Great question, that was not put clearly. Both delegates’ and holders’ power will be weighted based on the average of their voting power/delegated voting power at the proposal snapshots for that month’s proposals.
All active delegates in that period, and all the holders delegating to them, will have their power counted in each proposal, not only in the ones “actually cast” as expressed before. Thanks for asking this; it was badly expressed in the goal of making it easier to grasp.
Not sure what are you proposing that we do with a bonding curve here. Caps are very hard to reach - in our simulations, it’s mostly already established big holders and top delegates. Farmers will hardly interact with the cap because of the holding time modifier, unless they put in a huge amount of capital to farm only 40% of what they could.
Happy to hear more of a bonding curve model for this and its advantages, but I don’t see clearly a benefit or a model at this moment.
Only holders delegating to active delegators qualify, so this is not an issue. Our first model had reward amounts based on the % of activity of delegates, but given the small amount of active delegates, we found it more interesting to have it binary active/non-active to avoid everyone concentrating delegations to the even fewer delegates with 90% or 100% activity in order to improve their yields.
This would be a better model for filtering farmers, although more burdensome. Let me get that to a discussion internally and check how easy it would be to work with that data, if it actually improves the system, and get back to you.
My first thought is that it’s not necessary for the first implementation because, realistically, a farmer would have needed to get started on this seeding a good while ago to make it profitable, if we can keep close to our timeline goals.
No, because the supply for delegates is 10% of R. At the snapshot used for the simulation, there were 44 delegates to split 10%, and over 2500 holders delegating to them, splitting the other 90%. Only the top 3 delegates hit the cap and only the top 2 holders did. If concentration increases, those numbers should increase a bit too, but even our most intentionally skewed scenarios didn’t get more than 10 delegates hitting the cap before becoming very unrealistic.
The lottery addresses the 1 ENS minimum. Everyone who would receive less than that gets put into the lottery. Meaning they get a chance to be rewarded 10 ENS proportional to their original reward, instead of getting the reward itself.
Everyone above 1 ENS receives it normally. Everyone below it gets in the lottery. We never send less than 1.
I wouldn’t call it volunteering, as I see it as part of our current service provider proposal to improve ENS DAO governance resilience. But yes, we are saying we will build this inside the current funding stream we have.