It’s almost like there’s a number of different changes that could give the DAO some level of control or accountability over the foundation and the entire ENS treasury.
But that’s not the point of this proposal is it.
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Perhaps all the disputes surrounding this proposal are just superficial.I might be wrong about this.Since $ENS is currently a pure governance token,token holders will cling tightly to control of governance rights when its price has tumbled so sharply.It is just like a drowning man clutching the last plank he can grab.
In contrast,Chainlink still does not have an official DAO in the true sense,and $LINK holders do not possess real voting rights.Chainlink Labs effectively controls the treasury funds and core protocol upgrades.Even so,there has never been fierce conflict within the Chainlink community over governance power.The reason is that $LINK is far more than just a pure governance token,it is a utility token with a wide range of practical use cases.
I support professional execution, but the proposal should add public annual KPIs, a detailed budget approval and deviation framework, Endowment spending thresholds, transparent ED hiring criteria, independent grant evaluation, and clear limits for the 1 million ENS compensation pool. Foundation autonomy should be matched with measurable accountability to ENS tokenholders. @katherine.eth