Seeking Feedback on Bylaws GAP Analysis: A Call to Stewards, Delegates, and Contributors

Thank you for preparing this GAP Analysis for DAO-wide review. I am sharing some excerpts here, which I think are of particular interest to the DAO:

Points of Concern — Excerpts from the Gap Analysis
  • $ENS Governance Token Airdrop: Add additional wording explaining that the airdrops were carried out in the past and are no longer relevant today. New members will know straight away that this is no longer valid.
  • Context for Governance: Instead of saying “off-chain voting”, mention the types of proposals that are voted on here.
  • Onboarding & Participation: “To request access…” Link to a resource that explains in detail what happens after the form is submitted and who evaluates the form.
  • Venues: “Community members must register for an account before sharing or liking posts.” Define different personas in the beginning. This way, no one would get confused on what a community member is, what a governance participant is, etc. This could also include an access-level list for the different personas on different platforms.
  • Getting Work Done: Define what an RFP is. The process is unclear. Add clarification on the process and steps with detailed for Proposal and RFP will be added in the updated Bylaws. Suggestion would be a level/type system that would allow grouping different types of proposals and share best practices / criteria accordingly.
  • The RFP Process: What processes are in place to comply with KYC / AML regulations? (if and when required) How are milestones submitted and tracked and what is the process for milestone assessment before payments are made? KYC requirements before any payments are made will be added in the updated ByLaws as well as a threshold under which KYC is not required. The request for additional funding process will also be defined in more detail and what is required.
  • Passing a Proposal: What prevents someone from submitting an Executable Proposal to the governor contract even if it hasn’t passed the SnapShot vote? What processes are in place to avoid this? Are there processes in place that an authorized person could submit a veto and block the passed proposal from being executed? Main concern here is if KYC and AML checks are not passed or in the rare circumstances where it can damage reputation or is an illegal activity.
  • ENS DAO Constitution: Indicate the type of costs incurred by the foundation each year. In addition, from a transparency point of view, it would be good to regularly draw up a budget estimate and submit a detailed expenditure report so that the community can understand the expenditure. A transparency report can be presented to the DAO on an annual, bi- annual, or quarterly basis.
  • Dissolution of Working Groups: Who oversees freezing the assets? Add who the responsible party would be for returning the funds.
  • Conflicts of interest in election process: Create a resolution process that indicates how a conflict is declared, what is expected when it is declared, whether elected stewards can be part of the decsion making process, whether there are any term limits or re-election periods, etc.
  • Election of Directors: Incorporate the election of directors in the ByLaws. Outline the steps for the election or removal of a director.
  • Veto Right: Introduce a possibility to raise vetoes. At ENS, vetoes could be raised by the foundation.
  • Code of conduct: for council/community members that can be used for non-compliance.
  • Process for alteration of Bylaws, dispute resolution, arbitration, election of a supervisor in the Bylaws.
  1. Defining DAO Roles Beyond ‘Community Members’: To alleviate confusion, I agree that it would be helpful to define distinct personas or actors, rather than simply labeling all participants as ‘Community Members’. This could include creating an access-level list for these personas across various platforms.
  2. Clarification and Structuring of the RFP Process: The RFP process could be better outlined. Currently, I find it difficult to follow and it leaves too much room for interpretation. Additionally, there are no KYC/AML requirements, nor are there best practices established for submitting and tracking milestones. I believe that adding KYC/AML requirements before making payments, along with a threshold below which they are not required, would be beneficial.
  3. Posting and Voting Procedures for ENS Proposals: Recently, a rogue proposal was posted in the ENS snapshot space. According to the Governance Process, “if your proposal is an Executable Proposal, you will now need to submit it to the governor contract for voting onchain.” — Lemma raised an important point by asking what prevents someone from submitting an Executable Proposal to the governor contract even if it hasn’t passed the Snapshot vote. I would advise investigating this issue as a means of forming a preventive measure against governance attacks.
  4. Enhanced Budget Transparency for DAO Expenditures: Increase the transparency of costs incurred by the Foundation by regularly drawing up a budget estimate and submitting a detailed expenditure report. This will enable DAO participants to better understand the expenditures. A transparency report could be presented to the DAO on an annual, bi-annual, or quarterly basis. This report should be created by the role that is responsible for administering the DAO’s governance documentation and processes, and for keeping these materials up to date (to be formed per criteria outlined in the RFP).
  5. Procedures for Dissolution and Freezing of DAO Working Groups: Freezing of funds should be administered by the DAO secretary (imho).
  6. Formalizing Conflict of Interest Protocols in DAO Elections: Thus far, conflicts of interest in election processes have been handled on a ‘de facto’ basis. The DAO has done a stellar job of navigating these ambiguous situations, but to ensure continued effectiveness, it is pertinent that we develop clear documentation to establish a legitimate protocol as a guide for handling future conflicts of interest.
  7. Development of a Code of Conduct for DAO Governance: Code of conduct should be developed that can be used for non-compliance, as well as a process for alteration of Bylaws, dispute resolution, arbitration, and the election of a supervisor in the Bylaws.
  8. Review and Discussion of Veto Powers in DAO Proposals: Finally, the veto right is interesting in theory. Using Optimism as a reference, the Citizens’ House can raise vetoes on certain passed proposals. At ENS, vetoes could be raised by the Foundation. I believe that this is something that should be discussed at greater length by relevant parties.

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Please note: these are my professional opinions and do not reflect the overall opinion of the Meta-Governance Working Group.

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