Okay, I’ve read your post. This highlights one of the biggest problems facing DAOs today: the lack of incentives for governance participation.
The main issue is evaluating which participants are genuine contributors and which are bots (or, as you said, ENS-aligned vs. not). If you simply incentivize all voters, it may attract bot-like activity, though I’m not entirely sure that would happen. Your PoH approach doesn’t fully prevent human-operated bots either, and I’m not sure that kind of verification is even necessary.
Since it’s nearly impossible with today’s technology to objectively evaluate which delegates are truly valuable to the protocol, I think the best proxy is their own stake. Delegates with a significant personal stake are more likely to be genuinely aligned with the protocol. Based on that assumption, both these ENS-aligned delegates and their delegators could receive incentives reserved in the DAO Treasury for governance participation.
Even a small percentage of protocol yield could be enough to attract more token-holders to vote or delegate. Currently, only about 3% of the circulating ENS supply participates in governance — this approach could easily increase that to 10–15% in the near term, and potentially 30% over time. It’s similar to how Ethereum directs its revenue to validators, and they have %30 of circ. supply at stake.
Another complementary solution is education and awareness. Even without incentives, tokenholders should understand that delegating their tokens supports the protocol’s sustainability and security. Centralized and temporary solutions like security councils don’t align with the principles of any truly decentralized DAO.