[Temp Check] Replace the Working Groups with the ENS Admin Panel

[Limes]

Update (11/25/25): NEW TEMP CHECK BASED ON FEEDBACK: Link to post

Introduction

ENS DAO has had a profound impact on my life and I have met incredible people in my four years as Steward and two years as Working Group Secretary. However, after giving it due thought, I’ve come to believe that it is in the best interest of ENS to wind down Working Group operations.

Abstract

This proposal calls for winding down the Meta-Governance, Ecosystem, and Public Goods Working Groups at the end of Term 6 (Dec 31, 2025). The essential functions currently performed by Working Groups should be absorbed by ENS Labs.

Motivation

The purpose of Working Groups at their creation was to “promote stability and encourage long-term thinking and planning.”

A casual observation of working groups would suggest we are missing the mark and actually detracting from the north star goal of being a universal naming standard, often bringing attention to internal politics rather than external objectives.

Appointing an oversight committee would only add to the machine and doesn’t address structural problems, namely:

1. No incentive for hard truths

When future funding depends on relationships, your incentives are to not hurt feelings. “I’ll support your proposal if you support mine” becomes the norm. This prioritizes psychological safety over truth seeking, and without truth seeking, you get stuck with bad results.

2. Inability to fire contributors

Working Groups can’t curate who participates. Traditional organizations select their team and fire when needed while WGs are open by default, accumulating contributors based on availability rather than ability. The reality is bad contributors make good contributors leave.

These aren’t problems we can fix with better processes. They’re inherent to the WG structure. Shutting them down is the only way out.

Details

What Stays the Same

• ENS Labs Stream
• Service Provider Stream
• Contract Naming Season

What Gets Wound Down

• Working Group weekly calls
• Steward, Secretary, and Scribe positions
• Working Group Multisigs send remaining USDC, ETH, and ENS back to the DAO

Obligations That Should Move to Labs

• Manage Service Provider Multisig - Execute transactions when necessary on stream.mg.wg.ens.eth
• Coordinate with KPK - Pay KPK’s performance fees using investment yield.
• Provide platform for presentations - Organize quarterly YouTube/Zoom sessions where Service Providers and select community projects present updates/announcements. Curate presenters and moderate text-based Q&A.
• Organize IRL events - Plan and execute meetups at conferences and hackathons.

Why This Works

Having no structure is better than the current structure. Labs can execute these functions with greater efficiency while eliminating unnecessary compensation costs.

ENS should strive to have decentralization of teams (Labs & SPs), not decentralization inside teams (WGs). Five cars going to five destinations explore more territory than five people in one car arguing about where to go. Winding down Working Groups puts us back on track.

Update (11/25/25): NEW TEMP CHECK BASED ON FEEDBACK: Link to post

[brantlymillegan]

I’m very open to simplifying working groups.

I do think Labs should take over organizing all IRL events.

I don’t think Labs should be managing funds or doing administrative work on behalf of the DAO, e.g. I don’t think Labs should be managing KPK or the SPP streams. This is because part of the whole point of the DAO is to separate Labs from the ENS protocol treasury.

For all these reasons, if we were to simplify the existing WG setup, I’d still want there to be at least one WG (or something similar) that manages these remaining important administrative tasks for the DAO.

[simona_pop]

There seems to be a wider pattern across the ecosystem right now: DAOs contracting, foundations or Labs entities consolidating power, and communities taking a back seat while decisions get streamlined in the name of “efficiency.” This is not new and several DAOs have done this in the past few years. What it unfortunately results in is a quiet hollowing out of participation in order to “reduce friction.”

That context matters.

Before ENS considers winding down structures as foundational as the Working Groups, we owe it to the protocol (and ourselves as active participants) to take a more deliberate path than what we’ve seen elsewhere. Cuts without review often create clarity in the short term but produce long term concentration risks and weaker resilience.

This is not an argument against evolution. Mature organisations should refine and adapt. But pruning without a diagnosis of the problem — without a thorough look at what’s working, what isn’t and what alternatives exist — often leads to the same centralisation spiral other DAOs now regret.

