Well, there is no point in having elections then, is there?
A lot of Steward take pride in the fact, they’ve been reelected so many years, but if elections are not meaningful what’s the point of all this stuff?
P.S. If that’s the case, then the only point of newcomers is to legitimize current stewards via election procedure which is rigged against newcomers anyway. It only follows that it’s not really a DAO then.
I feel like I should elaborate on my support for this proposal.
I support this one because it emphasizes focused stewardship and prevents the over-concentration of responsibilities within the DAO. By limiting individuals to one working group nomination, the rule encourages specialization, ensuring stewards can dedicate their full attention to their designated roles.
I’m more in favour of having specialized individuals fully focused and dedicated to one area of expertise, in which they continuously grow and improve. However, as Nick mentioned, if someone is working full-time without other commitments, this rule might impose unnecessary restrictions. That scenario could be addressed separately by adding an exception to the rule if needed. I’m not sure if this has happened before or is worth addressing, so I lean toward supporting this as it is.
Also in favour of this one.
Besides promoting inclusion, decentralization, communicating openness, and inviting new members, while at the same time decreasing the risk of concentration of influence as Netto said, this would also ensure an increase in the candidate pool by at least one new member each term.
Without rotating, we potentially risk complacency and centralization of power and influence as mentioned. If it did happen, it could stifle innovation, experimentation, and progress, and it further discourages anyone else from participating if there’s a perception that the same people are chosen repeatedly. Maybe the worst case here is instead of rotating 3 people, we’re rotating 4-5. Potentially big upside, with no downside, due to the 50% (500k ENS tokens) quorum ensuring quality candidates.
But as Nick said, it’s also very important to honor the democratic process of voting and not infringe on Delegate rights—and it’s a very good argument! So I guess it’s a tradeoff. However, since DAOs live on the promise of having better governance procedures than those in the real world, and simply being better, due to codifying rules that ensure we abide by the values we aim to represent, so I’m in support of this amendment.
In support of this. Somewhat similar arguments as with the point A from above.
Another reason I support limiting time and focus to a single working group or a single role is because our industry is evolving, and getting bigger and more complex at a staggering pace. It’s better to specialize and excel in one area than to know a little from multiple ones. To learn, grow, and meaningfully contribute, you have to keep up with all the research and innovations happening around the DAO space, concerning: funding mechanisms, developer incentives, community building, improving delegate participation, compensation structures, user/builder retention, and other ideas and innovations.
All of which I would like to see continue to happen (and more) in ENS DAO. Led by an example of what’s been going on with the MetaGov Working Group and innovations and experiments like Service Provider Stream, efficient endowment/treasury management, Multi-delegate contract for decentralizing voting power among delegates, etc. I believe this amendment is one small step towards specialization and stewards performing better long term and making the DAO and the protocol better as a whole.
In support here too.
In support of this.
I like AvsA’s framework for thinking here. If we want this to be a company, then we’re doing a good job. If we want it to be a DAO, then we might want to reexamine some things. There are good arguments to be made for pursuing one or the other. I’m ok with both. But all of my arguments above are based on thinking that we want to run this as a DAO.
I would support the argument for point B (not big enough talent pool) if we didn’t have more than 3 applications for steward positions for the previous 3-4 terms but we do. This is easy to check.
Does it, though? Nobody qualified for the role is likely to be prepared to work full-time for a steward’s stipend alone, which means they will be doing other work besides. Would it really be better that they’re doing some other, unrelated job, rather than a second steward role?
If we expect stewards to be full-time professionals, we should pay accordingly. If we don’t, we shouldn’t exclude them from other roles inside the DAO; preventing our most enthusiastic contributors from contributing more of their time seems perverse.
I’n not following - how would this ensure an increase in the candidate pool?
Full attention, not full time.
To elaborate. After 2-3 years now of being here, I know a lot about ENS, but I still believe that doesn’t make me qualified to be a steward for MetaGov or a Public Goods working group. No matter how enthusiastic and willing I am to contribute. But Ecosystem steward, sure. I decided long ago that’s the only group I want to focus on even though I follow and read everything about ENS and other DAOs, not just the ecosystem part. And because I do other stuff I limited my focus to one working group. I’m not saying one person can’t do two steward positions equally well, I’m saying it’s better to have 1) people specializing, and 2) more people involved (2 people, 2 jobs, instead of 1 person, 2 jobs).
