Proposal: Committee Model for SPP3 Funding Allocation

brantlymillegan · February 26, 2026, 6:04pm

This is not a fully developed proposal that could be put to a vote in its current form. Instead, this is a summary meant to elicit feedback.

Summary

Seasons 1 and 2 of the SPP have successfully funded a number of projects for the benefit of the ENS ecosystem, and I look forward to season 3. Unfortunately, the lobbying and voting process has been exhausting for all involved.

I propose we replace the existing Delegate Model, in which delegates vote directly for applicants, with a Committee Model, in which a small group of people are deputized by the DAO to negotiate the allocation of the SPP funding.

Problems with the existing system

Delegate fatigue: Delegates are suddenly hit with a barrage of messages from dozens of applicants lobbying for their vote
Applicant fatigue: Applicants spend weeks tracking down up to a hundred delegates, many of whom are difficult to find. Applicants who are well connected have an advantage. It’s a major distraction from their work for weeks.
Lack of context: Most delegates don’t know enough about the ENS community to make an informed decision and don’t have time to properly read applications or talk to applicants.

The Solution: SPP Committee

I propose the DAO deputizes a small SPP Committee of 3-7 people to negotiate the allocation of funding on behalf of the DAO.

Under this model, the DAO is still in charge:

Budget & Principles: Still approves the total annual SPP3 budget and guiding principles for allocation
DAO Picks Committee: Deputizes an existing Working Group or set of stewards, or elects a new small committee (I prefer the former for simplicity, and this could be in the same proposal to approve budget and principles)
Final Approval: Votes to approve the final allocation onchain as a final stamp of approval

The SPP Committee would

Actually Read Applications: Carefully read every application in full
Meet with Applicants: Meet privately with every applicant
Negotiate: Be allowed to negotiate funding amounts with applicants (e.g. “You requested $500k, but would you be willing to take $400k?”)
Make Decisions: Privately formulate a proposal for how SPP funding will be allocated, by majority vote within the committee
Submit to DAO: Publicly submit proposal to DAO for onchain approval

Other aspects of the program - 1 or 2 year time periods, KPIs, quarterly reports, Metagov deputized to check-in with providers, etc - will all remain the same or otherwise negotiated separately from this proposal.

Benefits of this system:

Reduce delegate fatigue
Reduce applicant lobbying fatigue
Improve fairness in the process
Improve evaluation quality
Allow for negotiation on funding amount

Next Steps

I am very open to negotiation on the details of this proposal, since I’d like to see something like this model adopted. If there’s interest in this path, I will write up a detailed proposal taking into account feedback.

Unless there’s clear consensus on which model to use, it could make sense that when SPP3 is put up for a vote, we give delegates three options: Reject program, Approve with Delegate Model, Approve with Committee Model.

Specific Questions for Feedback

Broadly speaking, do people like the existing Delegate Model, or would they prefer to try a Committee Model?
Would people prefer to deputize an existing Working Group or set of Working Groups, or to elect an ad hoc committee? (My preference is the former for the sake of simplicity.)
What other details, principles, or qualifications would be particularly important for people to see in a Committee Model proposal?

lightwalker.eth · February 26, 2026, 9:53pm

@brantlymillegan Thanks for posting this and getting the discussion for SPP3 going.

I’ll give the existing system credit for all the outcomes it’s accomplished for ENS. Agreed though that it comes at a pretty heavy time and energy cost. It’s painful for every category of participant.

The devil is in the details for the SPP Committee. Whatever determines the members matters a lot for if it would be good or not.

Before an idea like that might be put to a vote, let’s first see if we can achieve some consensus on the details of the Committee Model. If it’s a choice between the “devil we know” (Delegate Model) vs “the devil we don’t” (a Committee Model that hasn’t been sufficiently defined yet) I would prefer to keep the existing Delegate Model because a bad Committee Model could be a lot worse.

For a Committee Model, suggest to keep it a smaller group (ex: just 3) to optimize for each member being high-caliber and receiving a fair & meaningful compensation from the DAO for their time / effort / experience / wisdom that carries big consequences for ENS.

For qualifications, the best place to look is at past SPP votes and voting reports. There’s a short list of candidates who have made thoughtful voting reports (on the forum or on social media) for both SPP1 and SPP2. Anyone who is currently receiving any form of compensation through the DAO (directly or indirectly) for the past ~one year is probably best to exclude to remove conflicts of interest. Ex: anyone receiving compensation from a Service Provider, Labs, a Steward, etc. seems best to exclude. All people in these categories could still have a voice and valuable insight, where I imagine the Committee would benefit from asking them for their perspectives, but I think best they not be official committee members.