If we are to reshape governance, let’s do it in conscious and grounded way vs knee jerk:

With data, honest retrospectives, community input based on findings and with a plan that protects accountability.

ENS has shown, time and again, that a decentralised organisation can evolve with clarity, accountability, and genuine community buy in. We don’t need to mirror the reactive cuts happening across the ecosystem; our strength has always come from taking the time to understand where we are and how to improve without compromising our values.

This is a moment for ENS to lead — to demonstrate what responsible adaptation looks like, and how a DAO can refine itself without surgically removing the very structures that have kept it transparent and resilient. We’re in a position to set an example of what thoughtful, well-governed decentralisation can become.

[jkm.eth]

When I first experienced ENS DAO, I was blown away by how much more accessible it was than nearly every other DAO out there. This access was made possible by the working groups.

Limes makes a valid point, that the WGs don’t have the power to curate their communities. However, in other DAOs, I’ve seen the exact opposite problem: quality newcomers can’t get a foot in the door, and the same insiders that have been there from day one suck up all the air in the room. I’m sure politics still come into play in the ENS working groups, but at least people can show up, contribute, demonstrate what they have to offer, and potentially convince the community they are worth investing in.

I think eliminating the ENS working groups would be a huge step backwards, and risks making ENS no longer stand out from all the other DAOs I’ve experienced.

I don’t know why the working group structure can’t be improved to solve for the weaknesses you’ve identified? What if working groups could curate the community? There’s no reason there couldn’t be an application process to be approved to join weekly calls, for example (I’m not necessarily suggesting we do this, but there are loads of things that could be tried short of setting fire to the whole thing).

Like Simona, I have noticed a lot of centralization going on all across the ecosystem. My impression is that many of those organizations are throwing in the towel because centralization is easy and governing in public is hard. But I think ENS is better than that, and has many choices other than giving up and admitting failure.

[James]

@simona_pop

There seems to be a wider pattern across the ecosystem right now: DAOs contracting, foundations or Labs entities consolidating power, and communities taking a back seat while decisions get streamlined in the name of “efficiency.” This is not new and several DAOs have done this in the past few years. What it unfortunately results in is a quiet hollowing out of participation in order to “reduce friction.”

@jkm.eth

I think eliminating the ENS working groups would be a huge step backwards, and risks making ENS no longer stand out from all the other DAOs I’ve experienced.

Entirely agree here ^^

Not sure where this post has come from and seems to be an overreaction to the idea of holding an ENS DAO retrospective, that was introduced a few weeks ago as an output from conversations at the d/acc residency at Edge City with @Arnold, about how DAOs can continue to thrive and be optimised in a world of ‘un-DAOification’. Working groups have provided objective and measurable value to ENS and winding them down entirely is unlikely to be a positive step towards the DAO’s longterm success. As a first step, including the working groups in a DAO-wide retro is a great way to clearly identify the incredible work these WGs have achieved and highlight any changes or improvements that could be made (be those structural or granular).

[ENSPunks.eth]

@James

Not sure where this post has come from and seems to be an overreaction to the idea of holding an ENS DAO retrospective

Interesting take. The WG meeting notes made a retro seem timely, if not overdue.

Half-joking, but ever since @AvsA’s audit of DAO fund flows, I’ve thought the ecosystem could use a truth-and-reconciliation commission.

I’m not alone: the culture is toxic, rife with gatekeeping, conflicts of interest, and self-dealing. When @ENSPunks.eth says it, it’s shrugged off. But the talent that’s fled speaks louder: coders, PhD mathematicians, multiple lawyers (myself included), even an astrophysicist. There’s little recognition of how hard that caliber is to attract, let alone why it’s been chased away, just constant complaints of lack of talent as if there weren’t people knocking at the door never let it.

One example: the DAO still lacks bylaws or a COI policy.

