| Status | Discussion |
|---|---|
| Type | Social |
| Discussion Thread | (this thread) |
Abstract
The two-year mandate of the current Security Council, framework established under EP5.7, members confirmed under EP5.10, and contract deployed under EP5.13, expires soon.
The Security Council holds an extraordinary power: the ability to cancel a proposal after it has passed through the DAO’s ordinary governance process and entered the timelock. That power is justified only as a narrow emergency safeguard to defend the DAO against malicious, coercive, or exploitative governance attacks.
Recent events have made clear that there is disagreement over the mandate and remit of the Security Council. In particular, there does not currently appear to have a sufficiently shared understanding of when a passing governance proposal may properly be treated as a malicious governance attack. That ambiguity is dangerous in both directions: a Security Council that is too constrained may fail to stop a genuine attack, while a Security Council that is too broad risks becoming a political veto over valid governance outcomes.
Given the importance of a well-functioning Security Council, this proposal seeks to establish a successor Security Council that clarifies the understanding of the expectations: a tighter public mandate, a binding commitment from each member to that mandate, a removal mechanism for members who act outside it, and a transition that preserves continuity of Security Council coverage.
The new Security Council would be enabled alongside the current one for any overlap period, and the current one disabled once its term ends. The intent is to have no gap in coverage.
Motivation
The Security Council was created to address a specific economic risk. As the DAO’s treasury grew and the percentage of actively delegated tokens declined, the cost of acquiring enough $ENS to control a governance attack fell below the value of what could be extracted from the treasury. EP5.7 framed the response narrowly: the Security Council exists to cancel malicious proposals, and only that.
The narrowness of that mandate is the point. The Security Council is not a second legislature, a policy review body, or a political backstop. It holds the DAO’s only post-vote veto over the timelock, meaning it can override a proposal that has already passed through the ordinary governance process. Such a power can only remain legitimate if its mandate is public, narrow, and accepted in advance by the members holding it.
Recent events have made it necessary to ask whether the current Security Council is exercising that power within remit, or whether it is being used as leverage in disputes that fall well outside the categories EP5.7 contemplated. If the answer is the latter, the Security Council is no longer fulfilling its function, and a successor Council operating under tighter, publicly affirmed terms is the right path forward.
The scheduled expiration of the current Council creates a natural point for the DAO to resolve this ambiguity. The DAO should not renew or replace an extraordinary veto power on ambiguous terms. A Security Council can only be legitimate if its members know in advance what they may veto, what they may not veto, and what consequences follow if they knowingly exceed that mandate. Waiting past expiry would create a coverage gap. Allowing the current Council to roll over without addressing the remit question would entrench the problem.
Specification
This proposal would:
- Establish a new Security Council of 8 members operating through a new multisig, with a 5/8 threshold for action (up from the current 4/8).
- Publish a tighter public mandate for Security Council action, more narrowly drawn than the operational guidance in EP5.7, with explicit criteria for what is and is not in remit.
- Require each nominee to publicly affirm the mandate as a condition of nomination and confirmation.
- Add a removal mechanism for members who act outside the mandate.
- Require each confirmed member to sign the Appointment Agreement with the ENS Foundation, drafted by counsel, that gives the publicly affirmed mandate operative legal effect.
The Security Council Charter, the Appointment Agreement, and the Public Pledge are published with this post and are available here. Delegates should review the framework before the social vote. The scope of authority granted to the new Council will remain the same as that defined by EP5.13: cancellation of timelocked proposals, nothing more.
The 5/8 threshold (up from 4/8 under EP5.7) means a majority of members is required for any cancellation, rather than half. The intent is to make it more difficult for any subset of members to use the veto for purposes outside the mandate without broader Council consensus. The tradeoff is some additional friction in legitimate emergency response, which the current circumstances justify.
Transition
To avoid any gap in veto coverage, the new Security Council would be enabled as an additional veto authority during any overlap period with the current Council. Once the current Council’s mandate ends, it can be disabled by revoking the PROPOSER_ROLE from the existing SecurityCouncil contract. The new council would carry forward the same role, operating under the new public mandate and the Appointment Agreements.
Nomination and Selection
The nomination process is open. Anyone can self-nominate or be nominated by another community member on this thread.
To appear on the Snapshot ballot, a nominee must meet all of the following:
- Be nominated publicly on this thread within the nomination window.
- Publicly affirm the new mandate and charter for the Security Council.
- Meet at least one of the following participation criteria:
- At least 80% participation in ENS DAO Snapshot and governor votes over the past year; or
- Suitable professional credentials relevant to Security Council responsibilities (e.g., smart contract security, governance design, applicable legal practice).
- Have no statements on record that would contradict the affirmation in (2).
- Ultimate confirmation to the Security Council is contingent upon the member’s willingness to sign the Appointment Agreement (mentioned above) and undergo a KYC and background check process.
If a top-8 nominee does not complete (5), the seat moves to the next-highest vote-getter.
To submit a nomination, please respond to this thread with the following:
- Name + ENS name
- Statement affirming the new Security Council mandate and charter
- Basis for eligibility under (3) above — voting record (with links), or relevant professional credentials (with supporting references)
- Confirmation of (a) no public statements on record contradicting the affirmation in (2), and (b) willingness, if selected, to sign the Appointment Agreement and undergo a KYC and background check
Please submit any interest for candidacy to this thread ASAP, the thread will be closed on Friday, July 3 at 11:59 PM UTC.
Next Steps
- Solicit public nominations for new Security Council members on this thread
- Social proposal on Snapshot to confirm the new Security Council, following the EP5.10 template.
- Executable proposal to grant the PROPOSER_ROLE to the new multisig.
- Once the new Council is operational and the current Council’s mandate ends, the PROPOSER_ROLE will be revoked from the existing contract.
Relevant Links
- Security Council Charter, Appointment Agreement, and Public Pledge (Link to Documents)
- [EP5.7] [Social] Security Council: EP5.7 | ENS Docs
- [EP5.10] [Social] Confirming the ENS DAO Security Council Members: EP5.10 | ENS Docs
- [EP5.13] [Executable] Security Council: EP 5.13 | ENS Docs
- SecurityCouncil contract (GitHub, Etherscan)
- Security Council multisig (Safe, Etherscan)
- Original forum discussion: [Temp Check] Enable CANCEL role on the DAO