One structural issue highlighted both in the retrospective and across many DAOs is the overlap between funding recipients and governance actors. I mentioned this earlier in a forum post and also discussed it in a related article on X.
If funding recipients also dominate the governance structures that allocate or oversee funding, accountability mechanisms become difficult to implement in practice. Creating committees composed primarily of actors drawn from the same group of funding recipients may therefore risk reproducing the same structural problem rather than resolving it. However, the issue does not necessarily disappear simply by appointing different individuals. If the committee is selected and overseen by governance actors who are themselves also funding recipients, the same incentive misalignment can persist. In such cases, the structure may still struggle to provide independent oversight over funding allocation.
A healthier governance structure would aim to maintain a clear separation between execution roles (service providers receiving funding) and oversight roles (delegates responsible for governance and accountability). Programs such as the Delegation Incentives Program can play an important role in enabling this separation by encouraging broader tokenholder delegation and allowing more independent delegates to emerge. Without strengthening this kind of governance structure, the DAO risks reproducing the same structural tensions between funding recipients and oversight actors.