• Bylaws: Paid non-lawyers to draft what is fundamentally legal work, rejecting a 10+ year corporate lawyer who underbid them. Result: no bylaws, wasted funds, lost talent.

• COI: The conflicted parties control adoption, so nothing ever happens. Classic negative feedback loop that results in little to no room for new contributors.

Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Greater centralization isn’t the fix for a decentralized treasury. Changing toxic culture is hard; it starts with asking questions - unfortunately asking questions is something contributors have been told not to do, even at WG meetings on important issues like personal liability, creating a chilling effect. A retro is the right place to begin.

Good luck.

[liubenben]

I just have a few thoughts.

When we encounter problems:

• Subjectively speaking, we should face them correctly. Because if someone can discover a profound problem and publish it, it means that person understands and loves it, and also that they are also inside the problem.

• Objectively speaking, we should actively improve. Just like @simona_pop said above.

Regarding ENS DAO:

• I believe it is a model of governance in the crypto world, but there is no perfect organization in the world. We cannot be too idealistic, dynamic evolution is the eternal task of every organization.

• Several comments already in this post have given me more confidence in the composition and capability level of the DAO’s personnel than before.

[BCV]

The management of a DAO should be as decentralized as its scalability needs allow. A protocol with a simple function like ENS can support multi-party management, I think. Full, single-party control might be necessary for more complex protocols, but not for ENS, in my opinion.

[nick.eth]

Politicking in working groups has taken its toll on the ENS DAO, driving off many dedicated contributors - with more departing at the end of this term. In its current state we are heading towards a situation where all serious, dedicated and competent individuals have been driven off or discouraged from participating, resulting in a situation where the leadership of the DAO devolves to only those who are either inexperienced, too stubborn to leave, or have external incentives not aligned with the protocol.

If you’re concerned I’m including you in that assessment, no, of course not - you’re one of the good ones.

I don’t want to see the DAO run like that, and I’m very concerned about the risk of governance capture or mismanagement if it does happen. As a director I’m also concerned about the DAO’s ability to uphold its legal obligations in the absence of a dedicated contributor base.

For that reason I’m supportive of a hiatus on working groups while a sustainable long-term solution is built - such as a management company taking care of the DAO’s day-to-day obligations and setting budgets, allowing contributors to focus on their areas of expertise.

[SpikeWatanabe.eth]

@nick.eth

Politicking in working groups has taken its toll on the ENS DAO, driving off many dedicated contributors - with more departing at the end of this term. In its current state we are heading towards a situation where all serious, dedicated and competent individuals have been driven off or discouraged from participating

this

I was hoping to make things work and make some real changes and I have some great ideas how to move things forward, but fighting politics in its current state is like fighting windmills

maybe problem is not working group, but the way they are organized

@netto.eth put forward proposition at some point to induce steward rotation, then suddenly abandoned it, however it would’ve been a welcome change

in principle WGs is a good thing, provided they are working efficiently

[vegayp]

@nick.eth

I don’t want to see the DAO run like that, and I’m very concerned about the risk of governance capture or mismanagement if it does happen. A

I will say that this is a call to action.

Since the inception, the DAO has been in a experimenting mode, with no really a lot of changes besides the Endaowment or the Community WG dissolution (structurally wise). As a consequence we have fall into a very political and not very evolving state. We could continue like this? Yes. Does dissolving the WG may change this? No. There is the name “DAO” for a reason. If the token holders would decide to dissolve the DAO operations and return the funds to LABS, that would be the only sense making but it would go against the very concept of crypto values of decentralisation. I’d rather change the DAO name and what it means, to just funding layer.

I think this post by @Limes and everyone else comments, make very obvious that things need to change, but towards evolution. Towards improving the model, not retracting the model simply because the model isn’t perfect.

