[Temp Check] 2026 Endowment Investment Policy Update

We are introducing an updated investment policy statement and are requesting feedback.

Below is a forum-ready draft. Changes will be implemented into a final draft after feedback. The final version will be progressed to Snapshot for a social vote.


For Review: Updated Investment Policy Statement

1. Introduction

This Investment Policy Statement (‘IPS’) governs the management of the ENS Endowment Fund (the ‘Endowment’) by the appointed Endowment Manager on behalf of ENS DAO. It defines the investment objectives, risk parameters, constraints, and governance mechanisms within which the Endowment Manager operates, and serves as the primary reference for investment governance, financial planning, and accountability.

This IPS is set forth by ENS DAO and KPK to: define and assign the responsibilities of all parties; establish clear investment goals, objectives, and constraints; provide guidance and limitations to the Endowment Manager; establish a basis for evaluating performance; and ensure Endowment assets are managed to prudent standards consistent with the ENS Constitution.

2. Background

History of ENS

Founded in 2017, Ethereum Name Service (‘ENS’) is a distributed, open, and extensible naming system built on Ethereum, mapping human-readable names to machine-readable identifiers including Ethereum addresses, content hashes, and metadata. It is a core piece of Ethereum’s public infrastructure.

Purpose of ENS

As stated in the ENS DAO Constitution, ENS is a decentralised public good. Income generated by the ENS treasury must be used first to ensure the long-term viability of ENS, and second to fund continuing development of the ENS system.

History of the Endowment

The Endowment was first proposed in March 2022. KPK was selected as Endowment Manager in November 2022 (EP2.2.5), and the Endowment was formally established on March 7, 2023 with an initial 16,000 ETH tranche (EP3.4). A second tranche of 16,000 ETH followed in late 2023 (EP4.2) and a third tranche of 5,000 ETH was approved in late 2024 (EP6.2). Since inception, the Endowment has generated over $8M in DeFi returns net of fees with no loss of principal, currently holding approximately $93.4M in non-custodial AUM at ~99% capital utilisation[1].

3. Governance and Oversight

Responsibilities of ENS DAO

ENS DAO, through the Meta-Governance Working Group, is responsible for:

  • establishing and approving investment objectives and constraints via this IPS; formally adopting the IPS via Social Proposal;
  • reviewing Endowment performance at least annually;
  • communicating material changes affecting the Endowment;
  • and appointing or terminating the Endowment Manager.

Responsibilities of the Endowment Manager

KPK, as the established Endowment Manager, operates with discretion within the boundaries of this IPS. Responsibilities include:

  • investment strategy implementation;
  • monthly performance reporting via the governance forum and MetaGov meetings;
  • ongoing risk monitoring;
  • transparent communication with the DAO, including prompt disclosure of material changes;
  • contributing to IPS reviews;
  • ad hoc treasury support;
  • maintaining a publicly accessible real-time dashboard reflecting asset allocation, constraint compliance, and benchmark performance; and
  • executing routine funding transfers to the DAO timelock pursuant to the Zodiac module permission granted by the DAO, without requiring a separate governance proposal.

IPS Adoption and Amendment Process

This IPS is adopted by Social Proposal: a 5-day Snapshot vote with 1% quorum and simple majority. The same process applies to amendments. All amendments require a minimum 7-day forum discussion period, during which KPK must publish a written rationale for each change with explicit reference to any relaxation of a prior constraint.

IPS Review Schedule

The IPS should be reviewed annually by the Meta-Governance Working Group. Ad hoc reviews are triggered by:

  • proposed changes to any IPS constraint or guideline;
  • material changes to the DAO’s purpose, governance, or financial situation;
  • changes in liquidity needs or regulatory environment;
  • appointment of a new Endowment Manager; or
  • material underperformance relative to benchmark for two consecutive quarters under normal market conditions.

