[Temp Check] Working Group Restructure

[James]

[Temp Check] Working Group Restructure

Summary

This temp check proposes rolling the three existing ENS DAO Working Groups, Meta-Governance, Public Goods, and Ecosystem, into a single, consolidated Working Group. This new working group would combine the Ecosystem and Public Goods functions while MetaGov functionality can be mostly provided by an empowered ENS Foundation. The new Working Group would also serve as the primary public-facing touchpoint between ENS DAO and the wider ecosystem.

This proposal is informed by the ENS DAO Retrospective, ENS DAO Reform Next Steps, @Limes’ Replace Working Groups Proposal, @katherine.eth’s ENS Foundation Proposal, and the broader set of reform discussions that have developed across the forum, IRL events and community calls since late 2025. We deeply appreciate the patience and pragmatism shown by the ENS community during this transitional period!

Motivation & Context

ENS DAO has operated with three Working Groups since the DAO launched as one of the primary ways to contribute to the DAO. Each WG has been made up of three elected stewards, with one serving as Lead Steward. Across all working groups there is a shared DAO Secretary and a dedicated Scribe. Working groups have been a great initiative that drove decentralised contribution and a large number of positive outcomes for ENS DAO, however as ENS evolves, so too should its working group and wider contribution structure.

The three different working groups drive three different areas of ENS support and growth (obviously this list isn’t exhaustive and each WG provides value in many ways):

• Ecosystem WG: Supporting the ENS Ecosystem through Hackathons, Grants, Bug Bounties and IRL events.
• Public Goods WG: Supporting Ethereum and ENS public goods through grants, network and highlighting impact.
• MetaGov WG: Supporting ENS Governance; proposal management, DAO timing and governance coordination.

This post proposes combining Ecosystem & PG into a single public facing ENS working group while MetaGov functionality can be provided by the ENS Foundation (CC @katherine.eth open to thoughts here around the separation of Foundation <> Working Group responsibilities)

The Cases for Change

Several converging signals have shaped this proposal:

Limes’ proposal at the end of 2025 to move away from the Working Group model attracted significant support from delegates, service providers, and contributors. But was defeated in favour of conducting the ENS retrospective before making structural changes to the DAO.

Katherine’s ENS Foundation temp check which proposes transitioning the majority of operational responsibilities currently managed by Working Groups to an empowered ENS Foundation. The Foundation proposal has drawn broad support from contributors and this WG restructure proposal is complementary to that effort.

The ENS DAO Retrospective, conducted independently by Metagov.org, surfaced three structural issues the current WG model has contributed to:

1. A breakdown in communication and accountability between contributors, working groups, ENS Labs, and delegates.
2. A concentration of decision-making and funding influence among a small group of long-standing participants, with the Retro finding that a significant proportion of decision-makers around funding are also recipients of that same funding.
3. Contributor fatigue stemming from the lack of structural evolution since the DAO’s launch in 2021, with Working Group structures remaining largely unchanged across 4+ years of operation.

The FireEyes ENS DAO Reform Next Steps post frames this proposal as one of three complementary structural changes, alongside the Foundation and SPP reforms, designed to be considered together as a coherent path forward.

Specification

Winding Down the Three Existing Working Groups

This proposal would wind down the Meta-Governance, Public Goods, and Ecosystem Working Groups in an orderly fashion at the conclusion of the current term (when this proposal passes). Existing multisig balances from dissolved Working Groups would be returned to the DAO treasury, consistent with the Working Group bylaws.

Any committed grants or active disbursements at the time of wind-down would be honoured in full before closure.

Establishing One Public-Facing Working Group

If this proposal draws support, a single consolidated Working Group would be established, combining the Public Goods and ecosystem functions. The purpose of this WG is not operational governance, that moves to the Foundation, but instead serves as the most open, accessible, and permissionless entry point for the broader community to engage with ENS DAO and vice versa.

The new WG would be responsible for:

• Community calls: Hosting regular weekly (or bi-weekly, interested in previous steward input here) calls where developers, new contributors, and community members can engage directly with the DAO and remain informed on its direction.
  • Hosting (or hosting in collaboration with the Foundation) delegate all hands monthly.
• Small grants: Distributing grants of up to $25,000 (open to input on what the bounds of this number should be) without requiring formal approval from delegates or the Foundation, enabling fast, lightweight funding of community experiments, events, external contributions, and ecosystem outreach.
• Public engagement: Supporting the public awareness of ENS: community engagement, ecosystem events, educational initiatives, and other externally-facing DAO communications.