There’s a pretty short list of candidates meeting such criteria. Ex: @AvsA, @James, @lefterisjp. Each have demonstrated how they are independent and don’t hesitate to call something out if they don’t believe it will be in the best interest of ENS.

Full transparency: I haven’t spoken to any of the names listed above about this, so no idea what they would think about it.

brantlymillegan · February 26, 2026, 10:07pm

Absolutely. To be clear, any vote on whether we should do the Committee Model would include all the details worked out. This post is meant to start the conversation to see if people are interested in this direction and then to also work out the details.

Directionally agree, though we might want to be careful about not making the criteria overly restrictive (e.g. I would not restrict anyone who has received any compensation from the DAO in the last year. I would only restrict those actively applying to this round.) . Also, given the work involved, we probably would want to compensate whoever we chose to do this job.

lightwalker.eth · February 26, 2026, 10:25pm

Open to other criteria.. but cautious. Prefer to error on the side of higher constraints for stronger independence.

The Committee should definitely have some meaningful comp. The decisions carry a lot of weight for ENS. It makes sense for ENS to invest in strong Committee members and to make it worth their time. It shouldn’t be charity work.

The Committee could have powers to oversee Service Providers post-election. Ex: quarterly reviews, powers to adjust streams based on performance, etc.

Premm.eth · February 26, 2026, 11:26pm

Brantly, thanks for kicking off a discussion about SPP3. I look forward to the discussion on how funding for independent teams building ENS can be improved and ENS strengthened as a whole.

From my perspective, the strength of the ENS DAO currently lies in the delegates. From my personal experience, I have seen that the delegates are committed to the mission of ENS, providing a neutral and decentralized protocol for onchain naming and identity for the Ethereum ecosystem and beyond. They are committed to the constitution of ENS, and the policies and initiatives they have supported have gone toward strengthening the credible neutrality and decentralization of ENS, including the creation of the SPP itself.

While the problem of delegate fatigue and delegates lacking context are real problems, I believe that existing initiatives and other incremental changes to existing processes can go a long way toward solving these issues, including the Delegate Incentives Program and setting and keeping clear schedules for funding applications and voting.

The problem with the SPP committee idea, in my view, is that lobbying will only increase, now directed to a small number of committee members, and I believe that the DAO is not currently ready for this degree of administrative stress testing. Over time, I hope and expect that the ENS DAO will gain organizational strength by adopting best practices from successful, similarly sized organizations with similar missions from which we can learn.

Compared to the committee model, I believe the system we have now, with direct delegate voting, makes politicking actually less intense because many delegates do not accept inbound communications, and proposals need to be directed to a more general audience. With a committee, the target is even smaller, and the potential for abuse is higher because of the small number of people deciding how large amounts of funding are allocated.

My proposal for incremental change to the existing SPP is to change the single SPP program into two programs: one for new projects ($100–$300k/year) for new teams that are given a year of funding to see if they can deliver for the ENS DAO, and another program ($300k+/year) for teams that are already established and are seeking continued funding. The goal should be to make the programs as straightforward as possible and keep the ultimate funding decisions in the hands of the delegates.

I believe that making incremental changes to the SPP by simplifying it into this two-tier model and simplifying the voting and application process is the way to go this year, while we further develop the strength and robustness of the ENS DAO.

Also, for full disclosure, the company I co-founded, Unruggable, is currently an SPP recipient, and we are thankful for the support we have received thus far to help build and strengthen ENS, together with all the other independent teams helping to grow and build ENS!

brantlymillegan · February 27, 2026, 2:07am

The point is that the committee would receive all the lobbying, rather than hitting all delegates with it. And they would have the time for a proper procedure to handle it: actually read every application and then schedule a meeting with each applicant team.

I think this is bad. Delegates not accepting inbound communications (from most people) means most people don’t have an opportunity to make their case. I also don’t think all of these delegates are carefully reading all the applications, because they just don’t have time.

The Committee Model solves all these problems: concentrate the lobbying on people who will actually take the time to read the applications and meet with everyone. That way everyone gets their hearing, without people trying to contact 100 different delegates of varying interest and context.

slobo.eth · February 27, 2026, 2:16am

I’d be for trying a committee model for SPP3.

I’d be open to a working group doing this, if and only if it’s explicitly stated before they decide to run for the steward position that this will be part of their responsibilities.

I believe the people best suited to be on the committee and those best suited to be stewards do not have a perfect overlap. It may even have low overlap.

Given the stakes involved, I’d suggest we focus on quality of outcomes vs. simplicity.

A mix of different expertise is likely to lead to good outcomes. We should look for folks who have a good understanding of ENS, business acumen, and are aligned with Ethereum values.

