<EDIT: This proposal has been updated on 02/12/2025
tldr edits;
Title: added " & Stakeholder Analysis
- Timeline & contributors section: Changes around Retro contributor structure. In line with wanting this process to be as credibly neutral as possible, the proposal now articulates Metagov.org as the primary and only contributor to the DAO Retro, while also creating structures for the the wider ENS DAO ecosystem to contribute to the retro in an open, permissionless way.
- Updates around proposal timeline and development; CC Specification section below.
- Working group extension section: More detail about if one/all of the stewards decide not to stay on during this extension.
- Budget section: More clarity around budget development, governance and timeline, outlining a new proposal timeline which includes a snapshot > onchain vote delay which gives Metagov.org and the DAO (via the forum) time to further scope the proposal and budget.
- Specification section: Restructured proposal specification to give clarity around proposal ordering and timelines. Added āone weekā and ā(By December 17th)ā to onchain vote timeline section
Summary
DAOs have had almost a decade of history, during which there have been very few retrospective reviews of DAO treasury spend. This proposal aims to bring more accountability to the DAOās spending, developing clear and measurable datapoints that the DAO can use to continue to build its processes and decision making mechanisms.
This temp check proposes undertaking a formalised retrospective on ENS DAO; its impact, its spending, its goals and its outputs from the past two years. Examining grants, DAO service providers, DAO working groups and any other output from the DAO treasury.
This retro was initially an output of conversations at Edge City with @arnold and myself exploring d/acc ideas on DAO evolution. ENS DAO is the golden example of how projects can actively expand output, community, contribution and opportunity by operating as a DAO - however, this doesnāt mean that we shouldnāt look within to improve our processes and operations. To maintain this industry leadership, ENS must be willing to self examine our goals, structure, spending and output in an honest and encouraging way.
This idea was then shared to a telegram group including working group stewards, ENS labs and @clowes.eth because of how This post sparked initial thinking about more retrospective analysis of the DAOs outputs. This was then discussed during ENS & Governance events at Devconnect, and most recently the pre-proposal has been introduced to Metagov.org and Eugene who (as this proposal will outline) will ideally play the role of a data-backed, independent actor, motivated by increasing the rigor and efficacy of DAOs more broadly.
The retro will build upon the existing reporting structures developed across service providers and working groups (such as the quarterly updates from both, shoutout to @Limes for these excellent WG spending summaries).
The goal of this proposal is to establish clear accountability standards for the DAO and measure outcomes against intentions. While gathering strong data to improve governance cycles, service provider selection, working groups and DAO growth.
Motivation
ENS DAO has grown significantly since its launch in 2021, supported by a wide range of contributors, funded initiatives, working groups, and service providers. While the high-level success of ENS is objective and clear, the DAO lacks some elements of structure and accountability. DAOs have already made immense impact on the growth and opportunity within Ethereum and we see this proposal as a way to continue improving these structures. The motivation of this proposal is to examine ENS DAOās purpose, practices, desired outcomes, spending, outputs, and outcomes.
- What has been funded
- What has not
- What has been delivered
- What has not
- Tracking outputs from the ENS DAO as well as what impact do we think will be generated over a longer timeline (in as measurable ways as possible, as well as anecdotally where possible).
- What outputs have not been tracked/considered
- What was considered to be reported on, what hasnāt, understanding previous reporting standards.
- What goals does the DAO have implicit and explicit
- Are they only outlined in the constitution or do specific programs have specific goals?
- What are ways in which the DAO can be more rigorous and more easily held accountable?
- ENS DAO Stakeholder analysis that would use a combination of surveys and interviews to better understand the desired outcomes of the DAO, as well as the challenges it faces.
This list obviously isnāt fully expansive of everything that will be covered in the retro and Iād encourage all ideas and additions here! An open call for different metrics, milestones or ideas that ENS could be evaluating.
After speaking with a number of delegates, stewards and other contributors, we believe that a retrospective is the most high impact action that we can take as a DAO. Below is a synopsis of the conversations that lead us to this position:
- ENS DAO is one of the strongest DAOs in the ecosystem; establishing more formal accountability standards further strengthens our position. Very few DAOs in history have conducted this type of activity, and this will continue ENSā position as a clear industry leader.
- Agreement that the SPP decision/vote structure needs improvement and that without conducting a retrospective on the decisions made to date itās difficult to recommend a new path forward.
- Working groups were an output from initial ideation around the DAO. Understanding their goals, output and processes is a perfect first step before executing any specific next step.
- This type of retro mirrors reporting norms expected from comparable scale traditional organisations, foundations, and public companies.
- Building structured evaluation into DAO operations improves signal for delegates and DAO contributors making DAO decisions.
- This sets a precedent around transparent DAO accountability.
We acknowledge that this process could increase the workload of WG stewards, service providers, delegates, and DAO contributors in the short term, however ideally this process increases efficiencies and makes contribution easier in the long run. The intention is to create a foundational review that reduces ambiguity and improves operational efficiency in all future cycles!
Timeline & Contributors
We envision this process taking no more than 4 months, with the aim of having it completed by the start of March before the SPP vote.
The ENS DAO Retro & Stakeholder Analysis would be fully conducted by @Eugene and Metagov.org as an independent party. Contributions and data provision can be provided by anyone (in or outside of the DAO) however the data collection and analysis will be managed independently by Metagov.org, to ensure that no internal DAO politics, or external parties acting in their own best interest, blur the intent or output of the retrospective.
