Replying here too after posting ENS DAO reform. The first thing I want to highlight is that @katherine.eth’s replies in this topic have almost all been further explanations and justifications rather than trying to address concerns and make amendments.
Understanding the makeup of 3/5 of the seats is vital to discussing the merits of the proposal. I’d argue that the makeup of the board is the single most important factor here, and we have not been given any context beyond: (as well as some generic VC lines)
Either there’s an idea of the type of people/organisations that could fill this role (which would make sense to share/discuss) or you already have names and they’re not being shared until this post becomes a ‘formal proposal’ (which seems confusing as part of this process).
The fact that the existing ENS Foundation (that is entirely Labs aligned) is responsible for the director selection process and creating the candidate slate without DAO input or visibility (when this foundation will be responsible for funding Labs) is clearly a conflict of interest.
Will only the existing ENS foundation members and ENS Labs have the ability to propose or select candidates?
There are so many ways to make this process more open and inclusive rather than the existing members of the ENS Foundation expanding their own foundation to take over the DAO’s ability to decide on Labs’ funding. A few ideas off the top of my head: (in addition to the various ideas myself and others have proposed and have been ignored)
- Allow the DAO/wider Ethereum community to participate in the selection process for potential directors through a self/community nomination structure.
- Allow one seat to be community voted.
- Give further breakdown as to who is even in the running for these seats. Currently anyone with “Financial and business acumen, a protocol or ecosystem leader or anyone with nonprofit/foundation experience”
- These are just too high level to understand who we’re actually talking about here and how connected they are to ENS Labs.
- 10,000 other ideas that would increase the legitimacy of this process, rather than “This is how corporate America works, this is the best path forward.”
This is the key section I’m referring to. This was posted ~3 weeks ago and after dozens of replies trying to understand more about this process and who these 3 independent directors could be, we as the ‘non-foundation-connected’ contributors still aren’t any closer to understanding who they could be, or how their selection will remain neutral.
This matters because of the unilateral power this foundation will have in distributing ENS Labs’ budget. While I support the idea of empowering the ENS Foundation, it shouldn’t be led and controlled by a foundation already completely intertwined with Labs.
For clarity, does; ‘and will publish the full candidate slate in the formal proposal for community review prior to ratification’ mean that there will be an opportunity for DAO contributors to have input on the candidate slate prior to the proposal being formally submitted? This would be at least a step in the right direction.
Given the justifying tone of your replies in this thread and in ENS DAO Reform Next Steps, it seems clear that there’s no interest in taking on feedback or criticism from the wider DAO, and that we should expect a formal proposal outlining an entirely Labs-decided Foundation, to oversee Labs’ budget for the foreseeable future.