[Temp Check] ENS Retro: An ENS DAO Retrospective & Stakeholder Analysis

DAO-Wide
42

I take issue with:

Thus why proposing metagov.org as the independent reviewer here was supported by ALL working group leads (that have publicly posted)

Being glad that a talented person (Eugene) is choosing to engage with ENS is not the same as support for the organization that the individual is part of. I never stated an opinion on metagov.org and that is the issue that I take with your summary.

43

While it was far from perfect, 6.25 stated its effects clearly:

If the social proposal passes, all Working Groups must return remaining funds to the DAO and transfer ownership of multisigs to the elected Admin Panel by December 31, 2025.

and:

If this proposal passes, the DAO would hold two separate social votes: one to elect the Administrator and one to elect the four Signers.

I am not questioning your motivations or intentions. Throughout this conversation you have been the only one to raise personal issues; I am focused exclusively on the content of the proposal.

Fair enough RE it being technically a temp check. However, as outlined above, it was written with clear and unambiguous actions.

Further, issues with other proposals do not absolve anyone of the responsibility to write their own proposals clearly and unambiguously. An ambiguous or unclear proposal being passed can cause chaos for the DAO, and the response to shortcomings being pointed out should be to correct them, not to deflect.

Then the proposal needs to clearly state that this is what it would do, for how long, and with what criteria for resuming them.

This is much clearer, thank you. A couple of issues remain:

  • Changes need to be firmly stated. If the proposal passes it doesn’t “propos[e] an extension to the current Working Group stewards term” - it enacts one. As written it seems like, if passed, it makes a suggestion.
  • You don’t need to state what happens if the proposal doesn’t pass, because it has no effect by definition.

I’d suggest a clearer wording along these lines:

Edit: After writing this, I see you posted the proposal to snapshot immediately after your last reply. I wonder if you realise that if this passes, you just suspended working group elections indefinitely (that is, until someone can pass a proposal setting a new election date) and without any compensation for the stewards remaining in their posts?

More trivially, you also created a recursive loop, since the specification section says:

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Re the comments from @nick.eth, Obviously, as highlighted in my previous reply, specific proposal framing around bylaws could always be improved - @netto.eth if you want to comment at all around the time pressure for posting this proposal I think it would be helpful to hear the time pressure from Metagov WG. I think a lot of your edits in the below section are practical, helpful and great, and am happy for the proposal to assume these (given they are just more specific outline of the existing specifics section):

Again I realise these bylaw specifics can forever be improved and appreciate the time and energy you’ve put into the above refinement - Similar to the specific changes in bylaws that the “Replace Working Groups with Admin Panel” proposal would have effected - Sometimes these aren’t fully baked into a proposal when voting happens and the assumption is all contributors can continue to refine specific bylaw changes while still voting.

Happy to edit the initial forum proposal to include those bullets and for the snapshot proposal to inherent them, as well as including them in the onchain proposal.

On a seperate topic;

Last night myself and @slobo.eth had a productive call where Slobo highlighted concerns with the retro and I shared hopefully solid paths forward; Slobo highlighted what I see as a very valid concern with the Retro - That this retro process shouldn’t be a name and shame activity, and specifically the retro shouldn’t name individual contributors as a part of it’s activities. This is a great call out and a valid concern and will be added to the proposal (and should this should be assumed by voters).

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Delegates will vote on whatever is currently on Snapshot; it’s proposal sprawl. Like @nick.eth highlighted, it’s confusing what exactly the DAO is engaging in.

Caveat emptor.

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My interpretation of how elections will proceed: Should this proposal pass, elections will be paused until either the onchain executable preceding it fails or immediately after the retrospective concludes.

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All parties need to understand what they are agreeing to before anything is enacted, and we’re not yet within earshot of what would constitute a sound, enforceable mandate — inclusive of clearly defined deliverables, budget certainty, execution authority, and mutual obligation.

Looking forward to ironing that all out.

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ENS Labs is not a DAO, and it’s not our business to assign value judgments about their internal process. Even if Labs’ selection of Nethermind was (supposedly) centralized, that doesn’t mean the DAO has to follow suit.

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@James — consider an RFP for this retro, with @Meta-Gov_Stewards managing the process. It would set a bad precedent not to.

Suggested timeline for the RFP:

  • Dec 12–22: RFP submissions
  • Dec 27: Selection and announcement
  • Jan 2: Onchain executable

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Sorry, confused here. Working Group rules ARE THEMSELVES the bylaws? That’s news to me… I just thought before invoking the bylaws we could perhaps point to them to be sure?