Steward Election Process

The steward election process for the new Working Group would follow the existing WG rules — three self-nominated and elected stewards, selected by delegates using the current nomination and election mechanics. No changes to the election process itself are proposed at this time. Experimenting with different steward selection and voting structures isn’t something this proposal is actively trying to achieve, however if there’s strong feelings from delegates or the ENS community we’re happy to amend this.

Compensation

Reflecting the reduced scope and responsibilities of the consolidated WG, steward compensation would be set at $3,000 USDC per month plus $1,000 in ENS tokens per month, vested using a structure consistent with the existing steward vesting model (2-year linear vesting from the start of the term).

Secretary and Scribe roles could be carried forward (interested in input here), however with the reduction in working groups our initial perspective is the secretary and scribe roles could be rolled into a single role (under the Foundation or independent) that would work alongside the Working Group.

Conclusion

ENS DAO’s Working Group structure served a genuine purpose in the DAO’s earlier stages by enabling permissionless contribution, distributing operational responsibility, and creating a home for community participation in governance. Three years on, the evidence from the Retrospective, from delegate sentiment, and from the proposals developing across the forum all point in one direction: the current model needs to evolve.

This proposal preserves what matters most about the WG model, an open, community-facing structure that any contributor can engage with, while significantly reducing operational and financial overhead as well as creating space for the ENS Foundation to take on the governance and operational functions that benefit from formal accountability structures.

ENS is one of the most important pieces of Ethereum-aligned infrastructure and holds one of the largest ETH treasuries in the ecosystem. Getting our contributor structures right directly shapes our ability to deploy resources effectively, build accountability into how the DAO operates, and continue to attract high-quality contributors to the mission.

There are clearly many ongoing initiatives within the DAO right now and this proposal aims to simplify elements of the DAO while still ensuring there’s space for public contribution and context gathering. We imagine this working group structure could continue to evolve over the year and are not opposed to any/all ideas about how this WG model could be improved!

We welcome feedback from delegates, stewards, service providers, and the wider ENS community as this temp check develops.

[brantlymillegan]

I’m very open to keeping one Working Group.

@James

This post proposes combining Ecosystem & PG into a single public facing ENS working group while MetaGov functionality can be provided by the ENS Foundation (CC @katherine.eth open to thoughts here around the separation of Foundation <> Working Group responsibilities)

I think Metagov work like helping guide people through the process to submit a proposal of the DAO to vote etc should be done by this working group. I could be wrong but that doesn’t sound like the kind of thing @katherine.eth had in mind for the Board to be doing.

Re doing events for ENS, I tend to think that’s something ENS Labs can take on.

Re public goods, whatever that may look like in the future, that sounds to me like something for the Board to be considering.

[vegayp]

In general terms I’d agree with this.

A few suggestions:

1. The Stewards who are elected shouldn’t have any other position at ENS or duties with Labs.

2. The ability for the foundation or the other stewards (either here or as a foundation capacity) to submit a change or removal of a steward. We have had many absent stewards in the past years who still came to collect the check every month and burden others with their responsibilities.

3. In the past years we hosted Community Calls (discord, google meets) and it didn’t yield a great result, nowadays our structure is more defined and I trust that this will act also as a window for the broader community to have access and knowledge about our protocol as well as the other bodies (Labs, Foundation) to have a public accountability place.

4. The small grants amount seems a bit too small for the scope of things like PG used to do. But I guess that can be defined post this temp-check.

5. What would be the role of the Secretary in this new context? (I understand the scribe)

   @brantlymillegan

   Re public goods, whatever that may look like in the future, that sounds to me like something for the Board to be considering.

Can you develop? Meaning that the board should take on the PG aspect?

[bcvfinance.eth]

I am already cautious about moving too many executive and accountability functions into the Foundation. For that reason, I especially think MetaGov-style functions should remain outside it. If the Foundation becomes central to both operational accountability and governance-process control, the DAO risks concentrating too much institutional power in one body. Proposal access, governance coordination, and delegate process are not ordinary operations; they shape how the ownership layer itself functions.

