Thanks @SpikeWatanabe.eth for putting this together.
As I said in the article you linked, the policy of canceling small initiative funding programs really does have a dramatic impact on the number of contributors.
Previously, you could get a “Small Grant” by working on a project for, say, a month, or in advance, without having anything implemented. Now, your path is to work on an idea for several months (ideally also have employees), and count on an unguaranteed chance of getting compensation.
It also creates a monopsony. Only working groups can give you funding. They have no competitors, which always leads to a drop in the quality of grant activity. Of course, you can request money directly from the DAO through a proposal, but if your application requires less than 100k USD of funding, it will most likely not reach quorum.
It is worth understanding that such a policy is discriminatory not only in terms of place of residence, but also in terms of age. The younger a person is, the less likely they are to have enough savings to be able to bring a project to fruition that will eventually receive a grant in the current system. As a result, it cuts off a whole layer of potentially valuable people.
I have received questions about how to get into ENS. As a person receiving projects and money, I do not consider myself morally entitled to offer those asking to work for free with the prospect of ruining their lives, so I answer that I have no idea (private initiatives such as the ENS Holiday Awards from NameHash give hope that the situation will change).
Now regarding the system you have developed. From my point of view, it certainly has its shortcomings, which is quite normal for the first draft.
My doubts are mainly related to the fact that the readiness of the ENS budget to create new salary positions (read: additional fixed costs) is questionable. If a person reaches phase 3, in fact, they will receive funds constantly, regardless of the availability of tasks and the quality of the work.
Having many effective salary positions is the prerogative and advantage of centralized structures. They can hire a person, replace them for inefficiency, index their salary or redistribute their responsibilities. In DAO, for each such step, it will be necessary to convene delegates, who, according to you, always find it difficult to familiarize themselves with applications in detail.
I do not believe that there will be a person who will create an RFP for each small task and at the same time control that the same task does not have, for example, a Junior developer at ENS Labs or some service provider.
Instead, I would suggest developing a rethought system of Small Grants. After the publication of the article, I talked to some former stewards and they defined the problems of the previous system as follows:
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Large delegates who are founders or managers of other projects in web3 find it difficult to familiarize themselves with 40 different projects. They have no motivation to spend 10 hours of their time so that someone gets $ 1,000.
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The previous problem implies that some large delegates do not vote at all, which leads to the fact that the decision of one or two people is decisive.
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Applications are submitted by large companies, for which a small grant is more of a bonus than vital funding.
This problem can be solved by creating a representative voting system. Conventionally, once a year, the DAO will select from 5 to 9 people who have the time and desire to familiarize themselves with all applications each time.
These people write their statement, similar to the delegate statement. “I will give preference to marketing-oriented projects, and will not vote for the same recipients for more than two rounds” or “I will only vote for technical projects, and only if the applicant is a small organization”.
The DAO selects them by vote, and the top 5-9 of them will receive an unpaid position. By re-electing this pool every year, the DAO will be able to maintain flexibility regarding the direction of small grants. This will solve the problem of disinterest in reviewing applications, disproportional voting and grant farming. It will also deprive stewards of the monopsony on distributing grants, which will help them and ENS as a whole.
Edit: Unlike the council you proposed, decisions in such a representative system would not be made collegially; each representative would vote separately for grant recipients. It would also be logical to restrict stewards from applying for such a role.