4. Investment Objectives

Primary and Secondary Objectives

The primary objective is long-term capital preservation and real return generation sufficient to support ENS’s operating expenses without eroding principal, insulating the DAO from economic fluctuations so it can continue core operations regardless of wider market conditions. The secondary objective is to grow the Endowment to a scale where ENS can rely primarily on investment income for sustainability.

  • Medium-term (0–5 years): capital growth and optimised deployment toward institutional-grade onchain strategies that enhance yield without compromising capital preservation, liquidity, or ENS’s values.
  • Long-term (5+ years): capital preservation as the dominant objective, with risk appetite shifting downward as the Endowment matures toward self-sustainability.

Principal Definition

The Endowment principal is the combined USD and ETH value held in the Endowment, reflecting ENS’s alignment with both Ethereum and operational stability. Under normal circumstances, principal must not be eroded.

Return Objective and Benchmark

The return objective is to outperform a 60/40 (ETH/USD) weighted average of onchain reference rates:

  • ETH Benchmark (60%): TVL-weighted average APY across the five largest staking vaults/pools ETH-denominated. Rebalanced bi-weekly.
  • USD Benchmark (40%): TVL-weighted average lending APY across the five largest Stablecoin vaults/pool positions. Rebalanced bi-weekly.

Each component uses a 30-day trailing average APY, recalculated on the first business day of each month. The ETH benchmark excludes centralised exchange products, consistent with Section 6 deployment constraints.

Earned and Unearned Income Treatment

Earned protocol income, meaning revenue ENS has already realised, is held in stablecoins so its value remains stable in dollar terms. Unearned income represents prepaid registrations and renewals that ENS is still obligated to service in future periods. This portion is held in ETH to retain ETH exposure, reflecting that it is a forward liability rather than fully realised treasury income.

Ecosystem Objective

(See Section 6 — Ecosystem Constraints.)

5. Risk Framework

Risk Tolerance

The DAO’s risk tolerance is moderate-to-low. Risk is defined as:

  1. the probability of failing to meet liquidity requirements or cash flow obligations; and
  2. the probability of losing principal.

The allocation framework is:

  • Low-risk (minimum 90%): strategies with established onchain track records (>12 months), audited contracts, high liquidity (redeemable within 7 days), and minimal counterparty concentration.
  • Moderate-risk (maximum 10%): strategies offering enhanced yield at the cost of higher complexity, lower liquidity, or elevated smart contract risk, but still onchain, non-speculative, and reversible within 30 days.

All moderate-risk positions must be disclosed in the monthly report with rationale and size.

Hard constraints:

  • no speculative trading (except ETH/stablecoin rebalancing);
  • no deployment in high-risk venues; and
  • ETH is classified as a low-risk asset.

Risk Categories

Risk Type Description Monitoring
Market Price volatility of held assets Daily mark-to-market; monthly drawdown report
Smart Contract Protocol failure or exploit Hypernative real-time alerts; war-room protocol; third-party audits for new strategies
Liquidity Inability to meet short-term obligations Weekly runway check against 3-year stablecoin floor
Governance Takeover or captured governance risk Security Council veto backstop; ongoing monitoring
Operational Day-to-day treasury execution errors Zodiac Roles Modifier v2 scoped permissions; multi-sig controls; execution security guidelines
Regulatory Legal or compliance changes, including stablecoin, DeFi, and DAO regulation across key jurisdictions. KPK flags material developments to Meta-Gov. Quarterly review; legal counsel as needed

6. Investment Guidelines and Constraints

Liquidity Constraint

Parameter Value
2025 operating expenses $16.4M (per Steakhouse financial reporting)[2]
Minimum Runway ~$49.34M (three years of operating expenses)
Runway review cadence Annually or at IPS revision using prior calendar year actuals
Runway priority Unconditional. Supersedes the 60/40 target in all circumstances

The runway is maintained across two layers. The Endowment holds stablecoins sufficient to meet the 3-year runway (~$49.34M), calculated at the Endowment level. The DAO timelock (wallet.ensdao.eth) separately maintains a 6-month operational USDC buffer funded by KPK quarterly as a routine operational action without requiring a governance proposal. The 3-year runway is not reduced by the timelock buffer.