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I’m in FAVOR of a retrospective btw. Just a bit tight on the procedure here and think the DAO deserves a less sophomoric approach to enacting change in process. But appreciate the energy and effort overall and understand its a WIP.

46

100% agreed.

With most of the ENS protocol’s initial development burden now behind us, this new generation of DAO organization must focus on financial sustainability. The ENS delegate set needs to ensure that the DAO remains financially stable and cost-efficient, because that is the only way to maintain truly sovereign and decentralized governance. Starting from the largest expenditures, delegate set should evaluate their effectiveness and necessity. What we need is a structured, professional framework that bridges the gap between the delegate set and service providers.

I’ve been involved in DAOs for about a year, and what I’ve generally observed is excessive spending, often on unnecessary development efforts that don’t return value to the protocol. At times, it even gives a small sense of corruption in the space, although I do believe this will improve as governance matures.

This is also a fair point. However, given that there’s already an ambitious entity proposing this initiative, I’m not sure an RFP process would change much in practice.

This is exactly right. Nothing overrides the dynamic, adaptive decision-making process of the delegate set. Any bylaw or constitution is ultimately just a guideline.

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As mentioned in the post Steward Elections Term 7 — Update on Timing and Next Steps, we need this proposal to move forward so we can reach a resolution. The timing and urgency aren’t ideal, but they are necessary given the current context. More details are outlined in the linked post, and we’re open to suggestions.

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This is not how DAO governance works. You cannot simply ‘assume’ that people meant some other text than the one they voted on.

Again, no, this is not how DAO governance works. You can’t edit what people voted on, after they voted on it.

As written, if this proposal succeeds, elections are suspended until another proposal is passed to set a new date for them:

(The second part of this second quote refers to what happens if the current Snapshot proposal fails - which is irrelevant since a failed proposal cannot affect anything.)

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DAO governance is a very emergent research area - ENS has the best DAO in the world (having experienced many others), part of this experimentation that all DAOs are participating in, is what happens when ‘standard’ DAO practices aren’t practical to follow (ie overlapping votes, timelines, etc. (such as the steward nomination window and this proposal)). Again, my assumption is all participants in ENS (especially large delegates, proposal submitters and elected stewards) are acting in good faith and proposals can be viewed in this way.

I’d argue this proposal clearly isn’t an attack on the DAO, and instead is aiming to aligned high quality research and data acquisition for a Retrospective to drive better DAO outcomes in the future, one side effect is a elections being pushed/suspended until another proposal (likely the onchain ratifying proposal, or at worst another proposal after the retro!).

Just like the proposal last week (that you voted yes on) and it’s lack of framing from a bylaw point of view (considering multiple parts of the " Replace the Working Groups with the ENS Admin Panel" effected bylaws) despite the proposal not mentioning any.

50

I appreciate the effort of everyone who has engaged in this discussion, and I also want to highlight that the retro structure has improved considerably since it was initially posted.

That said, my initial concern about intertwining this proposal with the Stewards election is a key reason why I cannot support this proposal.

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51

I feel similar to slobo here. Why can’t we separate those 2 things?

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The reasoning for the lack of separation is because of last weeks proposal to completely unwind working groups plus the lack of nomination window for the upcoming elections.

My fear is; this proposal doesn’t pass, I repost the proposal without the steward election section, all voters that took issue with the inclusion of the steward extension then vote yes, we now kickoff a retro while trying to run steward elections, while trying to understand the role of previous stewards and new stewards in the retro process. A majority of stewards have signalled willingness to extend their term and engage in the retro.

53

I am very torn on this one.

I am definitely in favour of a retro but would like to see more concrete details about it before voting with a yes.

And what I definitely don’t like is the timing and the postponement of the stewards elections. I don’t believe it’s a good idea for the retro itself to do so.

If you want a proper retro let the steward elections go through and do it afterwards, applied to all previous terms except the running one.

Generally very torn on this one but for now will vote No.

54

Abstaining because the proposal feels overly contrived, resulting in proposal sprawl and ambiguity around its true intent.

The tender process should take precedence over anointments.

It also feels odd that a majority of delegates voted in favor of a retrospective without first hearing from the entity responsible for carrying it out.

I will be watching closely.