A few suggestion I have given a thought for a while:

• Stewards and paid contributors should be held accountable (calls assistance, events participation, forum activity), and if criteria isn’t meet they should be fired.
• Stewards shouldn’t be able to get re-elected more than two periods, and not head of the WG for more than one period. Rotation is important.
• Stewards assistance to other calls should be encouraged, it’s outrageous that we barely see participation from other stewards in other WGs. Lime does a great job bringing updates, but common: it’s only an hour, I’d say 4k a month would justify that stewards participate more in calls or at least show an interest about what’s going on in the organisation we all are supposed to care for.
• Arbitrary distribution of funds should be reconsidered: if there is a conflict of interest WGs shouldn’t be able to distribute funds.
• Stewards and Service Providers shouldn’t be able to vote as long as they held up their positions. Why? Because by doing so you remove the political backdoor conversation that so often happens.
• Secretary role could be merged with Governance, and the role should evolve and transition towards a more coordinator role (Limes does a great job so far) that helps pushing accountability and communication between Labs, other DAOs, internal affairs and conflict resolution.
• Conflict resolution: we have no arbitration in place, nor a person responsable for it. Everything is handled in private messages with no transparency about it.

For the three years I have been contributed to the ENS DAO, it has been the best DAO I’ve been. We have things to improve? Yes of course. I don’t think it’s James retrospective what will give us the solution to this problems, it will certainly provide light or insights, but I feel is our duty as members of the organisations to uphold the values that ENS stands for. We aren’t a 1k people organisation who is too big to change and adapt.

And to be honest, we have done a great work so far, and winding down the WGs would be a setback in my opinion. I’d agree tho, that Ecosystem and Governance are the main ones to keep. As a ex-Public Goods Steward, I can see Governance doing the PG role if needed or Labs having a dedicated person to it.

Here it begs the question: if the current infrastructure is taken down, How much, realistically, can ENSlabs take over and how many things/dao relationships/events would get affected by such radical change?

[SpikeWatanabe.eth]

for all of that to happen - accountability etc there has to be some sort of very strong overseeing body, either centralized - in theory this could (should?) be metagov group or very strong body of delegates, who would really dig into the performance and question everything, and able to put real pressure of WGs, and for that there has to be proper incentives for them, and not just monetary, but also dedicated part of forum for them etc, so that they know that their voice will be heard

[GozmanGonzalez]

I appreciate the honesty and the courage it takes to put out a proposal like this. It is clear that you came to this conclusion after a lot of personal experience and long reflection, and that alone deserves respect. I’ve watched the Working Groups grow, struggle and evolve over the years and I understand how easy it is for the internal rhythms to drift away from the bigger mission.

Some of the points you raised hit close to home, especially the tension between wanting harmony and needing hard conversations. You captured something real there. When people start voting with relationships rather than conviction, the quality of decisions slowly erodes and nobody wants to say it out loud. I also understand the frustration around not being able to set expectations or hold contributors accountable. It creates a strange mix of goodwill and stagnation that is hard to escape.

At the same time, shutting everything down feels like a big step and I think many people will want to understand what we lose, not just what we fix. The Working Groups have been the first place where many of us found our footing in the ecosystem. They gave room for new voices and created a path for people who wanted to learn, experiment, or simply belong. If we hand everything to Labs, the worry is not about centralization alone but about losing that open door where people could show up and grow into real contributors.

Your proposal makes a strong case for efficiency, though I think the community needs to talk through how we protect the parts of the culture that made ENS special in the first place. There might be a way to simplify without closing the door completely. Maybe the bigger question is how to make the mission louder than the politics, not whether the Working Groups should exist at all.

Either way, I’m glad you raised this. It forces all of us to pause and ask what the DAO truly needs to move forward. I hope the discussion that follows is honest, patient and grounded in care for the project rather than sides or labels. That’s the only way we’ll reach something that actually strengthens ENS in the long run.

[Limes]

I had many talks with people at Devconnect about this topic, here is the distilled summary:

1. People want accountability for DAO funded programs. Everyone agrees accountability is necessary; the disagreement is over who should provide it. Past attempts within the ENS DAO have led to stalemates and inaction. Many believe a vote is required to determine who should be responsible for accountability.

