better.
The US is almost unique in disenfranchising felons. It’s still disenfranchisement.
I feel like there is a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of smart-contract based governance in a lot of these threads
If you apply a lot of them to traditional government, I think it would be clear why it’s bad to consider things like caps on delegation.
Either people have votes or they don’t. If someone delegates to someone, they are saying “I want this person to vote for me.” The hardest part of democracy is that sometimes our opinion wins and sometimes it loses. But respecting the validity of each person’s vote is above all else and is the one thing ultimately everyone should be able to agree on.
Whereas in law-based governance, it’s possible for a majority to change the rules from under you in order to disenfranchise you, the power of smart contracts is that the rules are set beforehand and nobody can change them or take it away from you later, no matter what (except in the ways the smart contract explicitly allows, or if there’s an exploit in the smart contract, of course).
This is not to comment on EP6 directly, just chiming in on the governance discussion because I keep seeing posts where people are proposing changes that are either directly antithetical to the reason DAOs were created, or are just literally impossible to implement at a technical level (as @nick.eth has pointed out above a few times).
I think a more productive discussion would be around whether the ENS Foundation bylaws should prevent the director in question from voting on their own removal. That is a social vote, not on-chain (today), so much easier to structurally deal with (you could program a Snapshot strategy that allows the person in question to not vote, and allows their delegated votes to vote on their own for that proposal). There’s an argument to be made that this is disenfranchisement of any small delegators of that person, though, so still not straightforward, but at least it’s not literally technically infeasible.
There are no general purpose DAOs. The purpose of a DAO is defined by the community that it serves. There are no core principles to a DAO other than decentralisation among its members and its autonomy that traces back to its members again directly, plus the articles of association. Anything else you add on top is your own personal addition. DAO don’t free themselves of legal frameworks just because they are DAO.
This is a very minor subset. If you have followed other threads, people with legal experience have already pointed out there are glaring loopholes in the articles that go well beyond one singular topic of ‘a director voting for himself’. There is a wider overarching concept of conflict-of-interest here.
They actually can’t, they are immutable. Some contracts implement what are called “proxies” to make functionality mutable, but $ENS is not a proxy afaik.
I thought that was the whole point of autonomy or/and self-determination. What did I miss? Are you in favour of keeping the DAO in the dark? You know that such information and analyses can still be published here whether you like it or not, and based on the severity of the risks to the DAO, the DAO can take a vote. Ok, I have been made aware that the immutability conditions of ENS contract don’t allow such a measure, aka ENS is not EIP2535 compatible. Rekt.
It is impractical and undoable. I disagree with you.
DAOs will govern themselves. Your opinions are your own.
Migrate to new contract? Is that possible? You cannot tell me that such basic functionality is permanently hardcoded; I find it hard to fathom. I hope you realise that the DAO runs the risk of stagnant votes this way if they cannot find a way to stir votes in those inactive wallets which delegated their airdropped tokens to the top dogs of the ecosystem without due diligence (because who would care about delegation when they were being dropped free cash). For reference, Nick, Lefteris and Cory published sub-votes for their delegates and didn’t even manage 5% quorum. What does that tell you?
That’s exactly what I’m saying, this is what I’m talking about. You are misunderstanding the whole point of smart contract-based organizations. The whole point Ethereum was created was to implement code-is-law. Nobody can change how the smart contract works once it’s deployed, unless the smart contract says it can be changed (and users can therefore see that possibility exists).
This property is what allows people to know, for example, that the ENS DAO can never revoke anyone’s .eth name, ever. It’s literally impossible because the smart contract doesn’t allow it, period. That’s one of the most powerful properties of smart contracts that makes it so you can own NFTs and other assets, and actually meaningfully own them. Otherwise, there’s no point in using a blockchain for any of this.
It does mean, though, that yes, you can’t change the rules after the fact unless the smart contract said you can. As @nick.eth said, the only way to do that in this case it to deploy a whole new $ENS token, which would technically just be a completely different token.
I understand. Thanks for clarifying it! It was helpful. Essentially, a new contract means a new token due to certain immutability conditions. Thanks again; as you can see, I still lack the specific details of the ENS contract when it comes to storage slots like @nick.eth said and its read/write/execute capabilities. I should look into it more
Addendum: I have been made aware of the EIP2535 incompatibility and similar.
