Previously, I shared my stance that trading upfront authority for operational efficiency is a reasonable trade-off if this proposal resolves political and governance overhead.
Several points surfaced in this thread telegraph the opposite.
- Sequencing — as @James and several other participants have noted, proposing a structural overhaul before the research completes — and before the community has had a chance to deliberate on its outputs — is a defacto parallel track, regardless of intent.
- Accountability structure — Two of five seats are held by representatives of the primary funding recipient. If the Board is meant to hold funded entities accountable, but those entities are embedded in the Board itself, who holds the Board accountable?
- The independence assumption — there is precedent in ENS DAO’s governance history for token holders to elect Foundation directors directly. Delegating the nominee search to current board directors undermines the very independence the proposal relies on — especially given that precedent has already established the DAO as the legitimate appointing body.
- Working Group dissolution — I am in favor of consolidating Working Groups for operational efficiency, but with nuance. ENS needs a way to interface with the public, independent of board structure. The BoD allocates for ecosystem initiatives — that allocation should explicitly support a continued public-facing function, not absorb it into board operations entirely.
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The ENS DAO commissioned a $125k research retrospective specifically to inform structural improvements. Not all may be in favor of this — but stakeholders should respect the process and allow MetaGov to finish their job before any structural proposal moves forward.
May I turn readers’ attention to @mikemetagov’s ENS Retro Modification to Support Co-Created Reforms, which proposes a bridge between the retrospective and the next iteration of ENS DAO governance in the form of a representative advisory body responsible for developing and submitting recommended reforms to the DAO for a vote.
If the proposal to expand the ENS Foundation Board is genuinely meant to be a structural answer to the retrospective’s findings rather than a parallel track, then its advocates should actively engage with the process — good faith demands it.
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One last thing:
Under Article 16(b) of The ENS Foundation’s Articles of Association, a director’s resignation is effected by “notice to the Foundation Company” and takes effect immediately unless the notice states otherwise.
avsa.eth has publicly stated his intention to vacate his board seat. Has formal notice of resignation been delivered to The ENS Foundation in accordance with Article 16(b)? If not, what is the process and appropriate venue for such notice to be submitted so that the resignation is formally recognized?