2. People think Working Groups should shrink, but not disappear. Those I spoke with found weekly calls excessive and preferred monthly or quarterly meetings focused on presentations rather than open discussion. Additionally, there was consensus that nine people weren’t necessary to run them. But people didn’t like the idea of getting rid of DAO operations entirely.

Taking this feedback into account, I am pivoting this temp check to: Replace the Working Groups with the ENS Admin Panel.

The goal of the Admin Panel is to eliminate the discretionary, subjective decision-making that Working Groups currently hold and shift DAO operations to a lean, administrative model that removes the perverse incentives outlined in the original post.

This group should:

1. Execute transactions when necessary on stream.mg.wg.ens.eth
2. Pay KPK’s performance fees using investment yield.
3. Ensure all service providers and ENS Labs adhere to objective reporting requirements and provide a consolidated report.
4. Can provide space for a quarterly town hall where Service Providers and Labs can present.
5. Perform reasonable admin roles when necessary.

This group should not:

• Have a grants progam
• Have weekly calls
• Do anything beyond the 5 points above

These responsibilities can realistically be handled by a single administrator, creating clear accountability and a direct point of responsibility. For security, this administrator should be supported by a small group of elected multisig signers whose sole duty is to review and approve transactions within a 72-hour window. If this proposal passes, the DAO would hold two separate social votes: one to elect the administrator and one to elect the four signers.

Compensation (To be distributed via stream of USDC from DAO):

• Administrator (1 spot): 100k to 150k USDC per year
• Signer (4 spots): 12k to 24k USDC per year

The Admin Panel would cost approximately 200k USDC per year (a roughly 90% reduction from current Working Group spending) while preserving the essential functions those groups provide.

This approach preserves what the DAO needs, removes the excess, and creates a clear line of accountability at a fraction of the current cost. It is the simplest, cleanest, and most effective way to make ENS governance work.

[vegayp]

Quick questions:

1. How does this work in the context of the Retrospective? Meaning if the conclusion presented by an internal analysis goes in a separate direction, but this was already voted. You mean this to be a transitory solution or a more permanent one?
2. If this passes, what happens with projects like https://builder.ensgrants.xyz/? Can we coordinate with Labs so they hire someone who absorbs and handles events and projects (Accra, Rome)? and if so, where does the funds for sponsorship would come?
3. Since Labs would be the point of contact for everything, does it mean Labs would have to post in the forum for every request they do to the admin?
4. What happens with the ENS constitution? This is a request to change it more than just replacing WG.
5. The DAO can’t be named DAO if this passes, because it would be a centralised organisation.

[Limes]

@vegayp

How does this work in the context of the Retrospective?

Hard to talk details as I haven’t seen any details posted publicly about a retrospective.

@vegayp

If this passes, what happens with projects like https://builder.ensgrants.xyz/?

Per ENS DAO WG Rule 2.3: " Upon the dissolution of a working group, any and all unspent working group funds from that working group, at the time of dissolution, must be immediately returned to the DAO treasury, without delay."

Labs would pick up irl event hosting and hackathons.

@vegayp

Since Labs would be the point of contact for everything, does it mean Labs would have to post in the forum for every request they do to the admin?

I’m not sure I understand your question, the DAO Administrator is not a part of Labs. A good rule for the social proposal would be that the administrator can not be a part of Labs or a Service provider to avoid a conflict of interest.

@vegayp

What happens with the ENS constitution? This is a request to change it more than just replacing WG.

Constitution remains the same, constitution doesn’t say anything about Working Groups.

@vegayp

The DAO can’t be named DAO if this passes, because it would be a centralised organisation.

Not true. Working Groups are not the DAO. The DAO is token holder control over the treasury and ENS smart contracts.

[vegayp]

@Limes

Labs would pick up irl event hosting and hackathons.