I think this is a misunderstanding. If they want to do two roles full-time, as I said in that case we could add an exception to rules A and C. That is how I understood your comment from above: “someone who wanted to work full-time for the DAO could likely take on two steward positions and do them both competently”, and I agree.
Agree. I wouldn’t be against people nominating themselves for multiple roles, which could change my view on Point A, but would still be in favour of Point C) Role Exclusivity. That way, this doesn’t exclude them from running for multiple roles, it excludes them from getting elected for multiple roles at the same time.
From what I can see here, and might be the root of the small-talent-pool problem, the perceived problems are 1) discouraged people from participating and 2) the same people chosen repeatedly (if we’re a DAO as AvsA said). If addressed, they’ll lead to an increase in the candidate pool. I think this amendment helps with that by requiring third-spot rotation if repeating steward.
I still don’t really follow this argument. It’s effectively saying we want part-time contributors only. Wouldn’t it be better for our most talented and aligned contributors to be able to work full-time for the DAO, if they’re qualified, able, and wanted?
But why enact a rule only to then make exceptions to it? It seems like the cure is worse than the disease.
I would want to see some solid evidence that there are qualified individuals who are declining to nominate themselves because of this before assuming it’s true. So far all I’ve seen is hypothesizing, which seems like a poor way to make a rule.
Re: CoC
Just want to restate my original suggestion from 2022 regarding a CoC, Bylaws, and other legal agreements.
Memorializing something as a stopgap is certainly better than nothing, and/or inconsistent rules made on an ad hoc basis. However, this CoC really is just as stopgap and a more encompassing CoC should be drafted by an independent and impartial professional.
As Slobo stated, there are and will be ambiguities. No matter how well drafted a CoC is, this will be true, it’s not a matter of if but when. While a CoC should obviously provide clear guidance and be as unambiguous as possible, on a case by case basis the CoC will need to be applied to actual sets of facts. That is a feature of governance documentation not a bug. Slobo asked the right question, who will make these interpretations? Who will be responsible for applying the CoC to a specific set of facts as guidance or even a formal ruling? Failing to plan for this inevitability is planning to fail.
In part, this is why my 2022 post included the suggestion of a legal subgroup. As the DAO has evolved and matured the need for an internal legal subgroup continues to grow more apparent and necessary. By no means exhaustive the responsibilities of this subgroup would include drafting, maintaining and interpreting DAO governance documentation under the MetaGov WG.
I’m hopeful the MG WG sees the value in having a subgroup of professionals with experience in these matters to assist in carrying out these important duties and the WG advocates for this longer term solution.
As a steward who works full-time for the DAO, I don’t think it’s necessary to hold two steward seats at the same time, but it would be pretty rad, and I don’t see why we should stop anyone from doing it.
The only concern might be that a steward with roles in different Working Groups could end up having signing ability on more than one multi-sig.
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Counter-rationale:
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I guess it depends on what kind of talent the Steward role should optimize to attract. Because if we’re talking about dev talent alone, I think there’s a lot of comptent and talented people in the community that could also be a steward.
But I also think that Working Groups can experiment with creating roles within their own group, similar to how @danch.quixote has been engaged by Meta-Governance stewards to develop and maintain the ENS Ledger—it’s not an official role, but its implicit in the relationship and exchange with the contributor.
Informal or implicit arrangements can be effective in enabling contributors to take on meaningful work.
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This is super arbitrary and discouraging for prospective stewards. You mean to say that even if a steward is ranked higher than their peer, they may not secure the role due to this ruleset? This also undermines the ‘will of the delegates’, don’t you think?
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Second all the above. We should be asking ourselves why the DAO is not able to provide more opportunity outside of Stewardship that may be attractive enough for a current steward to consider it instead.
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Again, I think the bigger concern is of having a concentration of single signer across different multisigs. I personally never have been suspect of our secretary/steward limes.eth to take advantage of this concentration, but not every DAO is lucky to have such a good cohort of value-aligned and ethical contributors!
We should think of alternatives to this structural governance risk, nonetheless.
I am for this but it’s not necessary to make this a part of Working Group rule amendments.