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55

I respect the effort that went into this proposal and really admire the time and passion behind it. However we are at a point where everyone who participates in the DAO knows the issues at hand, and spending another 4 months on DAO politics when we could all be working together towards ENSv2 feels redundant. I think the admin panel had the right intentions and covered some important issues. @clowes.eth’s proposal goes even more into detail on the current issues and proposed solutions, and offers exactly what we need: efficiency to bring out the best in ENS.

As an ENS Labs member, I really enjoyed working with different SP teams this year and want to see more of that in 2026. A healthy environment where competent teams can work confidently together under the umbrella of “ENS”. But it’s obvious the dynamics we have today don’t promote that, and you don’t really need a retro to see that.

That said, thank you to @James for putting in the effort and pushing these conversations forward to get things done! it’s greatly appreciated

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I’m glad you think so. Part of being “the best DAO in the world” is having high standards for proposals, and making sure that they’re unambiguous and clearly specified.

That’s not a safe assumption - nor is the implicit assumption that all good-faith participants will have the same interpretation of an ambiguous proposal.

It doesn’t matter that it’s not an attack on the DAO - only that different participants will have different interpretations of an ambiguous proposal.

What isn’t ambiguous is that this proposal suspends elections indefinitely (eg, until another proposal is passed resuming them), without any provision to pay stewards during the suspension. The only legal compensation allowed in the working group bylaws for stewards is a collective proposal as specified in section 10, but I haven’t seen any indication that provision is being made for continuation of stewards’ pay during the suspension. If this proposal passes, we will rapidly approach the equivalent of the US government’s regular shutdowns.

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@eugene presented Metagov.org’s PoV on the proposed retro during the Metagov (WG) call yesterday. Given the broad potential impact of the retro, I felt it was pertinent that his comments be made available to those who were not on the call.

I know that sharing recordings is not really a norm, but I scrubbed all unrelated voices from the transcript and requested permission from the speakers present.

  • I created the transcript using Descript, and removed filler words. Speakers include @James , @eugene , and @clowes.eth, all of whom granted permission for this to be posted.

TL;DR - With Claude Opus 4.5

Summary: ENS DAO Retrospective Planning Call

This transcript captures a governance call where Eugene (a DAO researcher/consultant) discusses a proposed retrospective and stakeholder analysis for ENS DAO.

The Core Proposal

Eugene outlines a combined initiative: a financial review of DAO spending paired with stakeholder analysis to understand pain points across delegates, labs, and community members. The goal is to map what outputs were promised, what was delivered, and whether outcomes can be tracked—moving DAOs toward greater rigor around spend accountability.

Key Context

Eugene frames this against a broader industry moment where most projects are “dropping the facade” about caring about DAOs and governance. He notes ENS is one of the communities genuinely committed to decentralization, but acknowledges the current state of DAOs broadly is “untenable”—there aren’t many examples anyone can point to as working great.

Klaus raises a pointed concern: at a recent domain conference, people told him they won’t integrate ENS because “ENS has done nothing in the past four years.” His worry is that too much energy goes into organizational structure debates rather than actually advancing the protocol.

Eugene’s Proposed Approach

The first phase would prioritize stakeholder interviews and anonymous feedback to answer a foundational question: does the community have roughly 80% consensus on what ENS DAO is actually trying to accomplish? If there’s fundamental misalignment on mission and purpose, that needs addressing before any retrospective analysis can be meaningfully utilized. He proposes building in clear “pause points” where work stops if prerequisites aren’t met.

Timeline Tensions

Eugene is candid that this work realistically takes 4-6 months given the complexity of coordinating a decentralized community—interviewing 20+ people, running community calls, processing multiple feedback channels. He notes this is exactly why legitimate consultants typically refuse DAO work: “the juice isn’t worth the squeeze.” He’s willing to engage because he believes there’s a 12-24 month window to prove governance can deliver ROI before the space abandons the experiment entirely.

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Overview

This proposal outlines a rigorous mixed-methods study to diagnose governance and operational challenges within the ENS DAO.

The study has three primary goals.

  • First, at the institutional level, it will provide ENS DAO with the context for proactive, evidence‑grounded governance and organizational design reforms.
  • Second, at the community level, it will offer transparent, credible analysis of current challenges, helping build shared understanding and legitimacy around any proposed changes.
  • Third, at the ecosystem level, it will generate transferable lessons for DAO governance practitioners and researchers working on similar public‑goods infrastructures.