Premm.eth · February 27, 2026, 3:05am

For many grant application processes, it’s not allowed to contact the individual reviewers of a grant.

brantlymillegan · February 27, 2026, 3:19am

But in the Delegate Model there’s no rule (and no way of enforcing one for that anyway). So some do, some don’t. And those who don’t talk to most people might still talk to some people (that they already know), and not talk to others.

One of the benefits of my proposal above is it equalizes the process for everyone.

(By the way, if disallowing communication between decision makers and applicants was important to you, that isn’t possible with the Delegate Model but it is possible with the Committee Model if we chose to make it a rule. Meaning, it would be argument for the Committee Model.)

Premm.eth · February 27, 2026, 3:44am

Why not? We could definitely make a do-not-contact-delegates rule. Delegates are the ones who make and ultimately enforce every decision at the ENS DAO, and would also be the ones starting the streams for SPP3. So even with a committee, it is still ultimately the delegates who decide.

Why wouldn’t it just shift the lobbying to lobbying for who is on the committee?

brantlymillegan · February 27, 2026, 4:13am

More abstract and much less likely to lead to weeks of stressful lobbying we know the existing system creates. I’d really prefer to avoid going through that system again man

BCV · February 27, 2026, 7:59am

Premm.eth

Premm.eth:

Brantly, thanks for kicking off a discussion about SPP3. I look forward to the discussion on how funding for independent teams building ENS can be improved and ENS strengthened as a whole.

From my perspective, the strength of the ENS DAO currently lies in the delegates. From my personal experience, I have seen that the delegates are committed to the mission of ENS, providing a neutral and decentralized protocol for onchain naming and identity for the Ethereum ecosystem and beyond. They are committed to the constitution of ENS, and the policies and initiatives they have supported have gone toward strengthening the credible neutrality and decentralization of ENS, including the creation of the SPP itself.

While the problem of delegate fatigue and delegates lacking context are real problems, I believe that existing initiatives and other incremental changes to existing processes can go a long way toward solving these issues, including the Delegate Incentives Program and setting and keeping clear schedules for funding applications and voting.

The problem with the SPP committee idea, in my view, is that lobbying will only increase, now directed to a small number of committee members, and I believe that the DAO is not currently ready for this degree of administrative stress testing. Over time, I hope and expect that the ENS DAO will gain organizational strength by adopting best practices from successful, similarly sized organizations with similar missions from which we can learn.

Compared to the committee model, I believe the system we have now, with direct delegate voting, makes politicking actually less intense because many delegates do not accept inbound communications, and proposals need to be directed to a more general audience. With a committee, the target is even smaller, and the potential for abuse is higher because of the small number of people deciding how large amounts of funding are allocated.

My proposal for incremental change to the existing SPP is to change the single SPP program into two programs: one for new projects ($100–$300k/year) for new teams that are given a year of funding to see if they can deliver for the ENS DAO, and another program ($300k+/year) for teams that are already established and are seeking continued funding. The goal should be to make the programs as straightforward as possible and keep the ultimate funding decisions in the hands of the delegates.

I believe that making incremental changes to the SPP by simplifying it into this two-tier model and simplifying the voting and application process is the way to go this year, while we further develop the strength and robustness of the ENS DAO.

Also, for full disclosure, the company I co-founded, Unruggable, is currently an SPP recipient, and we are thankful for the support we have received thus far to help build and strengthen ENS, together with all the other independent teams helping to grow and build ENS!

I fully agree with this. Committee-based solutions are often easy shortcuts. They may solve short-term problems, but they weaken the core properties of a DAO and undermine decentralization.

In my view, ENS DAO, with one of the simplest executive structures among major DAOs, is in a unique position. It may be the only DAO that can realistically evolve into a truly decentralized organization, rather than drifting toward a traditional, corporate-like structure as many others have.

For that reason, the execution role of ENS DAO should rest entirely with the delegate set. The key question is not whether this is possible, but how to make a decentralized group of participants more effective and capable.

I believe the answer has two components:

Simplify their responsibilities. (Structural changes in the SPP)
Properly incentivize their work. (Delegate Incentive Program)

When tasks are clearly defined and aligned with meaningful incentives, output naturally improves.

Ultimately, this is not a debate about whether a highly technical, centralized group can outperform a decentralized delegate set. It is about whether we are willing to compromise decentralization principles and return to traditional and centralized solutions.

I hope ENS DAO continues striving to become a truly decentralized organization. It may be one of the few with both the structure and the potential to achieve that.

clowes.eth · February 27, 2026, 10:17am

I am in favor of a committee model if the people on the committee will fund me.