[simona_pop]

I know we have been discussing a public facing “something” to outlive the working groups and this is a clean, simple move - I doubt it will be impactful though (esp on the grants side).

This whole conversation is starting to feel a little Gitcoin circa 2022, not neccesarily in a “same outcome” sense, but the trajectory: increasing centralisation paired with tightening around impactful allocation of capital and energy. Definitely not saying ENS heading that way but a useful historical artifact to keep in mind.

On the PG side, should this become a responsibility for the Board, I’m curious to see how that plays out. I am quietly lacking confidence that anything meaningful will be done in that direction once any specific group working towards that is removed. PG will become a footnote as it always does in times of uncertainty/contraction. It’s a pretty natural reflex at this point and many things would need to change both individually and collectively to meaningfully impact action on that front.

Net/net: this feels directionally tidy but I’m not convinced it will move any needles. Definitely happy to be wrong, just not particularly optimistic at this stage especially having witnessed behaviours and actions in the past few months that have confirmed how cyclical and pattern heavy most movements within DAOs are. Looking forward to a retro in a year/two year’s time where we come back to the conclusion that building new structures is hard but beneficial and that centralisation will see benefits in certain areas and winners on one side while removing meanigful effects in others.

Onward.

[estmcmxci]

+1 @James on the proposal.

Regarding moving current MGWG ops into the Foundation, I’m actually in favor of this — there’s been, to a large extent, confusion about what the responsibilities of the MG stewards are. Let me go on record and say they are not formally responsible for gating and/or staging proposals, but often involved in coordination.

For that reason, I believe the Governance Liaison role that @katherine.eth suggested would be better suited to take this on, as they’d have backing from the board and could serve as an interlocutor between delegates and broader ENS operations, while also helping shape the governance process.

That said, I think we could eventually automate much of this through better UI and governance design — once we have foundational processes and supporting documentation in place.

—

I notice there is no explicit mention of Steward term length. Here, I propose revising the term from yearly to quarterly elections. That may seem like an excessive ask for delegates, but it keeps them involved and stewards in check.

We should also define the expected level of effort and explicit responsibilities for stewards. That way, stewards can come in with clear expectations around workload, and the DAO has something concrete to measure performance against.

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Regarding grants, I do not think stewards should create this mandate. It should be prescribed by the Board as a scoped call for proposals that clearly articulates what ENS is looking for, in accordance with its broader strategy and operational focus.

This way, incoming stewards have a concrete understanding of which projects should be funded, how to assess project selection quality, and can be held accountable for funding projects that fall outside the prescribed scope.

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A final note: the Ecosystem Working Group has historically funded the DAO’s editorial and social media operations. If this proposal passes, I’d like to see the new Working Group assume that mandate and continue publishing timely Newsletter digests and maintaining the DAO’s voice on social media.

Full disclosure — and this should come as no surprise — I’ve maintained the Newsletter and the DAO’s social media since at least October 2023, so this is of particular interest to me.

That said, as roles evolve and the pool of competent, trusted contributors grows, I’d be keen to see fresh faces interested in taking on this role.

—

Thanks FireEyes for putting this prop forward!

[James]

Posting an update here after forum replies and discussion within the MetaGov WG calls.

A consistent theme of feedback throughout this post and surrounding discussion on the role of Meta Governance within ENS DAO is an important one. Agree with statements made by @brantlymillegan @bcvfinance.eth and @clowes.eth that having some kind of DAO-led Meta Governance role is important.

One question that we need to answer is what the proposed role of the Foundation will be with regards to roles that are currently handled by Working Groups. Regardless of this, if the ENS community and delegates feel strongly that meta-governance activities should be handled by a structure external to the Foundation, this is something generally we’re supportive of and would be happy to amend this proposal to have two WGs instead of one (public goods & ecosystem as one, Metagov as another).

This temp check was intended to be a ‘middle ground’ post aiming to spark forward momentum, given Limes’ proposal last year and the dissipating energy from existing stewards. We certainly don’t feel strongly that the exact restructure described is perfect. More that it maintains some level of publicly elected representation and focused initiatives from ENS DAO while also being conscious of the steward burnout seen across Working Groups, and the uncertainty around the exact dominion of the proposed ENS Foundation.

[estmcmxci]

@bcvfinance.eth

I am already cautious about moving too many executive and accountability functions into the Foundation. For that reason, I especially think MetaGov-style functions should remain outside it.

