Friendly correction: The ENS Governor has 1 block delay, but for being able to vote in a proposal you need actually 2 blocks after the proposal is submitted. Since ERC20Votes.getPastVotes() will revert with ERC20Votes: block not yet mined because snapshot < block.timestamp.
Anyway, it’s not a big change in the overall situation. Even in the less capital-efficient scenario, that is, buying the tokens, the attack is still profitable, depending on the market conditions. The most capital-efficient option would be incentivizing delegation + borrow some ENS. Also as specified in the proposal, the cancel function is also not useful.
I share the same concerns as Nick. It might be the case for a cobra effect (when incentives designed to solve a problem end up rewarding people for making it worse), that could end up making the DAO less secure and more susceptible to economic vulnerabilities, which is the main concern here.
Rewarding quality engagement is an interesting and complex problem. Then, a lot of questions come up: What is quality engagement? How can we reward and select those in a fair and credibly neutral way, taking into account the charisma bias or halo effect?
That proposal gives us time to come up with solutions and test them.