Allowed Assets

  • Stablecoins: USDC, USDT, DAI, USDS, GHO, EURC. USDS is the primary deployment stablecoin; DAI is retained as a legacy position. Non-USD stablecoin exposure (EURC) is capped at 5% of total stablecoin allocation and reported separately.
  • ETH and LST equivalents: stETH, rETH, eETH, osETH, ETHx, WETH, OETH and (wrapped) equivalents.
  • Yield-bearing assets derived from the above (e.g. aUSDC, sDAI, cUSDC, sUSDS, sGHO).
  • Real-World Assets (see RWA Framework below).

Allowed Strategies

  • Lending and borrowing (established, foundational blue-chip, non-custodial protocols for low-risk allocation).
  • Liquidity provision (same-denominator pairs: stablecoin/stablecoin or ETH/LST).
  • Liquid staking.
  • Cash-and-carry trades (delta-neutral; ETH risk-neutral for unearned revenue positions).

Real-World Asset Framework

RWAs are permitted subject to all of the following constraints being satisfied simultaneously:

  • Maximum allocation: 5% of total Endowment value.
  • Instruments: tokenised money market funds or government bonds only. No real estate, private credit, or equity.
  • Custody: regulated, onchain tokenisation wrapper with full onchain redemption rights; no off-chain settlement.
  • Counterparty: regulated issuer in a FATF-compliant jurisdiction with public audit or attestation reports.
  • Liquidity: redeemable within 7 business days under normal conditions.
  • Disclosure: each RWA position reported as a distinct line item in monthly reports with issuer, instrument, jurisdiction, and redemption terms.

Ecosystem Constraints

  • LSD consensus threshold: The Endowment shall not allocate to any LSD protocol holding more than 20% of Ethereum validator consensus.
    • Exception: The Endowment may hold up to 10% of its entire portfolio in LSD protocols with majority DVT adoption, provided the protocol’s consensus share does not exceed 25%. This effectively allows a 5% buffer above the 20% limit for protocols meeting the DVT condition.
  • LSD decentralisation preference: Among LSTs below the threshold, the Endowment prefers protocols operating via permissionless node operators.
  • Permissioned provider cap: Total exposure to permissioned service providers shall not exceed 10% of total Endowment value.
  • CEX exclusion: ETH shall not be allocated to or via centralised exchanges under any circumstances.
  • Single protocol cap: No more than 30% of the Endowment may be deployed in any single protocol. Concentration reports are published monthly.
  • Chain restriction: All assets must be held and/or deployed on Ethereum mainnet only.
  • Non-custodial preference: The Endowment prioritises non-custodial, onchain mechanisms that allow administration of funds without the fund administrator having custody.
  • Delta neutrality: Unearned revenue incorporated into the Endowment is held in ETH to retain ETH exposure, consistent with the treatment in Section 4.

LSD Consensus Threshold Deviation

Protocols with majority DVT adoption may hold up to 10% of Endowment allocation as an exception, provided their consensus share does not exceed 25%. Above 25%, no allocation is permitted regardless of DVT status.

Bluechip Protocol Definition

KPK considers any protocol demonstrating sufficient liquidity depth and operational reliability to serve as foundational infrastructure as “blue-chip.”

Qualifying criteria:

  • deep onchain liquidity (>$50M) across trading venues sufficient for large positions without material slippage;
  • at least one professional security audit with no unresolved critical findings;
  • transparent governance and incident response history;
  • and demonstrated and strong operational track record.

Assessment is conducted at the market level, accounting for oracle design, liquidity depth, and protocol dependencies, not the underlying asset in isolation.

7. Asset Allocation and Rebalancing

Target Portfolio

Parameter Value
Target allocation 60% ETH / 40% stablecoins (by market value)
Minimum Runway Three year runway. ~$49.3M (2025 reference) across all ENS DAO wallets including the Endowment.
Runway Priorities Unconditional. Supersedes the 60/40 target. If the floor is at risk, KPK initiates rebalancing within approved timelines.

