[social] Governance Distribution Program (Pilot)

[AvsA]

@nick.eth

Meaning no disrespect, it’s a bit dismaying that the third largest amount, of over $100k, didn’t get any basic due diligence to check the reason for the payment or whether it should qualify for a governance incentive before posting.

I apologize for that oversight. It’s not simple to gather that particular information and I have been working with Danch since the beginning of the year building ens-ledger website mostly for this purpose. I had removed lots of other transactions but the Cowswap slipped because I had misremembered that we had a call with them and thought maybe that was part of some agreement and not simply using it for exchanging ether.

The table was always meant to be an estimate and I posted precisely because I wanted more eyes on the recipient list. I have now updated the main table in the post to include links to each transaction and more detail on what that was for, and I post a summary below. After having a conversation about it on Metagov it’s our intent to post a social vote in 2 or 3 weeks to approve the project and to pick the ratio for refund the community feels is correct. Even if the exact detail of the table isn’t finalized I’d also like to present an upper bound on how much it would cost in terms of ENS tokens.

To	Value	ENS Estimate (at $15)
ImmuneFi*	$ 350,000.00	23333.3
ETHGlobal*	$ 240,000.00	16000.0
Rotki	$ 53,973.38	3598.2
wslyvh.eth	$ 50,004.00	3333.6
gashawk.eth	$ 40,000.00	2666.7
buidlguidl.eth*	$ 35,000.00	2333.3
borderlessafrica.eth	$ 30,000.00	2000.0
daemon.eth	$ 27,000.00	1800.0
Revoke.Cash	$ 25,000.00	1666.7
Onthis	$ 25,000.00	1666.7
ipns.eth	$ 25,000.00	1666.7
Fluidkey	$ 25,000.00	1666.7
Blockscout	$ 25,000.00	1666.7
beaconchain.eth	$ 25,000.00	1666.7
1w3.eth	$ 25,000.00	1666.7
Firefly	$ 20,000.00	1333.3
EIP-7212	$ 20,000.00	1333.3
Urbe Campus	$ 19,680.00	1312.0
ethdaily.eth	$ 14,797.60	986.5
Discord Support	$ 13,000.00	866.7
Dappnode	$ 12,500.00	833.3
generalmagic.eth	$ 11,563.43	770.9
Pugson	$ 10,000.00	666.7
Juicebox	$ 10,000.00	666.7
frolic.eth	$ 10,000.00	666.7
ETHDenver*	$ 10,000.00	666.7
Drips	$ 10,000.00	666.7
Lemma	$ 9,998.67	666.6
Tally	$ 8,999.54	600.0
pairwise.eth	$ 8,402.18	560.1
apoorv.eth	$ 7,021.88	468.1
leticiaferraz.eth	$ 6,949.32	463.3
Socket	$ 5,000.00	333.3
Latin Hackathon*	$ 5,000.00	333.3
eth-mexico.eth*	$ 5,000.00	333.3
aynieducativo.eth	$ 5,000.00	333.3
ENS Fairy	$ 4,781.34	318.8
glodollar.eth	$ 3,762.22	250.8
weird3.eth	$ 3,000.00	200.0
Event Support*	$ 3,000.00	200.0
daveytea.eth	$ 2,818.29	187.9
stephancill.eth	$ 2,367.89	157.9
Scope.sh	$ 2,367.89	157.9
Kiwi News	$ 2,367.89	157.9
bloomnetwork.eth	$ 1,881.11	125.4
modularcrypto.eth	$ 1,818.29	121.2
aexek.eth	$ 1,750.00	116.7
illuminated.eth	$ 940.56	62.7
dhive.eth	$ 940.56	62.7
pabl0cks.eth	$ 877.74	58.5
iviangita.eth	$ 877.74	58.5
easlabs.eth	$ 877.74	58.5
2118.eth	$ 877.74	58.5
andrewpage.eth	$ 780.00	52.0
Grand Total	$ 1,259,976.97	83998.5

*conferences or organizations that give prizes to other developers

[AvsA]

@snowdot

I think it would be great to implement a tiered system with minimum and maximum distributions. This way, everyone feels their efforts are valued while also encouraging higher levels of participation that benefit the DAO as a whole.

I feel having to check participation rates on calls and votes might add too much of an administrative overhead. But I do I think adding a max and min cap could be good idea, or maybe make a progressive ratio.

Not saying this is a good idea, but out of curiosity I checked how this table would look as a quadratic formula (square root of USD value multiplied by a weight chosen to get the total amount to the some budget) and this is what it would look like.

