$ENS Super Ultra Sound? $ENS🦇🔊(X2)

We not only have the best community!
.eth is also creating a more free and fair internet.

And not only that…
But also with the revenue we are building a better world by supporting public goods.

We are also fortunate to have a token with a direct correlation between three elements:

Market cap - .eth registrations - revenue generated and token value (to support public goods) .

In other words, improvement in any of these elements cannot be given without positively affecting the other two.

That said, the proposal I have is:

Let’s make $ENS super ultra sound! $ENS​:bat::loud_sound: (X2)

Making every year more scarce and deflationary.

The idea is that 2 or 3 times per year (secret random months choose by the keyholders) we can burn $ENS in double proportion of whatever is being burned in Ethereum.

This will incentive more people to invest in $ENS (and hold) and will also increases the value of the token and treasury, giving us more power to build a better world by founding public goods.

This proposal would be very important as well for token holders.

But remember…

“With great power there must also come great responsibility” :spider_web:

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$ENS is a governance token, intended to be used to make decisions for the future of ENS. I don’t think burning tokens is consistent with any of our goals.


ok. So let me ask you Nick…
As a investment…Would you recommend to your family or friends to sell their $ETH to buy $ENS?
I would like to know your answer and why.


burning is the most lazy way to pump. you may get involve the ENS tokenmic to learn the purpose .

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$ENS is not really an investment vehicle. Like nick.eth said, the tokens represent a right to have a say in the governance of ENS. The value of the tokens is based neither on financials nor assets but, other than speculation, the value a purchaser places on the token to have a say in its operation. Unlike shareholders of a corporation, token holders have no right to a share of any ENS asset or profits. The tokens were a gift to early adopters of the service to encourage greater participation in its governance, use, and marketing of ENS services, because token holders now have a stake in ENS’s success in obtaining greater worldwide adoption. :earth_americas:


I would not. ENS is a governance token, not an investment. It doesn’t exist to make its holders rich.


While this is a true statement… there’s a follow-on process of rich entities purchasing tokens in order to control the future of ENS. As ENS votes begin to have an effect on the architecture, I imagine several large commercial entities will buy up tokens in order to push ENS toward some kind of goal.

I just read through the “Article 0” thread… while the token is not the community, the direction of the community will be steered by the token… unless the token voting system is never actually used to effect systemically important changes.

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One way to address the concern of large accumulation of tokens to unfairly influence control (outside of proxy voting) is to have a modified rank voting system in which tokens controlled by an account would see a decreased percentage in the weight of their tokens’ voting rights to a predetermined limit of influence.


This only works if people are nice enough to keep their tokens all in one account.

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It’s not the accounts themselves that are affected; it’s the accumulated votes being cast from a particular token holder where all votes of a particular token holder can only be cast in a single voting event. This would prevent the token holder from engaging in multiple voting events on behalf of different accounts at different times. For example, to overcome the presumption of large accumulation voting, the token holder would have to demonstrate that the votes being casts are, in fact, on behalf a multiple distinct owners who have independently controlled their accounts before the vote was scheduled and who have duly delegated their votes to the particular token holder at a certain point in time prior to the vote. Further, eligibility to vote could be limited to token holders of record on or before the date the vote was scheduled and who continue to hold such tokens at the time of voting. This should prevent, if not dissuade, recruiting people to shadow vote for the offending token holder.

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you will always have sybil attacks, even against quadratic voting. Gitcoin Grants are the more advanced project utilizing this and they have ways to help alleviate the sybil attacks against the quadratic formula.

It is fairly trivial to script distributing your $ENS to many addresses to fool the system you propose. Currently the way Gitcoin helps in this scenario is via quadratic distribution and giving accounts more weight if they meet certain criteria. A few of these criteria are:

  1. possess an ENS name
  2. brightID confirmation
  3. connect your twitter account
    etc etc

There could be a way to propose something similar using the votes held by the DAO as the quadratic funding mechanism, but a proper solution would take much planning and game theory.


While I wholeheartedly agree, burning tokens is against the idea here. I replied to a similar post already:

I would like to get your thoughts on an idea of using a certain % of the fee market to buy back $ENS via uniswap, or some other DEX, and distributing those in airdrop fashion to $ENS holders.

My thoughts here are that it would help strengthen the DAO by removing $ENS from users not wishing to support the DAO (aka wishing to sell their tokens) and giving them to those more dedicated to the DAO (aka those who hodl and thus support the project).

Main concern here is that this seems a bit gimmicky as well, turning the token into a dividend producing speculation token as opposed as a strictly governance token. Pros/Cons, I guess.


Personally… I’m STRONGLY opposed to using centralized social media accounts as a basis for voting on anything or for identity assurance.

I was not necessarily recommending these points, just stating methods used by Gitcoin as an example. Researching, I actually do not see twitter, but I seem to recall setting that up during GR10. Anyway, here is a link to that article, any similar method of quadratic voting would likely require similar measures to be in place.

I believe @nick.eth that even by respecting the constitution we could (and should) create strategies for the community to benefit.
In the end, for them, having these tokens represents an opportunity cost that should be rewarded in some way.

Any thoughts on this?

We can certainly think about ways to incentivise people to take part in the community and reward those who engage in governance more meaningfully. But this should not come at the expense of turning $ENS as a whole into a highly speculative asset by baking burns into it.

Token holders that meaningfully participate in the community and help improve the protocol can be rewarded through further airdrops/distributions or similar mechanisms.

There is no need to take actions that will increase the token price to reward token holders for simply holding.


ENS must be deflationary. How can tokens that have no value take up the weight of the industry! ! ! Support repurchase or burn


It is suggested to allocate some ENS from the ENS Dao community Treasury to reward those who register ENS domain names and backlinks, and subsidize the handling fees they pay in this process, so as to promote more people to use ens, so as to develop and expand ENS ecology and improve the overall value of ENS. The community Treasury will be richer and stronger.

Not sure how that would help. There has been one proposal which was to subsidize gas prices with longevity of registration. If the proposal were properly formed I’d support that, but I cannot imagine attempting to buy users using ENS Treasury, seems very antithetical.

edit: Personally I think this thread should just be marked as spent and locked.


The best way to remove tokens from circulation is to hold them.

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