Conviction Voting in the ENS DAO: Why One-Token-One-Vote is a Better Alternative
I am concerned that our current conviction voting mechanism may not be the best approach for the DAO. While conviction voting has its merits, I believe that there are significant drawbacks that warrant a reconsideration of our voting system. In this post, I will outline the main arguments against conviction voting in the ENS DAO, focusing on the potential issues faced by small grant participants, and propose the one-token-one-vote alternative to better serve our community.
Arguments against conviction voting in the ENS DAO:
Concentration of power: One of the primary concerns with conviction voting is the potential for some large token holders to exert disproportionate influence over the decision-making process. Since some members have magnitudes more tokens than the majority of token holders, this system may create an unfair advantage for proposals supported by these whales, leaving others with little to no chance of approval.
Unfairness for small grants participants: Conviction voting allows whales to vote for an unlimited number of proposals with their full voting power, potentially ignoring smaller proposals that might not have the backing of large token holders. This can create an uneven playing field for small grant participants who may struggle to gain traction for their proposals. This is seen with proposals on winning streaks.
Complexity and confusion: Conviction voting can be challenging to understand and implement, especially for newcomers. The complexity of the voting mechanism may deter participation, create confusion around voting outcomes, and lead to decisions that don’t fully reflect the community’s wishes.
Alternative voting mechanism for the ENS DAO:
One-token-one-vote: This straightforward voting system assigns one vote per token, ensuring that each token holder’s influence is directly proportional to their holdings. While this method does not completely address the concentration of power, it offers simplicity and transparency that could encourage broader participation. Most importantly, it prevents whales from voting on unlimited proposals with their full power, creating a more level playing field for small grant participants.
I welcome further discussion on this topic and am eager to hear the thoughts of my fellow community members. Let’s work together to create a more inclusive and equitable decision-making process for the ENS DAO that gives every proposal a fair chance.
I appreciate you reading, first time posting a fresh topic in here.
The Small Grants platform voting is conducted differently from the on and off-chain proposal voting.
If there is an available snapshot strategy, we’re open to trying it out on the Small Grants. The small grants, by design, is meant to be iterative and experiment with different strategies if requested.
Are you available next Thursday at 1pm EST to join our call?
I like the willingness to consider experimenting with the small grants platform.
Some additional ideas:
Mirror the round using one or more alternative voting styles just to see if the outcome of the winners would be any different than the approval vote. (This is additional work/voting for the delegate, but probably not more than an extra minute per alternative voting style being tested).
Bifurcate 1ETH from the current Approval Voting to one of the alternative voting styles which would go to the winner of the alternative vote such as single choice vote. (if the winner of the alternative single choice vote already won in the main Approval Vote, then go to the next in line so as to not duplicate a winner from the Approval Vote).
Oh, and we chatted about this a few weeks ago on the call. I believe @avsa and @184.eth both ran simulations of quadratic voting. I know this is different, but no significant changes would have occurred in the previous rounds.
There has been a skewed distribution of PG winners who have more than one win
To address the repeat winners, we’re hoping that our forthcoming larger grant streams will reduce these occurrences. I want winners of our forthcoming Growth Grants to be ineligible for small grant during the term in which they win.
There is another recently deployed module for Snapshot that allows for shuttered voting, or private voting. During the voting period the votes are kept private but then revealed at the end of the voting period.
Not necessarily good for all voting things, but might have value in some multiple choice, social votes.
It’s worth just adding to the overall vote strategy conversation. The module is from Shutter Project. Here’s a tweet with some links.
Personally, I’m a fan of quadratic voting - interesting to hear that @AvsA and @184.eth ran the simulation. Would love to check out the data and see how the data changes upon the implementation of a quadratic vote.