I really like the above-mentioned idea as an initial framework for codifying a Code of Conduct. I prefer that Meta-Governance includes this as a separate initiative in Term 6, alongside the Bylaws.
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I don’t think this task should be prescribed to a single individual. Instead, discussions should take place within the Meta-Governance precinct and be driven as a bottom-up initiative.
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That’s putting the cart before the horse. Let’s first figure out how to formally establish a process for creating a satisfactory and robust Code of Conduct. I think the DAO is due for some discussion wrt to this.
We already took the first step with EP 5.18! Codifying it in the Working Group rules is a must and tbf I think this is the only amendment we should consider.
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Thanks, @alextnetto.eth, for starting this discussion. I’m proud that the community has managed to navigate this difficult conversation while maintaining a modicum of respect for one another.
They’re out there! We just need to do a better job of attracting and retaining the talent by offering more opportunity :] In my tenure as steward, I’ve met a handful of talented professionals who would kill it as a steward tbqf.
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Crazy idea, I love it. OR, encourage Working Groups to experiment with creating new roles within existing groups.
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Does the steward role have to be the only path for this to happen? The DAO could consider alternatives, couldn’t it?
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Note: Pardon the double reply, just had to get some thoughts off!
We’re too close to this year’s election process to change the steward structures or operations for Term 6 easily, so Amendments A, B, C, and E would likely only take effect for Term 7 (2026).
However, I believe there is a current need for the clarity that Amendment D brings to the voting and decision processes.
These are all excellent discussions to have, and I thank @alextnetto.eth for initiating this important conversation about our governance evolution.
I agree here, but for pragmatic reasons. I believe it’s in the best interests of the DAO to have a unique individual in each of the steward seats to further diverse perspectives in our governance.
While bringing fresh perspectives into stewardship is important for the DAO’s health, I’d rather not make a change this significant without a clear need.
We should certainly monitor for signs of unhealthy entrenchment or concentration of power among stewards, but I don’t see enough evidence of this yet to warrant mandating the rotation.
I agree here for purely technical and procedural reasons.
I’ve always believed that the steward role alone shouldn’t be a full time job for an individual, and that stewards could also be paid contributors to the DAO fulfilling other duties. @estmcmxci demonstrates this well, serving both as a steward and taking responsibility for the Newsletter and DAO socials. I viewed the secretary position similarly, as a DAO contributor role that could be held by a steward who wanted to contribute more. @Limes has served in this dual capacity flawlessly during Term 5.
Only recently have I changed my belief about the secretary role requiring a unique individual, for two key reasons:
First, the secretary is a signer on all three Working Group multisigs. That alone necessitates some accommodation. A single person shouldn’t be two of the signatures on a multisig transaction. (I’ll note that there are solutions to this other than making the role independent)
Second, and more importantly, I’d like to see the Secretary role evolve into something larger than it is today by expanding on the quarterly financial reporting that @Limes has pioneered. I envision the Secretary role becoming the official source of DAO financial reporting and a true check and balance on Working Group spending by providing independent accountability and oversight. For this evolution to occur effectively, we’d need the role to be held by someone separate and distinct from the 9 stewards.
This amendment was initially drafted as a “should abstain when” statement to provide clarity on when stewards should abstain from voting.
It addresses a real issue that emerged within the steward body this year, where some delegates raised concerns about potential “self-dealing” in votes where stewards didn’t abstain. This Amendment aims to clarify when stewards should abstain, establishing clear guidelines for abstentions that protect both the DAO’s interests and stewards from ambiguous situations.
This was not intended to be a fully defined Code of Conduct with formal adjudicators and penalties - that will require much more extensive development. Rather, an amendment like this could provide necessary guidance about when it’s appropriate for stewards to vote and when they should abstain.
This amendment is straightforward and provides needed transparency and community input into compensation structures.
Everyone who’s commented on this thread acknowledges that a conflict of interest rule or a pledge by the stewards is needed. For those that don’t agree with the wording in Amendment D above, can we work together to find something that we can agree on?
I’d especially like to hear from @lefterisjp given his previous strong interest in this topic.
I agree with you, and I agree with this immediate stopgap approach from Alex’s proposal for a CoI, I just wanted to acknowledge some of the objections I saw were reasonable and should eventually be addressed, but perfect should not be the enemy of good (progress).
