Preparing a post to share on the forum: analysis of endownment and how it funds the DAO in different scenarios.
Will help shape future plans. Want to set monthly transfer from controller to endownment to cover runway.
2. General DAO Updates
Two executables upcoming
Public Goods funding executable vote
Safe Permissions Executable
Working with Tally to make executables gas free. DAO pays fee to Tally, Tally covers gas fees for voters. Hoping to have working by the next vote. Will invite Tally to next call
This proposal outlines a strategic shift allowing the Endowment to autonomously finance its operations. Specifically, it grants the Metagov stewards the authority to withdraw up to 30 ETH monthly from the Endowment, designated for payments to karpatkey and @steakhouse for their services in managing the Endowment.
3. Open Discussion
Frisson from Tally.xyz
Current executables on Tally don’t require gas fees to vote, huge improvement
Looking into batching, but relayer casts vote immediately, batching requires a delay for votes to be cast
Multichain governance: Usually if put DAO on a chain, DAO is stuck on that chain. Tally just introduced multi-gov where user can vote and delegate on any chain through Tally
Over time amount of delegated power has been decreasing despite same number of delegates, need to increase amount of delegated tokens
Anyone who closely watches Agora or Tally will have noticed a new ‘delegate’ shooting to the top of the delegate list, veto.ensdao.eth, presently holding over 3.8M delegated tokens. Please don’t be alarmed - this isn’t a governance attack, in fact it’s quite the reverse
@avsa recently disclosed to a small group of delegates the existence and practicality of highly concerning governance attacks that could be used to target DAOs including the ENS DAO. Given the viability of these attacks (has happened before!) and the urgency with which they need to be addressed, @nick.eth devised a simple contract that makes it possible for a small group of trusted DAO participants to exercise a large number of “no” votes to veto proposals that risk the integrity of the ENS DAO. To put some weight behind this, ENS Labs has delegated all of its ENS tokens - most of which are being held on behalf of Labs staff - to this account
This contract only permits individuals who have been granted permission to use it, it only allows them to vote “no”, and before exercising this power, individuals must agree to a pledge to only use this power to veto proposals that constitute a governance attack on the DAO, or would violate the ENS constitution
Proposal for an executable that would grant the role of Canceller to a multisig, controlled by the same people that currently hold the Veto power. This would be a multisig of at least 2 accounts. We take this very seriously and understand that once this multisig has such power it’s hard to reverse it since they can veto any attempt to remove it. In order to have a balance of power the members would sign a pledge to only use the cancel power in an event of an attack or to protect the spirit of the constitution and we are open to discussion on any other measures that can be enacted
Other preventive measures to protect from the attack
The profitability of such attack is simply calculated by the amount of total assets in the DAO / (amount of delegated tokens * price of ENS tokens). So any attempt to improve the situation would have to change one of the factors:
Assets: The DAO should consider ways to protect the Endowment from any single transaction that takes over. This isn’t as simple as it appears.
Delegated tokens: the Metagovernance group has been considering ways to improve the amount of active delegates and will continue to propose new methods of both direct ENS distribution and ENS delegation.
Token price: while the DAO’s responsibility is to the ENS system and not the token, it would be healthy if there were ways in which the value of ENS was more tied to the amount of values in it’s management and the present and future revenue of the name system
3. Open Discussion
Discussion around upgrading the governance contract, will bring to the agenda next week
Next week will have spending report for all the Working Groups
Zodiac RM v2: https://kit.karpatkey.com/ Drafting proposal, will share overview before goes to a vote. Makes auditing much simpler through the UI and lessens need for manual changes
Tech team finishing ZRM v2 Migration Proposal, will post when complete during a voting window
2. General DAO Updates Section
Upcoming Proposals
Alex Netto proposing giving the allow contract to call the cancel function on the timelock for a social proposal tomorrow
This is the next step in safeguarding the DAO against a cryptoeceonomic attack whereby malicious users would take advantage of a lack of voting to pass issues against the best interests of the DAO
Will allow DAO to remove the veto contract (DAO using voting power to vote against attacks) which was a temporary solution for a cryptoeconomic attack against the DAO. Con of this solution relies on voting power, which can be overriden by malicious user with more votes
Jengajojo: While have reliable contributors today, want to create a DAO that outlasts contributors. Need to put measures in place that decentralize power, current proposal might not accomplish that with a security council
Netto: Security council is a short-term solution to security issue
Spike: Seems like a step backward in decentralizing the DAO
@avsa.eth: Need to stop malicious attempts to hijack the DAO, want to evolve in the future so we can get rid of this proposal
@5pence: All security council can do is stop a proposal, can’t create or remove proposals. Just to cancel a malicious activity
Jengajojo: Any discussions around delegating tokens in DAO?
@5pence: Yes discussions and thoughts about right way to do it are in the forum threads
Please bring discussions to the forum when it is posted
Another social proposal may be posted tomorrow related to ENS vesting requirements
Bylaws update
Have received bylaws proposal, working group will review before posting on the forum for feedback
Spike: What were key considerations when deciding between streaming payment services for paying stream providers? @avsa.eth: Superfluid allowed an open-ended stream that could just be topped-up and put more money in it, others didn’t
Ways to reduce risk: Increase delegated ENS and approve Netto’s proposal for a Security Council with the authority to cancel malicious proposals: Snapshot
Ambiguous language around vesting in Snapshot vote, discussion around numbers
Netto: All ENS disbursements to stewards will be vested on a linear 24 month schedule from the time of their appointment
Netto: For the current term’s stewards, ENS vesting will be scaled retroactively based on the time since their appointment. ~37.5% of ENS will be distributed to stewards directly from the multisig, whilst the remaining ENS will then be deposited into each steward’s vesting contract
Eduardo: Poorly written and ambiguous in language, needs clarification
Marcus: Need to confirm with @James.eth what his intention was and have Meta-Governance provide a statement that clarifies the position
Proposal Lifecycle Management: Allow anybody to draft proposals, send to sponsor to review, and allow anybody with enough ENS to put up vote, notifications system and integrations into systems included
Discussion around possibility of pooling ENS so multiple people could get together and put up for a vote
@avsa.eth: Want to make it easier to put things up for a vote, but want to ensure that proposals going up have high chance of passing / create cost for malicious proposals
Gas relay for free Agora Votes: Similar to Tally, abstract away costs of voting
Visualize streams for vendors: Explore vendors, how much paid, etc.
Gov Upgrade for Redelegation of Coinbase delegation: CB has large amount of delegated ENS tokens, difficult to delegate given how tokens are stored, proposal to CB to allow tokens to be delegated
Your DAOs in one place: Discover, follow, and influence the DAOs you care about. Our app brings the entire DAO ecosystem to your mobile, making participation easy and convenient.
Mission: Make it simpler to participate in DAOs
Improve communication between DAO to DAO voters
Integrated with Snapshot
Similar to Boardroom but on mobile
iOS and Mac (M1 chip) compatible
ENS names shown in profiles
Try out and please provide feedback on tg: @scherbovich
Spike: Lots of tools to connect to voting but still think need to increase participation. Uniswap working on initiatives to increase participation through staking, think ENS should think about similar ideas to increase voting participation
Discussion around how different incentive schemes can be gamed
an effective delegate 1) understands + follows ens dao constitution 2) adds value as either developer (ens service provider), steward, or as a delegate 3) good represenative in the space