I have shared my opinions in significant depth in these posts:

I think that my OpCo model outlined in the second post is a better, more fleshed out solution to the problems that you have outlined.

The ENS DAO continues to lack any kind of top-down product ownership. As a result, ENS has not, in my opinion, visibly developed over the past few years - it has stagnated.

DAO funding needs to be controlled by people who are incentivized to improve ENS, not people who are grifting the DAO or simply funding their friends. You will find generalized support for almost any structure if enough people believe it will serve their own interests.

ENS needs to find a way of hiring people based on merit who are building things that add value to the ENS protocol. That is why this needs to be a top down process - “This is what we need, who can do it?”.

Could you clarify what outcomes you are referring to?

Probably? We absolutely need to compensate. There is a huge opportunity cost to competent individuals filling these kinds of roles. Arguably we should be hiring externally.

Absolutely.

slobo.eth · February 27, 2026, 12:51pm

You can put obligations on committee members.

You can enforce those limitations on known quantities but not on delegates.

For example it is fine for delegates to be anon. Committee members should not be anon.

cap · February 27, 2026, 1:13pm

Thoughts:

Some delegates have very little context into who does what and how much for the ENS.
Some delegates don’t read entire applications and/or quarterly reports.
Politicking is strong during the voting period and adds stress to the whole process.
Delegates were stressed last year I remember, even though technically they don’t owe anyone their support, so I’m not sure we’d have an easy time finding committee members from existing delegates.
Feels like the Metagov team, who are conducting the Retro, could be a viable candidate for the committee since they are literally doing deep dives into every service provider now.

Any time I suggested something (publicly or privately) that I considered to be an improvement, optimization, or efficiency at the cost of ‘centralization’ of some kind, I’ve been reminded that my proposals shouldn’t impose on delegates’ free will or democratic (voting) rights. I’ve come to understand and respect that principle.

That said, I’m leaning more towards Delegates instead of Committee, but I’m fine either way.

Somehow I feel choosing a committee would be difficult:

They would be expected to evaluate projects working on different aspects of ENS: 1) the protocol and ENSIPs, 2) accompanying critical infra work, 3) growth / partnerships / integrations, 4) subnames, 5) marketplaces, 6) focused on increasing DAO revenue, 7) research, 8) Governance, 9) ENS-centric apps, 10) even AI, and possibly more.
How do they fairly compare and prioritize across these different verticals? Who decides what matters most / what brings most value or impact? If the SPP grant was treated as a VC “investment”, that would be easy, but it’s not. This is all a long-winded way of me saying that I wouldn’t opt for ‘simplicity’ as a factor for choosing someone who makes this decision.

Something along these lines is the direction and thinking I’m aligned with.

It would be interesting if there was an attempt to develop an “evaluation framework” of sorts or “SPP north star” to make this transparent and simpler.

I’d love to participate in a deeper discussion about the SPP program as a whole. I liked Premm’s suggestion of splitting it into two tracks. I think a similar idea was mentioned last year, along with many others, but I don’t want to digress here.

Arnold · February 28, 2026, 2:59pm

Agree on this point. During SPP2 there were many opinions shared with respect to parts of the programs construction.

Specifically the fact that there were many teams working on similar projects and given we were voting on all or nothing. It was hard to decouple and fund specific priorities.

Collectively there was so much time and effort spent discussing it seems sensible to revisit some of the later conclusions before proceeding.

Arnold · February 28, 2026, 3:24pm

I appreciate kickstart of the discussion.

Regarding the committee. The elephant in the room is can it be comprised of members who are also not recipients themselves?

In practice we have not yet really explored all that can be done. Perhaps this can be explored though an RFP process?

This will allow for many ideas to be shared on an even playing field and we can do a temperature check for alignment.

Strongly agree with this as a component.

brantlymillegan · February 28, 2026, 3:27pm

Of course, not really an elephant in the room.

Committee Model would allow precisely this kind of negotiation and precision.

vegayp · March 1, 2026, 7:52pm

I would go for the Committee Model.

And I wouldn’t have stewards being part of it, nor delegates above certain threshold. I think in general this process could follow the same process all grants systems follow (@Sov can provide more insights into this) to make it less obscure than it is now while becoming more efficient.

The only other thing I’d add is that the Committee needs to publicly share an objective matrix or rationale of why those were picked.

My only question left, would be, the Committe would also be in charge of stopping the funding in case of Providers not meeting the expectations? And if so, would that need DAO approval?

Sov · March 5, 2026, 2:49pm

Thanks for the tag here and would be happy to help, I’ve had a few people reach out to me on this same topic. I’ll plan on attending the all hands that we have coming up next week and maybe we can see from there the best way to proceed on this.