To quote myself from the 2022 post:
I think the Alex’s proposed verbiage is fine, though I’ll provide a potential alternative for consideration. In my own quote above I reference the Musk/Tesla/Solar City lawsuit, to put that in perspective there is a 106 page decision which includes, among other issues, conflict of interest and bad-faith (which includes self-dealing). It’s difficult to reduce down but taking 1 part of the Conflict of Interest legal test and 1 part of the Bad-faith legal test:
"Stewards are required to abstain from any decision-making processes, including voting, within a working group when:
They have a personal or financial interest in the transaction, decision, or vote; or
Their actions could reasonably be perceived as motivated by personal gain or self-dealing, rather than their duty to act in the best interests of the ENS DAO."
A. Single Working Group Nomination Rule
Yes. Good. We will end up with more diversity in roles.
B. Diversity in Stewardship Rule
I get the idea but not sure about the implementation here.
When would it be triggered? As the snapshot evolves? Or at nomination? I would hope for the rotation to just happen naturally after a number of terms?
We need new faces but also shouldn’t force good contributors out.
C. Role Exclusivity
Yes. Good.
But reading A, B and C combined they all have the same intention which is good but add multiple problems.
We need to also be careful to not paralyze the DAO by making it hard for people to focus on roles and work for the DAO.
A balance is needed. Perhaps we can recodify A, B and C to express the desired outcome without making it too restrictive that it would paralyze the DAO and its most active contributors?
That said, there was a talk about DAOs vs company. A DAO is not a company. If you guys wanted a company you should have just kept ENSLabs and manage it like a company. That’s what I would have done. I am quite bearish on DAOs as you know. But now we are here …
DAOs are messy and need new blood and have complicated governance structures. One common complaint I have heard from people who work with the ENS DAO is that it’s not easy to get involved and the DAO is run by the same people loosely affiliated with ENSLabs.
To work towards fixing that A, B and C should be somehow implemented. But the wording needs thinking. Perhaps think on what it is we want to achieve:
And then figure out rules that will help achieve that?
D. Conflict of Interest
Yes. Finally. This is extremely important to not be seen as a joke of a DAO. People voting to pay themselves. Multiple people have already been doing this abstaining voluntarily. Let’s make it a rule.
But clarification on what can be seen a a CoI should be there as to avoid misunderstandings. The current wording is indeed a bit too broad.
E. DAO Confirmation of Compensation Structures
I guess okay. More details and transparency is always good.
I would probably support A, B, D, E.
How many of the current 9 stewards work full-time (8 hours per day) in their steward positions? Per my suggestion, the exception for allowing 1 person to hold multiple roles would be applied if people were to dedicate (sign contracts) to a full-time commitment (essentially like an employee). And it’s my understanding that no one right now is full-time committed to being a steward, and everyone has other things they do - full-time jobs, running companies, service providers, other DAOs roles, delegations, contributions, etc. Nor it should be because steward roles don’t necessarily require full-time engagement. I always looked at this position as something like a focused and dedicated contributor with certain obligations and responsibilities. Making it less than a full-time employee and more than an average contributor. And all my comments are made under this assumption, that no one works full-time in these roles. But since I’ve never been a steward, I could be wrong though.
- An individual may nominate themselves for only one working group per term, replacing the previous two-working-group limit.
- This constraint will also prevent a sitting steward from nominating themselves in a midterm election.
Against, but with suggestion.
Although we have seen applicants nominate to more than one working group, we have yet to see a lack of diversity attributed to a steward filling multiple working groups in recent elections.
I would want to preserve the right for a highly qualified applicant to apply to multiple working groups. These roles are not so specialized that they are somehow mutually exclusive, and it’s reasonable to assume that a highly qualified applicant is generally well-suited to fill different roles. If this proposal and the DAO seeks to increase diversity or reduce limitations for new entrants, let’s leave this unrestricted.
Suggestion: If you ultimately want to prevent an individual steward from filling multiple steward roles, you could limit the acceptance of multiple steward roles instead. This would preserve both the flexibility in the nomination process and the delegates choice in voting for applicants. I would be more inclined to support this methodology, rather than limiting nominations, but I do not support this drafted version.
In the event that all three top-ranked candidates in a working group election are current stewards of that working group, a rotation system shall be triggered to ensure new participation in governance.
