It’s more because the .eth TLD is “locked” - it can’t be changed by anyone any longer - while the same is not true for the other TLDs.
They’re not; presently only .eth 2LDs are 721 NFTs. We’re working on a name wrapper contract that would let you wrap any name at any level into an 1155 NFT, though.
That’s really up to the DAO and the keyholders. Personally I’d like to see the DAO demonstrate a track record of sensible governance before asking the keyholders to hand over the most easily abused of the powers.
It’s worth enumerating the powers.
Ownership of the price oracle gives the DAO the ability to:
- Set the contract used to get the USD-ETH price.
- Change the price per year of each length of domain name.
Ownership of the registrar controller gives the DAO the ability to:
- Replace the price oracle contract.
- Withdraw accumulated funds to the DAO treasury.
- Set the minimum and maximum period between the first and second transactions of the registration process.
Ownership of the .eth registrar gives the DAO the ability to:
- Add and remove controller contracts.
- Set the resolver contract for .eth
Ownership of the .reverse TLD gives the DAO the ability to:
- Replace the reverse registrar for Ethereum addresses.
- Create new types of reverse resolution (For example, bitcoin addresses) and update them.
Of all the powers it’s the only one that can be easily abused to deny someone else ownership of their ENS name. I don’t think that’s likely to happen, but I think caution is warranted.
I would like to see the DAO establish budgets for each working group, that can be accessed via a multisig controlled by representatives appointed for each WG. I think @alisha.eth will be working to roll out proposals for this based on Gitcoin’s experience in the coming days and weeks.