Rebalancing Rules

Parameter Value
Cadence Bi-weekly, to maintain the 60/40 target and stablecoin floor
Tranche size 1,500 ETH per rebalancing event
Emergency trigger If the stablecoin floor is breached or at material risk, KPK may execute off-cycle rebalancing up to 3,000 ETH per tranche.

Portfolio rebalancing is a portfolio management function distinct from the operational funding process. KPK evaluates the timelock’s USDC balance quarterly and transfers stablecoins from the Endowment to the timelock if the balance falls below the 6-month floor. These two processes operate independently.

Endowment Revenue

ENS protocol revenue flows directly from registrar controllers to the Endowment via the Registrar Manager contract (Treasury Flow Automation proposal). Up to 100% of protocol revenue routes to the Endowment, superseding the prior 33% transfer mechanism. KPK ensures incoming revenue is deployed in accordance with the target allocation and investment guidelines.

Withdrawal Guidelines

  • Minimum stablecoin runway: at least ~$49.3M (2025 reference) must be maintained at the Endowment level at all times. Withdrawals that would breach this floor require a separate DAO vote.
  • Preferred asset: withdrawals for operational expenses should be made in stablecoins. ETH liquidations should be avoided except where stablecoin reserves are insufficient.
  • Withdrawal sizing: individual withdrawals should cover a minimum of 6 months of projected expenses (~$8.2M at current H1 2026 run-rate) to reduce governance overhead.
  • Rebalancing: following any single withdrawal to timelock, KPK shall assess and where necessary restore the 60/40 target allocation.
  • Withdrawal authority: directed by the Meta-Governance Working Group and executed by KPK. Routine quarterly timelock top-ups are executed by KPK without a separate proposal. Meta-Gov shall not direct an execution that would breach any IPS constraint or DAO mandate unless resolved by a DAO vote.

8. Reporting and Performance Review

Reporting Requirements

Report Cadence Contents
Monthly performance report Monthly, via governance forum and MetaGov meeting Portfolio NAV, benchmark comparison, strategy allocation, and constraint compliance across key parameters including LSD consensus exposure, protocol concentration, RWA exposure, and permissioned provider percentage. Flags any moderate-risk positions and outlines upcoming rebalancing actions. Content flexible based on DAO feedback/request.
Annual strategic review Annually Market analysis, DAO financial position, benchmark methodology review, proposed IPS amendments, operating expense projection for floor update
Dashboard Continuous (Daily Report) On-chain portfolio tracker showing current asset allocation versus target, stablecoin floor status, DeFi position exposure by protocol, and period-over-period performance

Performance Review

The DAO evaluates Endowment performance over a one-year rolling period against: net return relative to the 60/40 benchmark; capital preservation; constraint compliance; and reporting and communication obligations. The DAO reserves the right to terminate the Endowment Manager at any time, including for: net performance materially below benchmark for two consecutive quarters without adequate justification; breach of any IPS constraint; or failure to meet reporting requirements.

Termination and Transition

(Termination authority resides with ENS DAO per Section 3. Transition procedures to be defined upon appointment of a successor.)

9. Key Definitions

Term Definition
Endowment The ENS Endowment Fund managed by KPK on behalf of ENS DAO (endowment.ensdao.eth)
Principal The combined USD and ETH value held in the Endowment, on a dual-denomination basis
Low-risk strategy Onchain strategy with >12 months track record, audited contracts, liquidity redeemable within 7 days, and no novel mechanisms
Moderate-risk strategy Onchain strategy exceeding one or more low-risk thresholds but non-speculative and reversible within 30 days. Maximum 10% of Endowment.
LSD / LST Liquid Staking Derivative / Token: tokenised staked ETH (e.g. stETH, rETH, eETH)
DVT Distributed Validator Technology: decentralises validator key management, reducing single-point-of-failure risk for LSD protocols
RWA Real-World Asset: tokenised traditional financial instrument, governed by Section 6 RWA Framework
60/40 Target Target portfolio: 60% ETH and LST equivalents / 40% stablecoins by market value, subject to the stablecoin floor constraint
Timelock ENS DAO governance timelock (wallet.ensdao.eth) holds the 6-month operational USDC buffer
Registrar Manager Permissionless contract routing registrar controller revenue directly to the Endowment (Treasury Flow Automation proposal)
Normal market conditions Periods when major crypto markets are functioning without unusual stress. Conditions considered abnormal or under strain include a sharp decline in ETH or BTC, a stablecoin losing its peg, or material difficulty buying, selling, or redeeming the assets the Endowment holds.