The research is organized into three phases:

  • Phase 1: Stakeholder analysis and pre-retro data collection
  • Phase 2: Retrospective assessment of spend
  • Phase 3: Synthesis, research, and presentation

Throughout the process, milestone check‑ins ensure that ENS stakeholders can review interim findings, confirm alignment on research questions and methods, and provide feedback that is incorporated before moving to subsequent phases. Each party will have the opportunity to cease work upon milestone completion if mission drift occurs.

The final outputs will include a full research report, concise forum posts, and presentation materials for the ENS community.

One important open question: who is the direct project sponsor signing off on deliverables? This is not for us to decide though we are biased towards having a smaller group or committee as that makes it easier to move faster.

  • Similarly, we would like input on how the community sees the minimum set of people to tinterview as part of the stakeholder analysis to be seen as legitimate.

Methodology and Process

Study Design Overview

This design is a mixed-methods case study with embedded comparative elements and relies on systematic qualitative inquiry, document analysis, and structured comparative method to build a robust causal understanding of governance challenges.

There are three phases to the research, with milestones built in to provide the opportunity for ENS stakeholders to ensure the research fulfills their objectives, adheres to the research design and provide feedback on emergent findings and input on remaining research tasks.

  1. Stakeholder analysis and pre-retro data collection: Phase 1 focuses on building a shared, evidence‑based understanding of ENS DAO’s current governance reality across key stakeholder groups and on preparing the data foundation required for a rigorous retrospective. This phase combines structured stakeholder analysis with targeted pre‑retro data collection, so that the eventual assessment of “what worked and what did not” is anchored in the DAO’s stated purposes, desired outcomes, and actual operational history.
  2. Retrospective: Phase 2 conducts a structured retrospective on ENS DAO spending and governance performance, using the purpose statements and desired outcomes articulated in Phase 1 alongside the data assembled through pre‑retro collection. The goal is to determine the extent to which key initiatives, programs, and governance processes delivered on their intended outcomes, and to surface root‑cause patterns that connect specific results (or failures) to underlying institutional design and implementation choices.​
  3. Final Reporting: Phase 3 synthesizes insights from stakeholder analysis and the retrospective into a coherent diagnosis for ENS DAO. Additionally, relevant research will be conducted to help provide context for how other decentralized communities, in web3 or beyond, have dealt with similar challenges. This includes a full research report and community‑facing materials, designed to support transparent deliberation, consensus‑building, and staged implementation of governance and organizational reforms aligned with ENS DAO’s long‑term mission.

Phase 1 - Stakeholder Analysis and Pre-Retro Data Gathering

Overview

Phase 1 establishes the analytic and relational foundation for the entire study by clarifying ENS DAO’s purpose, mapping its stakeholder ecosystem, and documenting how different groups currently experience governance, coordination, and execution. Through background research, structured interviews, community discussions, and targeted external scanning, this phase generates a shared, multi‑perspective picture of “how ENS DAO is working today” and what outcomes its stakeholders believe recent spending and governance decisions were meant to achieve.

Phase 1A. Stakeholder Analysis

Goal

To have a clear understanding of

  • What is the purpose of the DAO?
  • What are the problems the DAO is facing?
  • What were the desired outcomes of your spend that we will be reviewing in Phase 2?

Activities

  1. Background context and ENS DAO research

  2. Thoroughly reviewing the forum, community calls, and any other relevant materials, including initial conversations with the MetaGov team

  3. Map the relevant stakeholders of ENS DAO (i.e., Delegates, Tokenholders, Stewards, Service Providers, Labs, etc.)

1. Role and formal authority (voting rights, execution rights, advisory)
2. Interests and known incentives
3. Reported engagement patterns and participation constraints
4. Known areas of alignment and conflict

  1. Starting to sketch some potential areas for improvement

  2. Conduct stakeholder interviews

  3. Conducting 30+ hours of interviews with key stakeholders (MetaGov team, other working groups at the DAO, select delegates, Labs team, service providers, any other stakeholders? We ideally get community support for generating the list.)

