These are off topic attacks so I will only address these two claims this one time.
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The claim that the DAO doesn’t have visibility into how Labs spends its budget is not accurate. ENS Labs publishes detailed quarterly financial and operational reports, including full breakdowns of how budget is being allocated across teams and workstreams. Those are avaliable here.
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Deprecation of Namechain was not a quiet or easy decision. ENS Labs published a full explanation of the rationale here: https://ens.domains/blog/post/ens-staying-on-ethereum. I’d also push back on the implication that budget should automatically end when a tech stack is deprecated - the team who would have built the tech stack are still building ENS and dedicated to making ENSv2 a successful protocol upgrade.
Now actually onto something substantive: separating the structure vote from the budget vote doesn’t give the DAO more control, it just creates two sequential battlegrounds where the same objections can be relitigated twice, and it introduces a governance gap where the Foundation structure exists but has no ratified mandate to act. That’s the same tension working groups are in right now and I think I can speak for our current stewards that it’s an extremely suboptimal position to be in.