Another area for immediate feedback is the methods in which ENS stakeholders can contribute to this project. Community members will be encouraged to provide all relevant data and reports, which will be publicly tracked. There will also be a surveys and interviews meant to gather more qualitative information, ranging from peopleās understanding of the mission, to outlining potential challenges or problems the DAO needs to solve.
It is important to remind readers - the goal of this project is not produce a proposal of what ENS DAO does next. This retrospective and stakeholder analysis is meant to provide clarity on where the DAO is and what are the some the challenges it is facing. From there, the community will use this information to inform subsequent proposals on where to take ENS DAO in Q2 of 2026 and beyond.
Request for Working Group Steward Term Extension
To ensure this retrospective informs the next SPP and WG cycles, this proposal also seeks to ratify the extension of Working Group Steward terms by up to 4 months, moving elections to ~March 2026.
We understand that a term extension without explicit opt in from WG stewards may incur some downstream effects as some WG stewards may have other commitments or already have made a decision about running in the next election. However this proposal would posit that by extending stewards term we encourage a minimum level of commitment in the retrospective where stewards have to opt out rather than opt in. This proposal would also extend the ongoing distributions to stewards to maintain their payment over this period.
If any steward wants to opt out and is not willing to continue to participate as a steward (or separately from the retro), then as long as one WG lead stays on the working group can be maintained over this extension (likely with an understood reduced output level, along with hopeful participation in the retro).
If a working group has all three stewards that are unwilling to participate in the term extension, this proposal would initially propose their WG would be āpausedā until the end of the extension and their multisig funds would be returned to the DAO.
This element is obviously a large and important part of the proposal - But after discussion with the ENS ecosystem (on & offline) and ideating on WG lead participation, it seems incredibly important to have the existing WG stewards (many of which have been here for the last two years) participating and bringing insight to this process.
On top of the reality that these stewards have insight to bring, because of these retro discussions over the past ~4 weeks (which I will directly take responsibility for alongside the MetaGov WG) there hasnāt been an announcement or any space for new possible electorates to propose themselves, which is another reason to extend these elections so we can have more time to invite wider contributors to the working groups.
As a part of this proposal it was considered to enable WG elections during the retro (over coming weeks), since extending working groups in this way disrupts the current structure that serves the DAO and community. However after consideration, keeping the current working group stewards by extending the current term for up to 4 months gives the retro the highest likelihood of engagement and ease.
Budget Requirements
As outlined below in the specification section, this forum post (and subsequent snapshot vote) is only an initial signal about whether the DAO retro and stakeholder analysis should go ahead. Specific deliverables, proposal scope and budget breakdown will be presented by Metagov.org as a part of the discussion between the snapshot vote and executable proposal, though as an initial estimate itās envisioned that this budget will be ~$125k +/- $25k.
This budget could be managed by a range of actors; the MetaGov Working group, ENS Labs or Metagov.org themselves. This budget would also be tied to deliverables, timeline and scope defined by Metagov.org in the subsequent proposal.
Specification
This proposal is an initial temp check that is the first step in a multi-step process towards this retrospective:
- This proposal will be posted on snapshot to signal from the DAO that this proposal and retrospective is a worthwhile exercise. (This week)
- After a successful snapshot vote, this proposal will be further refined by Metagov.org to give a clearer scope of work around deliverables, budget breakdowns and clear goals & outputs of a DAO retrospective. (~one week)
- ENS Working Group elections would be paused following this snapshot proposal until (at minimum) the following onchain proposal ratifies this proposal.
- A ratifying onchain vote would occur that would enact this proposal, kick off the retro, extend working group terms, distribute the retro budget and empower Metagov.org as the independent party of the initiative. (By December 17th)
- Work will commence immediately, accounting for time off during public holidays, with rolling updates shared on the forum.
Effect on working group rules:
This proposal affects Working Group elections and is utilising Working Group rule 12.1 around Working Group Amendments.
- This proposal directly affects Working group rule 3.2 around term time limits and Working group rule 6. around delaying steward elections, by proposing an extension to the current Working Groups stewards term (as well as their compensation) and delaying the Steward elections window until either:
- This proposal has an onchain ratifying vote that extends WG terms and pushes the next election window until March after the ENS retrospective.
- This snapshot proposal doesnāt pass, triggering a start to the elections whenever viable:
- Triggering Working Group rule 6.1, where steward elections will take place āas soon as is practicable after the missed Nomination Window or missed Election Window.ā CC the post from Metagov Working group here.
- If two or more WG stewards are no longer willing to continue in their positions, funds from that multisig will be returned to the DAO treasury, in line with the bylaws.
- If one WG steward is no longer willing to hold their multi-sig position, the Metagovernance working group will decide on multi-sig governance or funds being returned to the DAO.
Conclusion
This retrospective is an opportunity to elevate global DAO governance standards, reinforce accountability, and continue to set ENS up for long-term success. By conducting this retrospective now and aligning upcoming governance cycles to incorporate its findings, the DAO strengthens its ability to deploy resources efficiently and transparently.
Despite this being a doubted time period in the history of DAOs, Iām extremely confident in ENS DAOās ability to prioritise decentralisation, community contribution and genuinely building in public alongside Ethereum. Conducting this retro aims to strengthen decentralised organisations as a whole and empower ENS to continued industry leadership.
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