  4. Creating a process for anonymous and/or asynchronous contribution to the stakeholder analysis portion for those who are not able or interested in being interviewed

  5. Potentially hosting up to 5 hours worth of community discussions, whether existing calls or dedicated town halls, to better understand the nature of the challenges from the perspective of both delegates and the broader community

  6. Producing an overview of the perceived challenges from the perspective of key stakeholders, relating to how ENS DAO can improve

  7. Present findings and recommendations to the MetaGov team and the community

  8. Producing at least one forum post outlining the results of the research and findings

  9. Partaking in 1-2 community calls to discuss conclusions and receive feedback

  10. Hosting at least 1-2 dedicated calls with the MetaGov team to receive feedback on the recommendations

  11. Producing a revised list of recommendations that factor in both the research findings and the community’s and MetaGov’s reception of said findings

Outputs:

  1. Summary of the current state of affairs in terms of ENS DAO (Activity 1 above) and a list of whom to interview
  2. Outlining the research questions that are at the core of the retro (see initial draft of research questions above)

Phase 1B. Pre-Retro Data Collection

Goal:

  • To gather all of the relevant data that needs to be analyzed to understand if the desired outcomes defined through Phase 1 were or were not accomplished as part of conducting the full retro in Phase 2

Activities:

  • Design and implement a structured data-inventory process (templates and checklists) to identify all initiatives, grants, working‑group programs, and major governance decisions to be included in the retrospective.​
  • Produce a master catalog of relevant documents and data sources (forum threads, proposals, working‑group reports, treasury and disbursement data, ENS Labs updates, call notes, dashboards, and any off‑chain documentation).​
  • Create and maintain a shared data repository for unstructured documents (e.g., forum exports, meeting notes, slide decks, research reports) with clear naming conventions and access controls.​
  • Outline and document standard operating procedures for sharing relevant data with the research team, including who is responsible for providing which data, in what format, and on what timeline.​
  • Where needed, work with stewards, service providers, and ENS Labs to generate structured exports of key quantitative data (e.g., transaction histories, budget vs. actuals, participation metrics) for inclusion in the repository.​
  • Log initial data quality issues and gaps (e.g., missing reports, inconsistent categorization, incomplete forum documentation) to inform both the design of the retrospective in Phase 3 and any recommendations about future data practice

Outputs:

  • A data repository that will be used for the actual retrospective analysis

Milestone 1

Upon completion of Phase 1, the research team will produce a Phase 1 Stakeholder Analysis and Pre‑Retro Data Collection package, including: (a) a concise summary of ENS DAO’s purpose, problem statements, and desired outcomes as articulated by key stakeholder groups; (b) a stakeholder map with roles, authorities, incentives, and observed engagement patterns; and (c) a documented inventory and structure for the pre‑retro data repository. This package will be submitted to the designated ENS stakeholder group (e.g., MetaGov team, stewards, and selected delegates) for review.

Within one week of submission, the research team and ENS stakeholders will hold a milestone check‑in call to: (1) validate or refine the emerging picture of ENS DAO’s purpose, challenges, and intended outcomes; (2) confirm that the planned research methods and data sources for subsequent phases are appropriate and aligned with ENS priorities; and (3) surface any gaps, concerns, or additional questions. Following this session, the research team will revise the Phase 1 outputs and, where needed, adjust research questions, methods, or sampling plans to incorporate ENS feedback before formally closing the Phase 1 milestone.

Phase 2 - Retrospective Assessment

Goal

Analyse the data capture in Phase 1B in light of the purpose and desired outcomes articulated in Phase 1 & the Milestone 1 review to assess whether the spend achieved what was intended.

Activities

Phase 2 will systematically analyze the initiatives, grants, and governance processes identified in Phase 1 using the data assembled in the pre‑retro repository. Activities will include:

  • Reconstructing the intended theory of change and desired outcomes for major spending streams
  • coding qualitative and quantitative evidence against those intended outcomes
  • identifying cross‑cutting patterns of success, failure, and unintended consequences.

The team will convene at least one milestone review (see below) with ENS Stakeholders and relevant stewards to validate interpretations, refine emerging findings, and prioritize issues that require deeper investigation before final synthesis.

Outputs

The research team will conduct a structured retrospective assessment that links ENS DAO’s historical spending and governance decisions to observed outcomes. Outputs will include:

  • A set of initiative‑level and thematic retro summaries
  • An integrated analysis of root causes behind recurrent challenges
  • A prioritized list of leverage points where institutional or procedural changes are most likely to improve coordination and execution.

These outputs will feed directly into Phase 4, providing the empirical backbone for the final recommendations and governance roadmap.

Milestone 2

Upon completion of Phases 2, the research team will complete a retrospective of the spend of ENS DAO. This will include qualitative and quantitative data needed to produce the reports in Phase 3.