	USD	Quadratic ENS	Ratio
ImmuneFi	$ 350,000.00	4,726.65	20%
ETHGlobal	$ 240,000.00	3,914.04	24%
Rotki	$ 53,973.38	1,856.13	52%
wslyvh.eth	$ 50,004.00	1,786.58	54%
gashawk.eth	$ 40,000.00	1,597.90	60%
buidlguidl.eth	$ 35,000.00	1,494.70	64%
borderlessafrica.eth	$ 30,000.00	1,383.82	69%
daemon.eth	$ 27,000.00	1,312.81	73%
Revoke.Cash	$ 25,000.00	1,263.25	76%
Onthis	$ 25,000.00	1,263.25	76%
ipns.eth	$ 25,000.00	1,263.25	76%
Fluidkey	$ 25,000.00	1,263.25	76%
Blockscout	$ 25,000.00	1,263.25	76%
beaconchain.eth	$ 25,000.00	1,263.25	76%
1w3.eth	$ 25,000.00	1,263.25	76%
Firefly	$ 20,000.00	1,129.89	85%
EIP-7212	$ 20,000.00	1,129.89	85%
Urbe Campus	$ 19,680.00	1,120.81	85%
ethdaily.eth	$ 14,797.60	971.89	99%
Discord Support	$ 13,000.00	910.94	105%
Dappnode	$ 12,500.00	893.25	107%
generalmagic.eth	$ 11,563.43	859.14	111%
Pugson	$ 10,000.00	798.95	120%
Juicebox	$ 10,000.00	798.95	120%
frolic.eth	$ 10,000.00	798.95	120%
ETHDenver	$ 10,000.00	798.95	120%
Drips	$ 10,000.00	798.95	120%
Lemma	$ 9,998.67	798.90	120%
Tally	$ 8,999.54	757.93	126%
pairwise.eth	$ 8,402.18	732.34	131%
apoorv.eth	$ 7,021.88	669.49	143%
leticiaferraz.eth	$ 6,949.32	666.03	144%
Socket	$ 5,000.00	564.94	169%
Latin Hackathon	$ 5,000.00	564.94	169%
eth-mexico.eth	$ 5,000.00	564.94	169%
aynieducativo.eth	$ 5,000.00	564.94	169%
ENS Fairy	$ 4,781.34	552.45	173%
glodollar.eth	$ 3,762.22	490.05	195%
weird3.eth	$ 3,000.00	437.60	219%
Event Support	$ 3,000.00	437.60	219%
daveytea.eth	$ 2,818.29	424.14	226%
stephancill.eth	$ 2,367.89	388.78	246%
Scope.sh	$ 2,367.89	388.78	246%
Kiwi News	$ 2,367.89	388.78	246%
bloomnetwork.eth	$ 1,881.11	346.52	276%
modularcrypto.eth	$ 1,818.29	340.68	281%
aexek.eth	$ 1,750.00	334.22	286%
illuminated.eth	$ 940.56	245.03	391%
dhive.eth	$ 940.56	245.03	391%
pabl0cks.eth	$ 877.74	236.70	405%
iviangita.eth	$ 877.74	236.70	405%
easlabs.eth	$ 877.74	236.70	405%
2118.eth	$ 877.74	236.70	405%
andrewpage.eth	$ 780.00	223.13	429%
Total	$ 1,259,976.97	50,000.00

I have to say it’s an interesting result. Large groups like ImmuneFi would get a 1:0.20 ratio, Rotki gets a 52% bonus, and some of the small individual developers like Andrew page would get a 4x their initial payment, while at the same time the total ENS cost for the DAO is “only” 50k ENS (or any other budget we want). Is this fairer? Difficult to say, but suffice to say that in such scenario, breaking down an entity among like ETHGlobal into the individual hackathon winners would increase their ENS which is a weird result.

[estmcmxci]

@snowdot

With that in mind, since the goal is to increase governance participation, the distribution should be tied to some criteria that need to be met in order to receive it.

There’s another option: delegating ENS rather than distributing it directly. Eligibility for the ENS Matching (the direct distribution of ENS) in the proposed Governance Distribution Pilot has been based on steward discretion for allocating USDC/ETH funding and community voting through the Small Grants and similar programs.

However, in the scenario you’re suggesting—where ENS is rewarded for participation, voting, thoughtful discussion, and proposal submission—I believe delegation could be a better approach. Guaranteeing ENS simply for participation might attract contributors who are not fully aligned with the DAO constitution (just a hunch), whereas delegating ENS for participation would likely attract more aligned contributors.

