I feel like I should elaborate on my support for this proposal.
A. Single Working Group Nomination Rule
I support this one because it emphasizes focused stewardship and prevents the over-concentration of responsibilities within the DAO. By limiting individuals to one working group nomination, the rule encourages specialization, ensuring stewards can dedicate their full attention to their designated roles.
I’m more in favour of having specialized individuals fully focused and dedicated to one area of expertise, in which they continuously grow and improve. However, as Nick mentioned, if someone is working full-time without other commitments, this rule might impose unnecessary restrictions. That scenario could be addressed separately by adding an exception to the rule if needed. I’m not sure if this has happened before or is worth addressing, so I lean toward supporting this as it is.
B. Diversity in Stewardship Rule
Also in favour of this one.
Besides promoting inclusion, decentralization, communicating openness, and inviting new members, while at the same time decreasing the risk of concentration of influence as Netto said, this would also ensure an increase in the candidate pool by at least one new member each term.
Without rotating, we potentially risk complacency and centralization of power and influence as mentioned. If it did happen, it could stifle innovation, experimentation, and progress, and it further discourages anyone else from participating if there’s a perception that the same people are chosen repeatedly. Maybe the worst case here is instead of rotating 3 people, we’re rotating 4-5. Potentially big upside, with no downside, due to the 50% (500k ENS tokens) quorum ensuring quality candidates.
But as Nick said, it’s also very important to honor the democratic process of voting and not infringe on Delegate rights—and it’s a very good argument! So I guess it’s a tradeoff. However, since DAOs live on the promise of having better governance procedures than those in the real world, and simply being better, due to codifying rules that ensure we abide by the values we aim to represent, so I’m in support of this amendment.
C. Role Exclusivity
In support of this. Somewhat similar arguments as with the point A from above.
Another reason I support limiting time and focus to a single working group or a single role is because our industry is evolving, and getting bigger and more complex at a staggering pace. It’s better to specialize and excel in one area than to know a little from multiple ones. To learn, grow, and meaningfully contribute, you have to keep up with all the research and innovations happening around the DAO space, concerning: funding mechanisms, developer incentives, community building, improving delegate participation, compensation structures, user/builder retention, and other ideas and innovations.
All of which I would like to see continue to happen (and more) in ENS DAO. Led by an example of what’s been going on with the MetaGov Working Group and innovations and experiments like Service Provider Stream, efficient endowment/treasury management, Multi-delegate contract for decentralizing voting power among delegates, etc. I believe this amendment is one small step towards specialization and stewards performing better long term and making the DAO and the protocol better as a whole.
D. Conflict of Interest
In support here too.
E. DAO Confirmation of Compensation Structures
In support of this.
Notes
I like AvsA’s framework for thinking here. If we want this to be a company, then we’re doing a good job. If we want it to be a DAO, then we might want to reexamine some things. There are good arguments to be made for pursuing one or the other. I’m ok with both. But all of my arguments above are based on thinking that we want to run this as a DAO.
I would support the argument for point B (not big enough talent pool) if we didn’t have more than 3 applications for steward positions for the previous 3-4 terms but we do. This is easy to check.