Within one week of submission, the research team and ENS stakeholders will convene a milestone check‑in call to: (1) Share what the report structure will look like to provide initial feedback; and (2) Review some initial learnings from the retro before moving onto Phase 3.

Phase 3: Synthesis, Recommendations, and Community Validation

Goal

Integrate findings from Phases 1 & 2 into a coherent diagnosis of ENS DAO’s governance and operational challenges and develop a prioritized, evidence‑based set of recommendations and a governance roadmap that are validated with ENS stakeholders.

Activites

  1. Synthesis of findings across phases
  • Map stakeholder‑identified challenges and desired outcomes from Phase 1 against the retrospective findings from Phase 2.
  • Identify areas where multiple lines of evidence converge on the same problems and candidate solutions, as well as areas of persistent uncertainty, disagreement, or trade‑offs that require explicit governance choices.
  1. Recommendation development and structuring
  • Draft recommendations, each with a concise problem statement, proposed change, evidence base, risks, and implementation considerations.
  • Organize recommendations into clear categories, such as:
    • Governance infrastructure and process reforms (e.g., delegation mechanisms, proposal workflow, voting procedures, quorum/thresholds)
    • Organizational structure and accountability (e.g., working‑group mandates, steward terms and elections, standing committees)
    • Communication and information architecture (e.g., forum practices, information flows, transparency standards)
    • Cultural and incentive alignment (e.g., contributor recognition, incentive design, participation norms)
  1. Roadmap and success criteria
  • Sequence recommendations into a pragmatic roadmap with near‑term, medium‑term, and longer‑term actions, including dependencies and prerequisites.
  • Propose high‑level success criteria and monitoring indicators for key reforms, so ENS DAO can assess whether implemented changes are delivering the intended improvements.
  1. Stakeholder review and validation
  • Share a draft synthesis and recommendations package with ENS stakeholders (e.g., MetaGov team, stewards, key delegates) for review.
  • Facilitate at least one discussion session to assess the clarity, feasibility, and perceived legitimacy of the recommendations, and to incorporate stakeholder feedback prior to finalization.

Output

  1. Full research report with findings and recommendations
  2. Community‑facing materials
  • One or more forum posts summarizing major findings and recommended next steps for ENS DAO.
  • A slide deck for use in community calls and steward discussions.
  • A one‑page summary highlighting top recommendations, rationale, and immediate next actions for decision‑makers and contributors.

Timeline and Budget

We propose a workplan that concludes the week of April 6th, however, the learnings could be shared in more informal outputs and via community calls starting mid-March. This is based on my understanding of realistic governances timelines.

Reminder of phases:

Phase 0: Proposal on the forum through voting

Phase 1: Stakeholder analysis and data collection

Phase 2: Retrospective analysis

Phase 3: Report synthesis

Here is a visual breakdown of the phases to give a sense of timing:

Screenshot 2025-12-17 at 7.29.58 PM
Screenshot 2025-12-17 at 7.29.58 PM428×435 8.06 KB

Here is a sheet that provides a tentative breakdown of activities.

The budget request for this work is $125,000. This budget will cover the cost of labor and any relevant tooling that can be used to enhance the outcomes.

  • The cost of each phase comes out to $37,500 (doing an even split)
  • Metagov takes 10% overhead for legal and administrative costs

Team Composition

Eugene Leventhal and Mike Cooper will lead the team. Additionally, there will be some other contributors from an advisor or two, the OpenGrants team, a data analyst, and potentially an additional research contributor to support delivery of the work in a timely manner.

Eugene Leventhal

  • Eugene is currently the Head of Governance and Operations at Octant and a Research Director at Metagov, where he leads the Grant Innovation Lab and contributes to DAOstar.
  • Eugene has been coordinating with various ENS stakeholders since early November to produce this proposal and will be the lead advisor on the project, focusing on co-defining the overall strategy, producing and reviewing all protocols and materials to be used, build the team, and program manage the effort.

Mike Cooper

  • Mike is a Senior Researcher at Metagov, where he recently published the Grant Impact Handbook.
  • Mike has helped shape this proposal and will be the primary research and execution lead on the project.

Other contributors may include:

  • Christopher Lema
  • Sam McCarthy and/or Rashmi Abbigeri from DAOstar’s Open Grants team to help with Phase 1B and 2
  • TBC data analyst
  • TBC additional research contributor
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In case anyone is keeping an eye on this, I’ll be posting this as a separate post in the correct format soon. Looking forward to discussing with the community

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