Which functions are these, exactly—can you enumerate them?

I attend the calls weekly, and I’m not sure what “MetaGov-style functions” you’re referring to.

I assume you mean @kpk’s weekly Endowment review, and maybe broader discussion of proposals.

I think a single Working Group can include those functions and the functions @James described above.

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@James

One question that we need to answer is what the proposed role of the Foundation will be with regards to roles that are currently handled by Working Groups.

This is a good question, but my understanding is that the Foundation proposal aims to assume all Working Group responsibilities and wind down the Working Groups.

So we shouldn’t wait for a Foundation proposal to define what the Working Group restructure is allowed to do. We should define that now—clearly and explicitly.

Then, if there are overlaps or conflicts, proponents of the Foundation proposal can call out their red lines and we can resolve them directly.

In short: set our structure first, then negotiate overlap.

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@James

level of publicly elected representation and focused initiatives from ENS DAO

I’m all for this, and I believe that we’d all love to see it happen. Your initial ideas are a great start, and I’d love to see a more robust, operationally-specified iteration.

Some suggestions to amend the temp check:

1. Add a clear scope and mandate with specific responsibilities and boundaries.
2. Add a transition plan (avsa’s suggestion is a good start).
3. Set hard defaults (weekly calls, $25k cap, reporting cadence) instead of placeholders.
4. Define metrics (contributor throughput, decision latency, grant cycle speed, participation).
5. Specify an escalation/resolution path when WG/Foundation responsibilities conflict — my 2c is that the Governance Liaison role could help bridge here.

[katherine.eth]

Can certainly appreciate that uncertainty in the interim is not ideal. I’d like to propose for us to keep on Meta-Gov Stewards + Secretary in the interim so that we have trusted stewards who can sign and continue any ongoing commitments the DAO has made. Ecosystem and Public goods will wind down for now and send funds back to DAO wallet.

I feel strongly that a newly formed Foundation should hire a DAO liason/ Gov relations role (among other roles) and that should be able to fill the gap where board members cannot (and I’d argue, should not). In the interim, however, I would suggest that we keep on MG stewards and Secretary (if they opt in, of course) until disbanded otherwise.

[estmcmxci]

Suggesting the following process + timeline:

• June 1–5: Open nominations
• June 10–15: Steward elections (including the option to wind down Working Groups)
• July 1: Stewards seated

Also suggest returning the term length to six months to preserve continuity with the one-year terms beginning in 2027, as specified by EP 4.8

There are, of course, other details that I’ve left unspecified, but the above should serve as a loose guide for the near term.

[James]

@katherine.eth

I’d like to propose for us to keep on Meta-Gov Stewards + Secretary in the interim so that we have trusted stewards who can sign and continue any ongoing commitments the DAO has made.

Seems like there’s strong support for the MetaGov working group to live on then. Though rather than having MG stewards be temporary as described I’d argue it makes sense to have a full term while the Foundation is stood up as a supportive measure. Importantly, it would mean that the Foundation (and chosen DAO liaison) will be able to interface with an existing structure to see how things operate and where improvements can be made (rather than just starting from scratch or having a temp WG).

@katherine.eth

Ecosystem and Public goods will wind down for now and send funds back to DAO wallet.

Re this, disagree. Having some public facing working group for the DAO is important, especially with the current state of the market and DAO.

@katherine.eth

In the interim, however, I would suggest that we keep on MG stewards and Secretary (if they opt in, of course) until disbanded otherwise.

Again, given how the MG working group current operates (in terms of contributing stewards) this same group shouldn’t be the one that takes on this role. ie. A new steward election for MetaGov working group, and a public facing Ecosystem + Public goods WG makes sense.

@estmcmxci

• June 1–5: Open nominations
• June 10–15: Steward elections (including the option to wind down Working Groups)
• July 1: Stewards seated

+1 to these timelines, I wonder if the immediate next step should be making a proposal to be voted on (about the restructure, elections, etc) then run the steward elections?

@estmcmxci

Also suggest returning the term length to six months to preserve continuity with the one-year terms beginning in 2027, as specified by EP 4.8

This is an interesting one, I think +1 to the 6 month term, i do wonder how hard it will be to stand anything efficient up within that time, but it makes more sense than 12 or 18 month terms.

[Premm.eth]

I have posted a new thread that I intended to also be a reply to this one.

