$ENS Super Ultra Sound? $ENS🦇🔊(X2)

While this is a true statement… there’s a follow-on process of rich entities purchasing tokens in order to control the future of ENS. As ENS votes begin to have an effect on the architecture, I imagine several large commercial entities will buy up tokens in order to push ENS toward some kind of goal.

I just read through the “Article 0” thread… while the token is not the community, the direction of the community will be steered by the token… unless the token voting system is never actually used to effect systemically important changes.

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One way to address the concern of large accumulation of tokens to unfairly influence control (outside of proxy voting) is to have a modified rank voting system in which tokens controlled by an account would see a decreased percentage in the weight of their tokens’ voting rights to a predetermined limit of influence.


This only works if people are nice enough to keep their tokens all in one account.

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It’s not the accounts themselves that are affected; it’s the accumulated votes being cast from a particular token holder where all votes of a particular token holder can only be cast in a single voting event. This would prevent the token holder from engaging in multiple voting events on behalf of different accounts at different times. For example, to overcome the presumption of large accumulation voting, the token holder would have to demonstrate that the votes being casts are, in fact, on behalf a multiple distinct owners who have independently controlled their accounts before the vote was scheduled and who have duly delegated their votes to the particular token holder at a certain point in time prior to the vote. Further, eligibility to vote could be limited to token holders of record on or before the date the vote was scheduled and who continue to hold such tokens at the time of voting. This should prevent, if not dissuade, recruiting people to shadow vote for the offending token holder.

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you will always have sybil attacks, even against quadratic voting. Gitcoin Grants are the more advanced project utilizing this and they have ways to help alleviate the sybil attacks against the quadratic formula.

It is fairly trivial to script distributing your $ENS to many addresses to fool the system you propose. Currently the way Gitcoin helps in this scenario is via quadratic distribution and giving accounts more weight if they meet certain criteria. A few of these criteria are:

  1. possess an ENS name
  2. brightID confirmation
  3. connect your twitter account
    etc etc

There could be a way to propose something similar using the votes held by the DAO as the quadratic funding mechanism, but a proper solution would take much planning and game theory.


While I wholeheartedly agree, burning tokens is against the idea here. I replied to a similar post already:

I would like to get your thoughts on an idea of using a certain % of the fee market to buy back $ENS via uniswap, or some other DEX, and distributing those in airdrop fashion to $ENS holders.

My thoughts here are that it would help strengthen the DAO by removing $ENS from users not wishing to support the DAO (aka wishing to sell their tokens) and giving them to those more dedicated to the DAO (aka those who hodl and thus support the project).

Main concern here is that this seems a bit gimmicky as well, turning the token into a dividend producing speculation token as opposed as a strictly governance token. Pros/Cons, I guess.


Personally… I’m STRONGLY opposed to using centralized social media accounts as a basis for voting on anything or for identity assurance.

I was not necessarily recommending these points, just stating methods used by Gitcoin as an example. Researching, I actually do not see twitter, but I seem to recall setting that up during GR10. Anyway, here is a link to that article, any similar method of quadratic voting would likely require similar measures to be in place.

I believe @nick.eth that even by respecting the constitution we could (and should) create strategies for the community to benefit.
In the end, for them, having these tokens represents an opportunity cost that should be rewarded in some way.

Any thoughts on this?

We can certainly think about ways to incentivise people to take part in the community and reward those who engage in governance more meaningfully. But this should not come at the expense of turning $ENS as a whole into a highly speculative asset by baking burns into it.

Token holders that meaningfully participate in the community and help improve the protocol can be rewarded through further airdrops/distributions or similar mechanisms.

There is no need to take actions that will increase the token price to reward token holders for simply holding.


ENS must be deflationary. How can tokens that have no value take up the weight of the industry! ! ! Support repurchase or burn


It is suggested to allocate some ENS from the ENS Dao community Treasury to reward those who register ENS domain names and backlinks, and subsidize the handling fees they pay in this process, so as to promote more people to use ens, so as to develop and expand ENS ecology and improve the overall value of ENS. The community Treasury will be richer and stronger.

Not sure how that would help. There has been one proposal which was to subsidize gas prices with longevity of registration. If the proposal were properly formed I’d support that, but I cannot imagine attempting to buy users using ENS Treasury, seems very antithetical.

edit: Personally I think this thread should just be marked as spent and locked.


The best way to remove tokens from circulation is to hold them.

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I’m in favor of an idea to create a pool, from registration fees, which would buy back $ENS from uniswap, or whichever DEX, and redistribute to governance participants. The benefit here would be removing votes from users not wishing to participate, and guaranteeing those votes go to active participants, while also encouraging active delegation - aka distributing votes to more informed users.

We all think that ENS is easy to remember and use for long addresses, but gas is too expensive for ordinary people to use. If they subsidize some ens, users will increase significantly. The law of the Internet is: the more users, the greater the value of the project. Now it’s key to expand the number of users, and it’s too late to develop competitive products!

I follow what you’re saying here…

However, take someone like myself…not very tech-savvy, but I’m interested in the tech. I don’t know a shit-load about web3 or smart contracts, but I still consider myself to know more than the general public.

I don’t have a whole lot of technical talent to contribute here, but I feel that I have a voice and an opinion on how the ENS DAO, other DAOs, and other web3 projects can positively impact the world. Also, I have some non-technical skills that I can contribute.

If I can contribute, I would love that! However, if I cannot contribute that much, I would still like to hold the tokens as I believe in the project and believe that they could one day hold more value. Is there anything inherently wrong with this? I mean, can I casually voice my opinion, participate in discussions, contribute here and there, and still be a holder of $ENS and a believer in its ability to be worth more as we move into the future?

I am genuinely asking these questions to see if anyone has any thoughts on this. I feel there may be others who share the same curiosity.


ENS must be valuable and must appreciate like SOL. If ENS is worthless and value is not considered, then why issue ENS? Just use ETH directly.

The tokens were the result of a free airdrop, so on what basis “must” ENS do anything? If I use your premise, which I don’t agree with, then ENS’s ROI is already phenomenal. You started with nothing and got something of value. You were rewarded as an early adopter. ENS is not worthless, as the tokens continue to have monetary speculative value despite its purpose to have a say in its governance.

This is exactly the problem delegation solves. I’d say the majority of users fit your bill. We dont expect every user to be an expert, what we want is for every delegate to be an expert, then the non-experts delegate their votes to the experts who can vote accordingly.

Thus I believe the average users should be rewarded for delegating, and in my write up I recommend those who assign their votes to a delegate actually earn more than if they vote themselves. This is to encourage users to defer to the experts, which would improve the value of the votes.