We’re wanting to follow as many processes as possible around this proposal, though as was discussed at the delegate all hands metagov call this week, there’s time pressure around this proposal because of the steward election timeline and DAO pressure around working groups generally.
Credibly neutral as possible compared to the previous proposal that outlined Myself, Arnold and Clowes as part of the retro initiative - There was strong feedback from delegates and working group stewards that by having individuals already involved in the DAO there would be some underlying bias within the retro. Thus by making metagov.org the primary contributor to the retro we make a more credibly neutral process (by removing the bias myself and others might have had).
An RFP process would consume significantly more DAO time and coordination than this proposal aims to. Similar to the SPP program and other DAO initiatives, we should continue to refine these ideas in the future (perhaps with a retro v2 in years to come). However for this initial retro, aligning with an organisation as respected as metagov.org is a strong first step. Just like Nethermind was selected as the partner to contribute to Namechain development without a RFP, at times industry leaders can be selected via their expertise and network. Thus why proposing metagov.org as the independent reviewer here was supported by ALL working group leads (that have publicly posted) and was well received at the delegates all hands meetings (both online and IRL, neither of which you have recently attended, delegates and contributors who have attended recent DAO calls have generally signalled positively towards the retro and have been very supportive of metagov.org’s participation).
My initial thought here is that last week’s proposal about abolishing the working groups was in a similar place. That proposal received no such pushback from yourself and ENS Labs delegates. I recognise that as I’m a primary driver of the retro there is inherent bias against this initiative based on our history. Throughout this process I’ve been working alongside stewards, contributors and delegates in order to move the entire industry and ENS DAO forward in good faith.
On point 1.
- Last week a proposal went to vote with very short cadence and while still being in ‘temp check’ phase rather than a draft proposal which you voted yes on. Many of these more nuanced forum proposal rules aren’t consistently followed, which makes sense given the emergent nature of DAOs and their bylaws.
- As outlined in above replies, DAOs are emergent and given wider timelines (such as the pending steward election) moving this vote to snapshot is the first step in this proposal because of the need for a social proposal to pause the steward nomination period.
On point 2.
The bylaws were written under a broader ruleset which has obviously evolved gradually over the years since DAO launch. Adherence to those bylaws is always encouraged, but certainly many proposals and decisions made in the past have enshrined common sense and trust as the guiding lights over strict adherence to specific bylaws, especially in these emergent situations. The DAO has maintained course throughout and I would argue that the same is true here.
Saying this, adding more detail to the specification section is a good call: The specification section has now been updated to include; 1. Specific meta governance rules that are affected by this proposal 2. Adding ‘pause’ specifications around WG multi-sigs in the edge case that all three stewards are unwilling to continue during this period. The assumption is that the humans (especially those elected by the DAO such as WG stewards) involved with ENS DAO are acting in good faith. The section below has been added to the specification section of the proposal:
Effect on working group rules:
This proposal affects Working Group elections and is utilising Working Group rule 12.1 around Working Group Amendments.
- This proposal directly affects Working group rule 3.2 around term time limits and Working group rule 6. around delaying steward elections, by proposing an extension to the current Working Groups stewards term (as well as their compensation) and delaying the Steward elections window until either:
- This proposal has an onchain ratifying vote that extends WG terms and pushes the next election window until March after the ENS retrospective.
- This snapshot proposal doesn’t pass, triggering a start to the elections whenever viable:
- Triggering Working Group rule 6.1, where steward elections will take place “as soon as is practicable after the missed Nomination Window or missed Election Window.” CC the post from Metagov Working group here.
- If two or more WG stewards are no longer willing to continue in their positions, funds from that multisig will be returned to the DAO treasury, in line with the bylaws.
- If one WG steward is no longer willing to hold their multi-sig position, the Metagovernance working group will decide on multi-sig governance or funds being returned to the DAO.
On point 3.
This proposal is signalling support and structure for an ENS DAO retro, and the outcomes have been discussed at length, both in the replies to this post, during working group meetings, and discussed at delegate all hands meetings. As outlined, this proposal is a timely first step (due to the pending steward elections) in a multi-week process around ratifying the retro, where this proposal gives early clarity around core contributors (metagov.org), budget outlines (without committing capital), paths for wider DAO contribution as well as proposal motivations and timelines.
As mentioned at the top of this reply, the reason for this proposal being pushed to a vote quicker than normal is due to advice from the MetaGov working group and the time pressure of the planned steward elections and their impact on the retro.