EP4 Amendments: Working Group Rules

This is not about “pandering” in any sense. It’s simply that requiring someone to redelegate their vote away from the person they want nominated, in order to vote for them, is a really weird norm to set, and extremely unintuitive.

“I’m standing for Meta-Governance Steward! If you agree I should be elected, whatever you do, don’t give your vote to me.”

I think making decisions based on the assumption that people don’t mean what they do is a bad example, and very paternalistic.

Can we please focus on the topic here, of EP4 amendments? If you want to discuss wider voting reform, that should be its own topic.

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Fair point. We do not have a good enough solution to replace the current system with. Something the Meta-Gov WG will have to give a deep thought to.

+1

“The people do not vote as I have expected, hence it must mean that they’re voting is wrong!” :slight_smile:

Using this starting point make a series of guesses (“voters did not care who they delegated their votes to”, "They are also not going to return to re-delegate despite the free re-delegation windows. “…if ENS tokenholders were informed decision-makers, but the reality is that they are not.”), which you seem to treat as “facts”, and your all course of action follows that.

I do not agree at the moment with these assumptions, as you understood from my humourous reply (take it in good spirit!), but I especially don’t think it’s a discussion for here.

EP4 doesn’t discuss the delegation process. It assumes the process exists and is good. This means that the rules of EP4 should come from an assumption that if people delegate their votes to someone, they did it intentionally and for their own good reasons.

Now, adopt for a second this assumption. Under this assumption, do you think people should be able to vote for themselves with coins that were delegated to them?

If not, then why?

If yes, then I suggest having the discussion on how to make sure the delegation process achieves this assumption (redelegation? decay weight on delegated votes? or maybe the current process does work?) in another thread, since it’s a completely independent topic.

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I am inclined to agree. I expected that this amendment will be controversial and it indeed requires a longer independent discussion on its own next term.

On a sidenote: I am timed out from liking posts for 10 hours. Who did this to me? :smiling_face_with_tear: Please let me use the emoji reactions :sob:

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Agree with all of @alisha.eth 's proposed amendments! I think reducing the steward count should be fine. For those worried about participation, a reminder that you don’t have to be a steward to participate in working groups. The meetings are open, and they are very friendly!

Against this. These kinds of things never work in practice. Either a steward is good and they care, or they are not. “Requiring” them to post on the forums is not going to change that, elections are the proper way to handle a bad case.

Yea, but think of it this way: imagine this past term was 1 year long. We’d need to wait another 6 months to reboot the MetaGov WG, for example. I think the term length is fine for now, let’s try one more term before considering this.

Hard no from us. This has been discussed ad-nauseum, I think I basically agree with everything @nick.eth says on this topic, so I’ll just refer my reasoning to what he’s written.

I think we need to worry less in general about delegation and all that stuff. That’s not really a huge issue for the DAO right now, in my mind. Our top problem we need to solve is getting a pace of execution from the DAO-side going. I think @alisha.eth 's amendments go toward that from a position of her experience in working groups in ENS, and in other DAOs.

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Btw, based on this thread I also propose to change the description of the Public Goods WG to:

Public Goods: funding public goods within web3 but outside the ENS ecosystem.

This removes from the current descriptions two parts:

  • " funding public goods within the ENS ecosystem". This is done by the Ecosystem WG.
  • “amplifying ENS as a public good”. It’s unclear what it means.
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Can we just take a moment to appreciate that nobody had any hesitations about accepting a role called “Steward,” had no reservations about passing budgets to pay themselves, but the idea that they perhaps write a small monthly summary of what they did about as long as this post is out of the question.

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To @slobo.eth @cthulu.eth @neiman @inplco and others - great discussion on steward lead responsibility and accountability. Just want to add my take to move this forward productively and close this out:

If we believe there’s a need for a “steward lead” with some increased level of responsibility, accountability (and presumed compensation), I think it makes sense to explicitly outline the responsibilities of this lead in EP4.

However, I’d prefer to stay away from prescribing specific word count summaries (e.g., 200 word summary X often). Instead, keep it general and flexible such as, “Keep DAO informed on status, progress, blockers of initiatives/projects.” Just an opinion - but we don’t want to be too stringent with how work is done within a DAO. Distribute that decision-making out to the edges and let stewards/contributors figure it out. Prescribe the outcome we want (e.g., visibility on progress to ensure accountability).

For reference, the Orca community has defined social and technical roles and responsibilities that must be filled by pod members. It’s available in our governance charter here. I think following a similar model within EP4 is valuable.

@alisha.eth - happy to help draft this too.

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I agree with everything here proposed on the initial post.

