Most corporate structures have an independent oversight auditor appointed directly by the shareholders and operates with full autonomy from the Board of Directors or the Executive branch. Such an auditing committee for a DAO,
a) will be elected by and answers to the Delegates and Delegates only (excluding the Directors, Stewards and Core team at TNL),
b) cannot be formed by members who are delegates,
c) cannot take any actions but only provide independent feedback on the governance, disbursement of funds (← Treasury Management), and
ensure that advise if by-laws are followed (← Meta-governance).
Such an entity will (should) have no explicit vested interest in the
operation monetisation of the DAO since its members can (should) not be part of the Council or the Foundation (thereby excluding them from the DAO) for the duration of the time they serve. Its utility also links somewhat to the by-laws. If ENS ends up adopting two sets of by-laws – one set of directions for the DAO working branch as Nick has requested, and another update to the Constitution/Articles to close up the loopholes we found during the EP6 process, then this auditing committee can explicitly oversee cases when conflict arises between the two sets and provide feedback when asked.
The scope of what I am proposing goes beyond treasury management though.