Correct, I miss explained. The constitution also explains that ENS Governance "Funds that are not reasonably required to achieve this goal may be used to fund other public goods ". Which is what Builders and Grants programs do, so the constitution role of funding Public Goods by who will be executed if the WG gets dissolved? By the admin? or by Labs? Considering the fact that there is people relying in funds from that stream, I’d say to also keep that stream open managed by “x” (x being the admin or labs).

@Limes

I’m not sure I understand your question, the DAO Administrator is not a part of Labs. A good rule for the social proposal would be that the administrator can not be a part of Labs or a Service provider to avoid a conflict of interest.

So, now Labs requests funds to the DAO, but for funding events and so, since a lot of the events (to say an example) we funded were improvised and not in the budget, how does labs tackle requests of funds? Hence my question: does the admin take on that role? This applies to the ICANN initiatives and the people who were funded by PG to do this research, which is key for ENS. So now those researches would request the funds to Admin or Labs? xD

@Limes

Not true. Working Groups are not the DAO. The DAO is token holder control over the treasury and ENS smart contracts.

Correct, but the model presented doesn’t seem desentralised nor a organisation. Organisation by one admin and 4 signers isn’t that.

Also, is naming season included in this revision?

My only real fear is that this proposal moves towards a direction that doesn’t seem to consider all the other people, protocols, projects and factors with whom we have built a relationship in the past 3 years, nor the consequences that an oversimplification may bring.

[simona_pop]

Since we are discussing the Constitution - it directs that funds collected by ENS (e.g. from fees) should first go toward sustaining ENS but if there is a surplus, that surplus may — “with DAO governance approval” — be used to fund other public goods within web3. I believe the question here really is what is surplus and how does one determine surplus.

In other words: ENS is not just a private/proprietary project — it is governed as a public-good–conscious DAO, and its treasury surplus is explicitly intended to support broader public-good initiatives (within web3), if the DAO so decides (which the WG structure has provided and abided by).

When evaluating a governance-structure change like replacing working groups with an Admin Panel, we should consider how such a change affects ENS’s capacity to honour its constitutional mandate (especially the part about supporting public goods since that is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution).

With distributed governance, surplus funds are more likely to be approved and distributed through community consensus rather than top-down control. This promotes transparency and trust, and encourages stewardship.

Risks of shifting to a centralised “Admin Panel” turning the DAO into a payments operator only:

• An Admin Panel — by design — centralises decision and control. That will concentrate power, reduce community oversight, and create potential for misalignment with the DAO’s broader mandate.
• Concentrated control may inhibit diverse proposals for (public-goods) funding, or lead to fewer voices deciding what is worthy of funding.

Technically then, under the Constitution — any governance-structure change should be evaluated by how it affects ENS’s broader mission (including public-goods funding, explicitly stated in act III). If the Admin Panel reduces participation, funding allocation, transparency, or accountability, it risks weakening ENS’s ability to responsibly allocate surplus funds which would run counter to the constitutional directive (even if not explicitly forbidden).

A review then is needed before any such measures are effected, especially around how funding has been allocated, if that funding has been done in line with the Constitution and defining what surplus is and how funds are classified as surplus.

[James]

@Limes

Hard to talk details as I haven’t seen any details posted publicly about a retrospective.

Luckily now the proposal is up on the forum and Limes you were part of the discussion last week irl that felt like great & positive framing of the retro from all delegates in attendance.

But certainly conducting a DAO wide retro before making any rash and reactionary decisions is the best path forward and with the support of MetaGov as an external reviewer I believe ENS DAO can continue to position itself as the most efficient and impactful DAO in the space.

@Limes

I had many talks with people at Devconnect about this topic, here is the distilled summary:

Also at the IRL delegate all hands events there was strong agreement that this proposal didn’t make sense and was overly rash.

[Limes]

You should stop using Chat GPT to write these for you, there is 7 em-dashes in here.

@simona_pop

directs that funds collected by ENS (e.g. from fees) should first go toward sustaining ENS but if there is a surplus, that surplus may — “with DAO governance approval” — be used to fund other public goods within web3.

Keyword “may”, dissolving working groups doesn’t break a constitutional mandate.