I really appreciate the thoughtfulness in any case!

—

@AvsA

I checked how this table would look as a quadratic formula (square root of USD value multiplied by a weight chosen to get the total amount to the some budget)

Based on the ongoing discussion, it seems there has been some concern regarding the 1:1 ratio. I believe the QF approach adds a nice touch and helps address this concern.

[nick.eth]

@snowdot

I think it would be great to implement a tiered system with minimum and maximum distributions. This way, everyone feels their efforts are valued while also encouraging higher levels of participation that benefit the DAO as a whole.

Motivating individual members and promoting equality within our community is important, especially since it takes time and effort to stay updated, participate in discussions, and make time for meetings for the entire duration of the matching program.

With that in mind, since the goal is to increase governance participation, the distribution should be tied to some criteria that need to be met in order to receive it.

I think this sounds like an interesting idea, but a totally different proposal to what @AvsA is putting forward. It’s complementary rather than an alternative, and could be discussed separately.

[clowes.eth]

Some thoughts following on from discussions in the Metagov call:

Firstly, this is a great proposal - I think that appropriately incentivizing people to actively contribute to ENS is incredibly important.

@AvsA

it’s our intent to post a social vote in 2 or 3 weeks to approve the project and to pick the ratio for refund the community feels is correct

Appreciate this delay - I think it is important that the numbers have some high level scrutiny and that the social vote is generally as close to the vote that will then go on to be executed.

@AvsA

When I put this for a social proposal, I’d be willing to put the ratio to a vote: is it 1:1, 1:0.5, 1:0.25 or simply 0?

I like this format.

@slobo.eth

I suggest treating ImmuneFi, CoW Swap, and ETHGlobal differently, along others.

I agree with @slobo.eth here

@AvsA

We could contact them and make sure they use these tokens not to themselves but to support the developers who they facilitated through our funds.

Thats not necessarily easy to enforce and I question if for Immunefi/EthGlobal something separate is put in place through already established communication channels so the reward is more explicit…?

@simona_pop

an experimentation with lower ratio for the pilot would be good and a set timeline for the experiment laid out - say six months.

I agree with this. I’m intrigued as to what happens here - perversely I see it as perfectly plausible that some entities on that list may not even realise they’ve received a reward because of a lack of engagement within the ecosystem/governance. But I guess that is what experiments are for…

@estmcmxci

There’s another option: delegating ENS rather than distributing it directly

I personally don’t see this as a viable option. Incentive alignment is obviously an incredibly complex and nuanced problem (as we’ve seen in previous proposals) but I believe the reward needs to be a direct distribution.

@snowdot

the distribution should be tied to some criteria that need to be met in order to receive it.

It is not objectively easy to discern the reasoning behind why people don’t participate in governance but I think there are an abundance of completely valid reasons. I don’t think that criteria based distributions are appropriate because it risks having incredibly active governance where the majority of participants are simply box ticking. Quality over quantity?

[estmcmxci]

@clowes.eth

I personally don’t see this as a viable option. Incentive alignment is obviously an incredibly complex and nuanced problem (as we’ve seen in previous proposals) but I believe the reward needs to be a direct distribution.

I believe delegation as an additional option is fine; not every contribution needs to be recognized through direct ENS distribution. For example, we were considering ‘Inertial Delegation,’ which would complement direct ENS distribution.

This could potentially be worth considering in the broader Governance Distribution Program (more on this soon), alongside the eligibility criteria that @snowdot had shared (more nuance).

As @nick.eth mentioned, this is beyond the scope of the current thread, but I think it would be beneficial to continue the discussion separately.

—

Hopefully, we’ll see this Pilot go to a vote soon once it’s refined a bit more!

[vegayp]

Maybe this slip passed through my reading, but what if an organisation have more than one account on this list? Different names, but they all belong to the same organisation.

[accessor.eth]

@clowes.eth

It is not objectively easy to discern the reasoning behind why people don’t participate in governance but I think there are an abundance of completely valid reasons

Arguably, i would have to say that participation had initially been sparse due to the very reasons that this is trying to solve—the incentive to participate was / is extremely low and contributions from folks have been dismissed and then implemented by those incentivized already.

These entities are essentially service providers that are not funded by the dubbed ‘Service Provider’ funding stream. Where as myself do not fall into this distribution but have participated extensively in conversation et al.

[accessor.eth]

@James

Love the idea of distributing governance power (ENS tokens) to eligible recipients, however think a 1:1 matching is too high for an initial pilot imo, and creates expectation and perverse incentive to future contributors.

