Just an FYI the issues being discussed here re: DAO tokens & participation create the very legal risks which I previously analyzed vis-a-vis assets ENS DAO owns in the endowment (both with & without voting rights/participation in underlying DAOs/protocols). See: DAO Governance Threat Identification & Proposed Mitigation
While it doesn’t seem any action was taken in response to my prior legal risk report, it should be noted that without the proper legal analysis & basic legal protections (i.e. holding companies/legal wrappers to isolate 3rd party tokens and/or DAO participation) ENS DAO is unnecessarily risking 100% of its assets across all ENS wallets including the treasury; therefore, control of DAO governance & the protocol.
I’ll further note, in one of the two cases I cited the court found holders of tokens in unwrapped DAO to be partners of a general partnership creating joint and several liability on passive token holders for actions of the DAO.
Re: Syndicate, on a preliminary review of their terms they seem to operate as Syndicate Inc. (a “legal wrapper within the meaning of the case law), but it’s not clear if the corporation wraps the DAO/DAO token or just their services. If this corporation “wraps” Syndicate DAO, ENS would then be subject to the those terms, including indemnification of Syndicate, a Delaware governing law provision, and a ADR provision (mediation).
It’s relatively easy and cost effective to protect ENS DAO even in the instance ENS wanted to actively participate/vote in another DAO, but it’s even easier to get it wrong and create unmitigated legal risk such as the asset(s) I highlighted in my prior risk report. While “doing nothing” with an airdrop to the treasury wallet may seem like it’s the safest course of action, ENS DAO should discuss the potential risks of doing nothing with their counsel.