Against.
On the point of diversity, I support the premise that we should promote an open DAO with pathways for new entrants, but as @nick.eth mentioned, we currently do not have a deep talent pool.
If this is an issue, we should focus on attracting new talent first. Procedurally, for me, this is the more correct order of operations
Improving the depth of the talent pool would be an interesting project for the incoming meta-governance stewards to tackle over the term without escalating to amending the rules. Steward applications are open during a small window of time relative to the duration of the role. Better marketing the nomination period is a low hanging fruit.
This also seems somewhat complex and we already have complexities in our voting strategies.
- Each individual within the working group structure must hold only one Official Role. Official Role being defined as a role that is included in the DAO approved compensation structures, but does not include roles defined via an individual Working Group’s discretion.
Against
This amendment focuses nearly exclusively on the secretary and scribe roles.
As instructed by the current working group current rules, the stewards choose the secretary at their discretion. It’s my opinion that the current steward cohort has been fortunate to have a qualified individual filling that role who is familiar with the DAO operations: @Limes.
I do not support a rule that potentially forces stewards to avoid a qualified secretary who is trusted and familiar with the DAO’s current operations soley for the sake of diversity.
The secretary is one of the DAO positions where I would actually seek to add incentives for retention through increased compensation or more predictable nomination mechanisms. This is a trusted role sitting on multiple DAO wallets securing a significant amount of capital. It’s not a trivial position.
- Ensures a minimum of four distinct signatories for Working Group multi-sig transactions
Ensuring the multi-sig signing authority remains as secure as intended is a serious consideration, but this is a different topic that should be codified elsewhere.
- Stewards are required to abstain from decision-making processes within the working group when they have a direct relationship with, or stand to directly benefit from, the receipt of resources in question.
For, but…
Definitely for, and this is a sensible amendment, but a comment on 13.1 is that we really need to limit the subjectivity related to the interpretation on what constitutes a conflict of interest. This point was also noted by @slobo.eth.
We also need to remember that voting is permissionless. We can make this a rule, and I think we should, but it is complex to arbitrate because the only tools we currently have to remove a steward who violates the rules feel blunt to me (See: EP0.4 Rule 9).
I easily support 13.2 with the understanding that stewards can vote on funding requests, and that CoI is inherently removed from compensation decisions if Amendment E is passed.
- Prior to the start of each term, the compensation structure for the stewards and supporting DAO roles in the coming term will be put up for a social vote to allow the delegates to codify. This shall be both USDC compensation and ENS token governance distributions.
For
I thought we already decided this last year. Absolutely for getting this codified.
Have they told you they didn’t step up because of the existing set of stewards, though? I would love to encourage a broader talent pool; I just don’t believe there’s evidence that this is an issue that’s limiting it.
Yes, but if we enact this rule without creating these other roles, we are effectively enforcing a part-time contribution limit.
I think this is better; “reasonably” is a much better standard than “could possibly”.
Who are these people? No current steward except for me - and I’m only standing in to fill a space until the election - is affiliated with ENS Labs.
One concern I have with this approach is that it leads to change for change’s sake. If someone is universally agreed to be an excellent contributor who has the DAO’s best interests at heart, they shouldn’t be artificially evicted from that position in the interest of some abstract conception of fairness. For every incumbent who uses their position unethically, there’s another who works tirelessly for the people who elected them.
Systematically preventing people from holding the same position repeatedly also works to prevent institutional knowledge and experience from being built up - it ensures the DAO is always run by people who are new to it. That might work in a situation like a presidency, where the figure is surrounded by civil servants with the experience to guide the person at the top - but it doesn’t work for a whole organization.
None, to my knowledge. So this aims to solve a ‘problem’ that does not currently exist. And if it did happen, you propose to make exceptions to allow it. Why not just preserve the status-quo?
My broader point is that we should encourage full-time contribution from qualified individuals, not discourage it, because someone focused only on the DAO is likely to do a better job than if their attention is split.
Rather than expanding the Secretary role, why not issue an RFP for a DAO financial planner instead?
I was reflecting on this over the weekend and believe that the reporting provided by limes.eth to the DAO goes beyond the responsibilities outlined for the secretary in the working group rules, which include:
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I believe the primary structural risk lies in allowing one person to hold two keys within a single multi-sig. To address this, we could either restrict contributors from holding multiple roles (as proposed in the amendments), devise a workaround, or operate under a trust-based assumption.