An Incremental and Measured Approach to ENS DAO Development

I believe there is broad consensus that ENS DAO has core structural issues that are preventing it from being a stable and competent steward of the ENS protocol. With that diagnosis, it is easy to look at the existing governance structure and take a knee jerk approach. The three Working Groups are not coordinating well, so delete two of them and assume that will solve the coordination problem. I am not convinced that is the right framing. That approach feels a bit like a field hospital in a wa…

[estmcmxci]

@James

Importantly, it would mean that the Foundation (and chosen DAO liaison) will be able to interface with an existing structure to see how things operate and where improvements can be made (rather than just starting from scratch or having a temp WG).

Agree. The Foundation-backed Governance Liaison should serve as a public-facing role interfacing with the Board, acting as a formally recognized channel and system of record for receiving and acknowledging input, responding to public and expert inquiry as a lever for accountability, and escalating matters to the Board when necessary — especially to help liaison the DAO’s votes with real-world regulatory considerations and implications.

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@James

Having some public facing working group for the DAO is important, especially with the current state of the market and DAO.

+1

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@James

A new steward election for MetaGov working group, and a public facing Ecosystem + Public goods WG makes sense.

I’m a bit hesitant on this, but I hope we can reach a middle ground. I think the single Working Group can continue Meta-Governance functions and ongoing commitments, provide a public-facing venue for transparency, and serve as a space for contributor discussion — similar to how @cap and @Premm.eth’s weekly ENS x AI space has functioned.

Either that, OR formalize the ENS x AI discussion space as DAO-recognized — but without execution authority or accountability functions (no multisig, signing authority, etc.).

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@James

+1 to these timelines, I wonder if the immediate next step should be making a proposal to be voted on (about the restructure, elections, etc) then run the steward elections?

100% — seems pragmatic. I’m working on a draft, will share for feedback soon.

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@James

This is an interesting one, I think +1 to the 6 month term, i do wonder how hard it will be to stand anything efficient up within that time, but it makes more sense than 12 or 18 month terms.

A good rule of thumb to follow is Parkinson’s Law: the time work takes expands to fill the time allotted for its completion.

If we design this Working Group’s mandate to be anchored to, and fulfill, MetaGov.org’s roadmap — with the specific task of executing and implementing those changes assigned to the stewards — I believe we’ll get it done.

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+1 to @Premm.eth’s incremental and measured approach to change. The Working Group should bake in the Governance Advisor role to help coordinate these phased changes.

A single Working Group with the exclusive scope of realizing the roadmap’s “Master Plan,” bounded by the Governance Advisor as specialized external support, is a good bet.

[cap]

@estmcmxci

I’m a bit hesitant on this, but I hope we can reach a middle ground. I think the single Working Group can continue Meta-Governance functions and ongoing commitments, provide a public-facing venue for transparency, and serve as a space for contributor discussion — similar to how @cap and @Premm.eth’s weekly ENS x AI space has functioned.

My take is that the scope of work between the Ecosystem and MetaGov working groups is very different, so I wouldn’t advise bundling that work together.

Thanks for acknowledging our work. Fwiw, I’d be happy to inherit the responsibilities of the ecosystem working group, at least temporarily, until things get resolved.

We host weekly calls anyway, have regular attendees (mostly ENS contributors), and already have a spot on the DAO public calendar, so it’d be easy.

[bcvfinance.eth]

Glad you asked for details. I meant a broader set of governance functions, not only the functions currently placed under the MetaGov Working Group.

This is the DAO-facing governance infrastructure layer: proposal process support, governance calendars and timing, delegate coordination, documentation of governance processes, governance security review for proposal execution, and public coordination between delegates, proposers, SPs, and any Foundation-side governance liaison.

I also think future governance programs such as the Delegation Incentives Program need a clear DAO-facing home for implementation updates, communication, and effectiveness tracking. One possible model could be placing these functions with a governance-focused SP such as blockful, since they are already doing some of the most important governance-related work for ENS. In that case, there may be no need to recreate a separate MetaGov WG structure.

The important point for me is separation. If the Foundation is already becoming the main executive body, governance-process functions should not also move fully inside it. These functions shape how the ownership layer(delegates and tokenholders) interacts with governance, so they should remain clearly DAO-facing and separately accountable.