What about past contributors outside of this 2024 who have received usdc from DAO wallets and have been actively participating for multiple years ?

[AvsA]

@vegayp

what if an organisation have more than one account on this list? Different names, but they all belong to the same organisation.

This is the challenge with quadratic funding. Not so much with linear fundings: although we would need to contact each organization anyway for funds.

@accessor.eth

What about past contributors outside of this 2024 who have received usdc from DAO wallets and have been actively participating for multiple years ?

If the pilot is successful future stewards could apply it retroactively, but it’s up to them.

[daveytea]

As a small grants recipient i’d welcome gaining some (small) voting power to be able to participate directly in ENS governance.

The idea of delegating, rather than ‘gifting’, the ENS token makes sense to me. We could improve on this and have a tiered / waterfall delegation program:

1. You start with equal (or similar) delegations to all of those on the list
2. Delegates join weekly calls to align/train the delegates to ENS culture/constitution
3. Delegates vote over a certain time period (2 months?)
4. Analyse which delegates contributed/voted/participated in ways that aligned with ENS ethos.
5. Increase the delegation to those aligned delegates, decrease to those less aligned / didn’t participate
6. Repeat these steps over 12 months and by the end of it there should be a core group of aligned delegates that have contributed and self-selected to be more involved
7. At that point you may decide to ‘gift’ or vest the tokens directly to the delegates

The overhead of this wouldn’t be too much either, as likely you could have one person in the ‘lead’ of this delegate program.

[estmcmxci]

What mechanism would you use to:

• Identify ‘aligned’ contributors
• Weigh their contributions
• Distribute ENS to ‘aligned’ contributors

—

Disclaimer: This is beyond the scope of the current proposal, but I always appreciate hearing new ideas, especially when it comes to decentralization!

[5pence.eth]

@daveytea

• Analyse which delegates contributed/voted/participated in ways that aligned with ENS ethos.
• Increase the delegation to those aligned delegates, decrease to those less aligned / didn’t participate
• Repeat these steps over 12 months and by the end of it there should be a core group of

@estmcmxci

• Identify ‘aligned’ contributors
• Weigh their contributions
• Distribute ENS to ‘aligned’ contributors

A small comment here that having the DAO intentionally decrease the delegated vote power to contrarians while increasing it to those that are ascertained as “aligned” would likely have negative outcomes.

---

Regarding Avsa’s initial proposal above:

Many comments begin with “This is a great initiative, but…,” indicating we may not have the right recipe yet. We have questions about the ratio and which payments to include. While options can be put in the Snapshot vote, it’s complicated to make these choices about retroactive awards with already identified recipients and the specific values.

Playing devil’s advocate - Would it be more effective to debate this as a policy for future payments only? A pilot program for next term? This would allow time to identify the qualifying conditions and payment categories before knowing the recipients.
This would:

• Enable more objective criteria setting without knowing who will benefit
• Provide clearer expectations for all participants going forward
• Avoid potential conflicts or appearances of favoritism

[daveytea]

Aligned contributors:

• based on the goals and constitution of the DAO, most likely very loose but directionally clear.
• So in reply to @5pence.eth comment, I agree you definitely don’t want to disincentivise contrarians. But you’d want to disincentivise behaviours that act against the constitution/goals of the DAO.

Weighing contributions is an open research question but there are a few groups/DAOs working on this.

Distribution of ENS should be quite simple on a technical level (multisend contract).

---

Back to the original proposal: I’m in support of low risk rapid experimentation as action will lead to learnings and improvements, even if none of the above discussions influence the design of proposed pilot.

[estmcmxci]

@daveytea

based on the goals and constitution of the DAO, most likely very loose but directionally clear.

Yeah, 100%—I also think that thoughtfulness in their approach and a knack for self-starter behavior are characteristics I find personally exemplary in a delegate. Over time, it becomes fairly obvious whether someone is aligned with the goals and principles of the constitution—if not literally, then at least in spirit.

Still difficult to codify that, though! Things like this can always be left to interpretation… imho.

—

@daveytea

Back to the original proposal: I’m in support of low risk rapid experimentation as action will lead to learnings and improvements, even if none of the above discussions influence the design of proposed pilot.

Nice, let’s see how it all shakes out!

[accessor.eth]

@AvsA

If the pilot is successful future stewards could apply it retroactively, but it’s up to them.

If I am understanding. the pilot program would take 3 years to complete due to the proposed vesting schedule. After that, then the future stewards could make a decision?

I am curious if I will be included in any distribution at all.