My reasons for wanting to be a delegate:
My motivation for being a delegate rests solely on a desire to contribute to a protocol I believe has vital importance to the Ethereum community. As social adoption increases there will be no difference between that community and the global community of individuals who seek to explore more functional models of social organization. ENS provides an invaluable service to the Ethereum community and I think that the problems ENS holders will confront will have broad spanning implications in global conversations concerning digital identity.
l. Name ownership shall not be infringed. /Agree
Publicly verifiable ownership rests at the cornerstone of DLTs. .eth names are technically an “asset” and protecting users rights to hold and use those assets as they see fit is something that ENS has been successfully doing for years. It makes sense that this is the first Article in the ENS constitution as it is the fundamental value proposition of the Ethereum Naming Service. I think that upholding and protecting the first article of the constitution will be of primary importance for the future of ENS as a viable alternative to centralized services.
ll. Fees are primarily an incentive mechanism. /Disagree
While I think that fees act as a primary layer of defense for potential abuse of the ENS I disagree that they that they are the primary reason to charge fees for the services that ENS provides.
- Deter users from abusing the ENS for speculative reasons.
2.Compensation for the individuals who make ENS a reality now and in the future.
3.Building a robust and secure platform that can offer users a reliable way to interact with the Web3 namespace.
All three are of equal importance to me as someone who has an interest in ENS governance and the future of global social organization. ENS is a service and service providers should be compensated for the value they offer their users. While I don’t agree with the current wording of article 2, I strongly agree that fees are a vital component to protecting the integrity of ENS in a broader sense.
III. Income funds ENS and other public goods. Agree /Disagree
I agree wholeheartedly that revenue generated by ENS should be used to maintain and protect the services provided by ENS. Whether this is team compensation, gitcoin grants or payment for services that make ENS possible (hosting services,audits, team development), all are appropriate uses of funds.
As it is currently defined, a “public good” consists of having non-rivalrous and non-excludable qualities. While I consider multiple publicly accessible services ( Ethereum, IPFS,ENS) to be public goods, the technical definition of “public good” excludes all three. Definitions are important, even more so when they are articles of a constitution and I think that phrasing and verbiage should be built to last. I would suggest changing “public good” to an alternative that has a broader definition.(publicworks,digital infrastructure etc….)
I have no issues with the idea that ENS could use revenue to fund development of publicly accessible services as along as there exists a robust treasury to ensure the security and future of ENS.
IV. ENS Integrates with the global namespace. Agree
I think that this is the most exciting article in the proposed constitution, the global namespace is yet to be clearly defined and I believe services like ENS and IPFS will be pivotal in creating functional frameworks for how public spaces are defined not only in Web3 but in a global context that is not dependent on boarders or political/ideological frameworks.
V. Amendments to this constitution by majority vote.
I personally think that Article V needs to be reworked to protect against the potential issues that result from a publicly traded governance token. While tokenized governance is a remarkable social structure being explored on public networks, it has not yet created a robust ethical framework to protect against majority interest being controlled by small wealthy groups of individuals. While the majority of available tokens have been set aside for the Airdrop there is no provision to protect against a third party acquiring a controlling interest in the ENS D.A.O. through secondary markets.
I personally think that there should be a provision limiting voting rights of a party that acquired a majority share of voting power through secondary markets. An example being that if a party where to acquire a majority of tokens their voting power would be limited to the top delegates voting power or some other provision to protect against potential governance attacks.
Majority Vote is a functional model until those voting rights are traded openly on public markets. As it stands this article in the constitution will function as intended but the possibility for abuse arises and I believe the constitution should address that possibility from the very beginning.
My web3 qualifications / skills:
User since 2017, active since 2019, spend all of my time researching and developing Web3
Thanks to @AvsA @adamscochran camchis trose and edzorg.eth for their delegate applications as they inspired me to write my own.