[estmcmxci]

@bcvfinance.eth

This is the DAO-facing governance infrastructure layer: proposal process support, governance calendars and timing, delegate coordination, documentation of governance processes, governance security review for proposal execution, and public coordination between delegates, proposers, SPs, and any Foundation-side governance liaison.

I agree with everything except the security review — DAO security ≠ DAO governance, in my view.

Blockful already does an excellent job on the security side, and the DAO should absolutely continue supporting their work in that specific capacity. But we need clearer separation of concerns so the existing Meta-Governance structure can stay focused on facilitating and coordinating DAO governance.

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@bcvfinance.eth

In that case, there may be no need to recreate a separate MetaGov WG structure.

It’s tempting, but ideally we should continue evolving the Working Group structure so it preserves existing functionality while also supporting initiatives like Ecosystem and Public Goods, stimulating contributor discussion, and serving as a broader hub for open-source coordination.

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@bcvfinance.eth

If the Foundation is already becoming the main executive body, governance-process functions should not also move fully inside it. These functions shape how the ownership layer(delegates and tokenholders) interacts with governance, so they should remain clearly DAO-facing and separately accountable.

It’s important to note that the Temp Check to extend the Foundation board is still in the Temp Check phase, and the proposer has already shown willingness to maintain Meta-Governance Working Group operations in the interim.

All things considered, we should treat the Foundation Temp Check as a separate track. That said, the outcome of the interim WG restructuring will likely determine, in my view, which responsibilities the Foundation eventually assumes.

A new Working Group structure with clear parameters—grounded in evidence-based research rather than ad hoc hyperbole—will strengthen the WG’s position as an independent, legitimate entity that can support (not replace) and harmonize with the Foundation.

[lightwalker.eth]

Would it help if ecosystem / public goods changed from being structured as “working groups” (of multiple part-time people) into full-time roles for 1 “ecosystem program director” and 1 “public goods program director”?

Please feel welcome to ignore if not a good idea. I don’t have all the context here.

[estmcmxci]

Those roles would need to be defined a priori by a formal Governance process.

It’s an interesting idea that could be workshopped within an MG-bounded framework.

[estmcmxci]

@cap

My take is that the scope of work between the Ecosystem and MetaGov working groups is very different, so I wouldn’t advise bundling that work together.

Thanks for acknowledging our work. Fwiw, I’d be happy to inherit the responsibilities of the ecosystem working group, at least temporarily, until things get resolved.

We host weekly calls anyway, have regular attendees (mostly ENS contributors), and already have a spot on the DAO public calendar, so it’d be easy.

You’re right — but the question is whether the ENS x AI group needs a formal structure with a multisig tied to it. I’d argue no.

That said, there’s a strong case for recognizing it as ENS DAO’s public-facing working group, since some of the most interesting and relevant efforts (ENSIP-25, ENSIP-26, AIP, NMS) are already being actively developed and discussed there.

[estmcmxci]

@katherine.eth

I’d like to propose for us to keep on Meta-Gov Stewards + Secretary in the interim so that we have trusted stewards who can sign and continue any ongoing commitments the DAO has made

A new WG structure that folds existing operations into a single body must first make those outstanding commitments concrete.

This points to the research on information asymmetry: without a formal role-clarity framework (and transparent reporting), continuity of existing WG operations sans commitment transparency will propagate the same opaque decision-making patterns the reform is supposed to fix.

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@katherine.eth

I feel strongly that a newly formed Foundation should hire a DAO liason/ Gov relations role (among other roles) and that should be able to fill the gap where board members cannot (and I’d argue, should not). In the interim, however, I would suggest that we keep on MG stewards and Secretary (if they opt in, of course) until disbanded otherwise.

I support the creation of a Foundation liason role, but rather than have this role (and others the foundation may stand up) subsume the existing WG operations, I’d argue that the liason role should liason with the Working Group, as I stated here:

The Foundation-backed Governance Liaison should serve as a public-facing role interfacing with the Board, acting as a formally recognized channel and system of record for receiving and acknowledging input, responding to public and expert inquiry as a lever for accountability, and escalating matters to the Board when necessary — especially to help liaison the DAO’s votes with real-world regulatory considerations and implications.

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The Governance Liaison should serve as a bridge that translates and operationalizes DAO-mandated action through the Foundation, which has the necessary authority as the DAO’s real-world representative and the capacity to enter into real-world contracts.