10. Adoption

This IPS is adopted by ENS DAO via Social Proposal in accordance with the governance process. Upon adoption, it supersedes the previous Investment Policy Statement from 2025. The final version will be uploaded to Pinata and Github.

Footnotes

  1. Syncrone - DeFi Portfolio Intelligence :right_arrow_curving_left:
  2. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PZ7sIOHovNfN6trzzq7qzHUUDC8-jCQQ/edit


  1. Syncrone - DeFi Portfolio Intelligence ↩︎

  2. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PZ7sIOHovNfN6trzzq7qzHUUDC8-jCQQ/edit ↩︎

1 Like

Summary of Changes

Below is a summary of the substantive changes.

Liquidity Floor: UPDATED
Stablecoin runway raised from ~$26.7M (2023 actuals) to ~$49.34M (2025 actuals). This formalises a two-layer structure: the Endowment holds the 3-year floor; the DAO timelock holds a separate 6-month buffer funded quarterly by KPK without a governance proposal. The 3-year floor is not reduced by the timelock buffer.

Risk Tolerance: UPDATED
Changed from “very low” (low-risk venues only) to “moderate-to-low” with a formal two-tier framework: minimum 90% low-risk, maximum 10% moderate-risk. Moderate-risk is defined as non-speculative, reversible within 30 days, and must be disclosed monthly with rationale and size.

Benchmark Methodology: UPDATED
Replaced the fixed simple average of four named protocols with a TVL-weighted average APY across the five largest staking vaults/pools (ETH) and five largest stablecoin vault positions (USD), rebalanced bi-weekly on a 30-day trailing average.

Allowed Assets: EXPANDED
Added USDS (primary deployment stablecoin), GHO, EURC (capped at 5% of stablecoin allocation), oETH, and yield-bearing derivatives (aUSDC, sDAI, cUSDC, sUSDS, sGHO). DAI retained as a legacy position.

Real-World Asset Framework: NEW
RWA exposure permitted up to 5% of total Endowment value. Limited to tokenised money market funds and government bonds. Requires onchain custody with full onchain redemption rights, regulated issuer in a FATF-compliant jurisdiction, and liquidity redeemable within 7 business days.

Endowment Revenue Routing: UPDATED
Replaced the 33% ENS Controller cash flow transfer with up to 100% of protocol revenue routing directly to the Endowment via the Registrar Manager contract. This reflects changes made by [Executable] Treasury Flow Automation.

Single Protocol Cap: UPDATED
Raised from 25% to 30%.

Rebalancing Tranche Size: UPDATED
Standard tranche raised from 1,000 ETH to 1,500 ETH. Emergency tranche of up to 3,000 ETH added for situations where the stablecoin floor is breached or at material risk.

DVT Exception: NEW (See Critical Questions Below)
Up to 10% of the total portfolio may be allocated to LSD protocols with majority DVT adoption, provided consensus share does not exceed 25%. Above 25%, no allocation is permitted regardless of DVT status. This is a buffer that was not provisioned in previous verson


Critical Questions

Below is a list of critical questions where DAO feedback is appreciated.

1) Lido/LSD consensus

The IPS currently prohibits allocation to any LSD protocol above 20% of Ethereum validator consensus. Following the rsETH incident, KPK is looking to expand low-risk ETH staking allocations and is proposing a narrow exception for protocols with majority DVT adoption.