I prefer that we consider a technical workaround rather than limiting contributors to a single role, as it allows for greater flexibility while still addressing the structural risks.
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What do you think of @ENSPunks.eth verbiage? Could be a good place to start:
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Tbf, I think we need to move past this way of thinking. As you know, working in crypto is basically a 24/7 gig. I’d be hard-pressed to say I spend a full 8 hours a day solely on my role as a Steward, but I believe compensation isn’t about hours clocked—pay should reflect the significance, accountability, and outcomes of the role rather than the sheer number of hours spent.
On the other hand, when I combine it with my other responsibilities to the DAO, it adds up to a full-time commitment. Some days, I even forget to touch grass! 
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+1 to this! I think it’s a more worthwhile project to focus on improving the depth of the talent pool rather than artificially limiting existing roles.
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Let’s make this a project for the incoming Meta-Gov stewards. Even if I am not in a steward position next term, I want to advocate for this because I strongly believe there are talented contributors who simply haven’t had enough touchpoints with the DAO to realize they have a role to fill.
At a high level, I feel that we should allow the best people to fill available roles, even if it means they hold multiple positions. We should also generally trust delegates to choose who is best. Anything else could be seen as taking away power from delegates which doesn’t seem like the best direction. Based on this line of thinking:
Against.
Against.
Against, but I agree that for technical reasons, it’s not great to have one person hold two of the three signatures required for a multisig transaction. Similarly, I feel that one person being unavailable should not block a pending transaction from being executed, which could happen if one person holds two keys on a 3/4 multisig. This is key person risk.
For, but with the same concerns that other people mentioned regarding ambiguity.
For.
To be clear, even though I think this is an alternative solution to the proposed amendment, I also want to avoid pulling levers for the sake of it and making compromises that merely deepen the pool without adding depth to the talent.
Abstracting one of the core purposes of the steward role: they exist to allocate capital in the scope of their working group mandate. The stewards are counterparties on potentially large transactions and oversee multisigs for a year. In this role, we should optimise/bias/elect towards trust, not merely inclusion.
There has been a lot of great discussion to this thread so far so I’ll keep my thoughts short. As a former MG steward who came into the DAO as a brand new comer to the ENS ecosystem, perhaps my thoughts and experience could be pertinent in the discussions from a talent perspective.
To me, the motivation behind wanting to introduce A, B, and C is to solve a problem that, in my opinion, doesn’t quite exist. The premise is that the DAO needs to encourage more talent and lower any barriers to better talent-- I am all for that rationale, but only if the problem is actually present.
I do not believe that the ENS DAO talent pool is exclusionary as is. I also do not believe in limiting choices for good talent. If a newcomer to the DAO wanted to learn by doing (as was my case), it makes sense for them to broaden their options in terms of WG options. The delegates will decide, based on someone’s statement and their work/onchain history, where the DAO needs a particular set of skills/ talent the most. For that reason and rationale, I am against A as well as C.
Also, the DAO steward selection is already a publicly marketed, nominated, and voted-upon process. I myself came across the DAO elections via the ENS twitter account. There are also many docs in public that detail the responsibilities of each role, and the DAO forum and its history can easily be caught up on for any curious newcomers. I don’t believe we need to add unnecessary bureaucracy to solve a nonexistent problem. For that reason, I am against B.
As part of the MG group that first started to refine processes around compensation, E is long overdue and I am supportive.
Rules A (Single Working Group Nomination Rule),
B (Diversity in Stewardship Rule),
& C (Role Exclusivity):
AGAINST
I think this is less a principles question and more a pragmatic one. We may need rules like these someday, but we don’t need them right now. No reason to prevent us from using the skilled people we have.
Re the problem with multisigs, this is a real problem but we can solve it by adding the DAO itself to the multisigs or some other similar method.
Rule D (Conflict of Interest):
AGAINST
I agree with @slobo.eth and @Limes, while a laudable goal, it’s not clear to me how this plays out in real life. I’m open to considering another proposal that is more specific. Would also want to know what the enforcement is.
Rule E (DAO Confirmation of Compensation Structures):
FOR