I am against delegates being able to vote for themselves. One thing is having a open governance, and the other is having a popularity contest, I don’t feel there is enough information to make a real vote based only on a forum postulation (that applies for delegates and for stewards too). There could be the consideration to have something like token-log for token gated votes for stewards only, so anyone willing to engage in governance can do so, without the risk of people taking advantages of a delegation made months ago: the votes given to delegates when there was no DAO active at that moment, shouldn’t be able to impact the present state of the DAO. I am not implying a re-delegation process, I am stating that the delegation process time is different than this one. And if there is no possibility to use something like token-log (which I highly doubt) (https://tokenlog.xyz/) then there should be a campaign to inform about the election of stewards, even as a simple Q&A open to anyone, in order to let know the tokenholders what’s going on.

The second point regarding accountability, I highly encourage, adding a certain level of “commitment”, in the form of an agreement with the DAO, that even if symbolic, will help with the expectations of the role. Right now the subjective frame of the steward role has induced certain level of limbo and lack of coordination, mainly because very few stewards are committed to the real demands of a DAO such as ENS. So I’d set certain levels of expectation and objective responsabilities to the role such as: monthly updates, bi-weekly public sync of the stewards on discord and so on.

Apologies if any of these have been said before, I’m ranting a bit.

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This. This really is not asking much. I haven’t seen a single lucid argument for why this shouldn’t be required.

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Because it wouldn’t make a difference, simple as that. Implementing a rule that naively seems like it would make a difference that wouldn’t actually in practice make a difference is silly.

If a steward is inactive, “requiring” them to post 200 words in the forum regularly isn’t going to make them suddenly care. On the contrary, it gives a really low bar for potential stewards to meet.

Also, let’s say there’s a really good steward that legit just forgets to post on the forums regularly because they are so busy doing real things for ENS and other DAOs. Are we going to remove them because they forget to post 200 words on the forum? Obviously not, so the rule would never actually be enforced. It’s a placebo.

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I am in favor of this, and agree with the logic Alisha has presented that, “with fewer stewards, each steward is likely to feel a great sense of responsibility for the role.”

If this is the case, I would really like to identify a clear line of communication with the TNL team that works for both groups. We should make sure there is a collaborative relationship between the TNL and the DAO so that neither body becomes a black box, which I feel is our current status at times.

I don’t see an issue with this, but I with the objections, I wonder if a mandatory “mid-term” report might be more appropriate?"

Edit: Typo fix.

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Second that.

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It would make it a lot easier for people who aren’t stewards to follow the work that stewards does at the very least. If a steward were to suddenly start making up work I’m sure that’d be quite noticeable, and if a steward forgot to write something it’s not like they would automatically be terminated. That might cause someone to reach out and see what’s going on, and if something needs to be done about it.

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Just for some perspective on my frustration, let’s look at when I started the newsletter. With the exception of @Coltron.eth and @slobo.eth, every other Steward(!) completely ghosted me when I asked for updates on their WG. I asked publicly and privately. Absolutely no response. Several attempts. They couldn’t even click the heart. The fact that they could stick around until budgets were passed though is just sad.

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Oh yea, to be clear I think we need more communication from stewards moving forward, not arguing against that!

I just don’t think the solution is to encode a rule into the Constitution. This can only be achieved in practice at the culture level. People need to vote for stewards who demonstrate willingness to keep everyone informed! :slightly_smiling_face:

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Agree that it might not be best to enshrine in the constitution, but we absolutely have to articulate the expectation that any Steward update the community regularly on the various things that they’re doing to serve the DAO. Ideally we wouldn’t have to spell this out formally, but we do, and clearly defining the expectation has no real downside.

100%. This. Keeping the community informed might be one of the most important parts of a Steward’s responsibilities. The forum isn’t perfect, but it does serve as the historical record for most of the DAO’s activities. Any community member should be able to come here asynchronously and find updates that keep them in the loop on what’s happening in each working group.

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Placebos work. I know it wouldn’t make a massive difference in the grand scheme but it sends a signal that the DAO expects you to work. It costs us nothing.

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In my experience, these kinds of provisions do nothing :man_shrugging: I would vote against it.

I think pressuring stewards to communicate more is fine. I think establishing a more regular community call that is a formal place to give those updates with Q&A is better, and the Community WG is already starting that up.

Didn’t work.

Calls didn’t work well for some WGs.

I understand the objection to this proposal, it reminds me of micromanagement (which I despise) and gives stewards some extra work to do for a position that is already not as rewarding as it is.

But it’s important to remember that this proposal didn’t came out of nowhere. It followed @inplco effort to wake up the meta-governance WG. So your proposals should also consider this incident, and I don’t see how it would have affected it.

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