Q1: Should the IPS permit allocation to LSD protocols up to 10% of total portfolio, provided their consensus share does not exceed 25%?

2) Unearned/Earned Income

The Original RFC specifies treating earned and unearned income differently. These funds are now generally co-mingled and only separated on an accounting basis. With the current 60/40 ETH/stables mandate, the unearned liability is contained within the stablecoin leg and remains ETH-neutral. According to Steakhouse reporting, unearned liability is ~8500 ETH or $19.3M USD at current prices.

• Q3: Are you comfortable containing unearned income within the stablecoin leg of the endowment, or should the unearned income requirement be treated as a separate obligation on top of the stablecoin allocation? The latter would stress the 60/40 split.

3) Priorities Further

We have three requirements: a three-year stables runway, unearned income reserves, and a 60/40 ETH/Stablecoin composition target.

Q3: How should we prioritize among the three-year stables runway, 60/40 split, and unearned income reserves when they conflict?

2 Likes

where can we see realized APR of the endowment as well as how the realized APR tracks against the benchmark?

the datastudio results ENS Endowment Report v1.0 are confusing (e.g. when i click Jan 1, 2026 to May 17, 2026) and the capital amount is clearly wrong. the syncrone doesn’t seem very helpful for performance attribution data points.

1 Like

@Jimo our reporting partner @Steakhouse has a dashboard available here: https://dune.com/steakhouse/ens-kpk-yields

It seems prudent to err on the side of caution when trading operational convenience for resilience.

My vote is to stick to mandate discipline by ring-fencing unearned income as a separate obligation, even if that introduces pressure on the 60/40 split.

Hello all, Juan Montoni here. Glad to be here again sharing some thoughts!

The Key Definitions section is excellent. That was actually one of the comments I made last time.([RFC] Target Allocations for Endowment - #2 by Juan.Montoni)

I believe it would be great to include a definition of “normal market conditions” here:

“IPS Review Schedule: material underperformance relative to benchmark for two consecutive quarters under normal market conditions.”

If the market remains stable for one year from where we are today, does the current environment become a normal market condition? Or not? In other words, are “normal market conditions” defined by a variation from a pre defined state in the Key Definitions section, or by some delta from the current market environment?

That is my point here. I think it is worth raising this question and letting the group decide how explicit the definition should be.

Q1: Should the IPS permit allocation to LSD protocols up to 10% of total portfolio, provided their consensus share does not exceed 25%?

I believe so.

My view is that, in crypto, diversification is not directly equivalent to risk reduction. Diluting capital across crypto assets has a different impact than diluting capital across traditional financial assets. Even though much of crypto depends on a relatively small number of core players, diversification in crypto can expose the portfolio to a broader set of direct and indirect agents. In some cases, that can increase risk instead of reducing it.

Q2: Are you comfortable containing unearned income within the stablecoin leg of the endowment, or should the unearned income requirement be treated as a separate obligation on top of the stablecoin allocation? The latter would stress the 60/40 split.

I believe it would be more prudent for the unearned income requirement to be treated as a separate obligation on top of the stablecoin allocation. The Endowment is already extremely diligent, careful, and conservative in managing capital that has already been earned. However, unearned income should not carry the same risk profile as capital that is already considered ENS or Endowment capital. The obligations tied to that capital have not yet been fulfilled. For that reason, I believe it should accept even less risk than earned capital.

Q3: How should we prioritize among the three-year stables runway, 60/40 split, and unearned income reserves when they conflict?

I believe unearned income should always come first.

That capital does not fully belong to the Endowment yet. In a strict sense, it does not fully belong to ENS either. It is, theoretically, user balance paid in advance and temporarily held by the project. In an extreme case, that capital would be necessary to deliver a pending service that ENS has already agreed to provide.

After that, the priority should be the runway. The health of the operation should come before the 60/40 allocation. The 60/40 split is only a framework to efficiently manage and preserve capital that has already been earned from past operations.

So my priority order would be:

Customer balances > Operating runway > Management of already earned capital

Finally, I want to leave two additional questions.

I understand why ETH is the only speculative asset and directional position held in the Endowment. ETH is aligned with the ENS vision and purpose, it is the home of the project, and there are several reasons why it makes sense.

Q1: I would like to raise the question of whether there should be room for BTC in the Endowment. Has this already been considered?

If it has, given the current crypto and global market environment, would it be prudent to reopen the discussion around allocating some space to this ecosystem agnostic asset within the Endowment, even if only as a small allocation?

Q2: “Ecosystem Constraints: Chain restriction: All assets must be held and/or deployed on Ethereum mainnet only.”

Would exposure to networks that have an exit path back to L1 also be excluded?

To me, exposure under those conditions does not necessarily fall outside the idea of being Ethereum aligned. Depending on the opportunity, it may give the Endowment more tools to do its job. There are already other rules in the mandate that restrict speculative positions, define exposure limits, and establish risk parameters.

If those rules are not violated, I believe this could be an opportunity, even with a maximum allocation of 5%, similar to what was proposed for RWA. In my view, RWA seems riskier than this. For example, with Lighter, users can exit to L1 through a ZK proof.

2 Likes

Thanks, @Juan.Montoni

Market Conditions Definition

Your point about a definition of Normal Market Conditions is valid.

We can include in the Key Definitions section something to the effect of:

Normal market conditions: Periods when major crypto markets are working normally, without unusual stress. Conditions that may be considered abnormal or when markets are clearly under strain include a sharp drop in ETH or BTC, a stablecoin losing its peg, or trouble buying, selling, or cashing out the assets the Endowment holds.

Unearned Income

We tend to agree with the conservative approach you suggest, however this is constraining.

At the close of May the total endowment value was 87M and the current mandate requires:

  • Three years of runway. (~$49.34M based on prior year accounting reports)
  • Unearned income ETH-neutral. (~$17.3M USD at ETH price on May 31st, down from the $19.3M quoted at the time of the original post)
  • 60/40 ETH to stablecoin split.

If the stablecoin leg needs to hold both runway and all unearned income ETH-neutral, that would put the split well beyond the 60/40 mandate. It would also pressure selling ETH at current market lows.

Another option, and our initial recommendation, is to put unearned income into two buckets similar to runway:

  • Current Portion defined as the near-term (3-year) liability kept in stables and ETH-neutral. The total is approximately ~4812.74 ETH (~$9.6M).
  • Long-term Portion defined as the remainder of unearned liability extending from three years and beyond, which remains exposed to ETH. The total is approximately ~3837.39 ETH.

This is a less conservative approach, but maintains a plan to conserve treasury for future services, while reducing pressure to rebalance at a market low.

Our recommendation from a capital-preservation standpoint is to avoid selling ETH at current levels, but how to treat customer balances is an operational and accounting decision about the DAO’s commitment to name owners, and not specifically an investment decision. It would be helpful to have direction from meta-governance or large delegate on this point.

BTC and L2 Exposure (Q1/Q2)

There is at least some indirect exposure to cbBTC and WBTC as collateral assets on the underlying markets of the Endowment’s Morpho positions.

Opening up the mandate to allow primary exposure to these wrapped or collateral assets could is worth evaluating, particularly if they are outperforming what is currently mandated.

This can be done with constraints such as % allocation caps, but feedback on this from delegates would be similarly helpful as the current exclusion seems rooted in ecosystem alignment.

The same guidance goes for L2 exposure, although we believe the risk surface area differs greatly (bridge assumptions, proof systems, sequencer liveness). That belongs in its own framework rather than folded in here.

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If it’s kept in stables, how is it ETH-neutral? It seems like you are reversing these; “ETH Neutral” and “exposed to ETH” should be synonymous.

Thanks, @nick.eth! You’re right, those are reversed. This resolves our concern, and we’ll fix it in the final draft. Appreciate the read.

Thank you for the feedback during the temp check. We’ve folded in the points raised and are moving the IPS to a Snapshot social vote today.

Summary of what changed since the draft:

  • Earned and unearned income (Section 4): clarified the wording. Earned income is held in stablecoins; unearned income is held in ETH to retain ETH exposure, reflecting that it is a forward liability rather than realised income. This resolves the labeling point @nick.eth flagged.
  • Normal market conditions: added a definition to Section 9, per @Juan.Montoni request, so the term is explicit wherever it appears.

BTC, L2s, and alt L1s: these came up in discussions here and the meta-governance calls, but are not part of this revision. The existing ETH-alignment and Ethereum mainnet-only constraints are unchanged. Rather than fold them into this vote, we plan to run dedicated discussions or Snapshot votes on each of these exposures and, where there is delegate support, add them to the IPS as an addendum at a later date.

These are clarifications and do not alter the mandate. The 60/40 target, the runway floor, and all risk and allocation limits are unchanged from the draft reviewed here.

cc: @Meta-Gov_Stewards

2 Likes

That’s a great opportunity to discuss larger changes. Otherwise we’ll keep hearing from delegates that “yield is low” without properly weighing the tradeoffs. This is a once-a-year revision, so I encourage delegates to engage now, and I’ll ping them in DMs. The IPS doesn’t change often and takes some effort to discuss.

I often hear delegates complain about the yield. We can’t keep doing the same thing and expect different results, so we need to try other options and find opportunities with a similar risk profile. As @slobo.eth highlighted in today’s metagov call, this is an endowment, so its main goal should remain capital preservation.

If the plans is to have these discussions in a later date, could we have some commitments on when?


Some ideas:

1. Sell options
We need to rebalance depending on the ETH price anyway, so we can use that constraint as a yield generator. This strategy has produced strong results for other DAOs like Arbitrum, where it ran on 15% of the portfolio while generating 45% of total returns. We also have onchain protocols that mitigate counterparty risk, like Rysk.

2. Protocol-Owned Liquidity
Provide liquidity on the ETH/ENS pair on Uniswap V3. This has proven to be a good strategy for other DAOs and tokens. It expands how much treasury we can allocate, more yield and liquidity for the token.

3. DAO-owned staking
The DAO staking ETH directly is an interesting idea, and we’d be one of the first to do it. It’s not very practical to set up, but we could get better yield and also act as node operators for other protocols (Lido, Rocket Pool).

4. Real-World Assets (RWA)
Tokenized RWAs like short-term treasuries might actually be lower risk than most DeFi strategies, while offering higher yields at the moment. This fits the USD side of the endowment well, and the space has matured a lot, with established options from BlackRock (BUIDL), Ondo, and others.

I personally see options 1, 2 and 4 as low-hanging fruit with high impact. Option 3 is worth discussing, but it’s harder to set up, so I lean towards it not being worth it.

Opportunity raised by kpk in today’s call:

USDC allocation in Morpho Vaults on Arc (another L1), offered by Circle itself, yielding at least 8% APY. This sits on the lower end of DeFi risk, similar to what we have today, since we already enabled Morpho for the endowment. The main risk added here is operational, since the DAO can’t hold custody of the assets crosschain. My main question is how custody would work and what the liability is. The extra yield comes mainly from incentives.

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Of these ideas, which involve the least amount of operational risk? RWAs, probably.

  • Sell options sounds a bit involved — what is the level of effort?
  • DAO-owned staking: very interesting, but it probably needs a lot of hand-holding.
  • Gauntlet reads like it offers a turnkey solution for DAO-serviced liquidity (PoL), but introduces counterparty risk, no?

Crosschain risk is smart contract risk. The DAO would have to feel comfortable losing whatever amount allocated to the Morpho Vault on Arc. That is, of course, unless we could spec out the architecture first — or better yet, if there’s an existing reference implementation we can point to.

Great ideas @netto.eth — wouldn’t have thought of these myself, at least not in this context.