I want to thank everyone who participated and provided feedback in the 1st Temp Check. There was a lot of great thoughts and ideas.
The ultimate goal of this expanded Temp Check is to provide a crafted proposal in which DAO leadership can respond in greater detail. A clear response which contains data, supporting documentation, and historical evidence is what the community needs. This information in the response will either be verifiable or not, but it will help this initiative move forward with a fair decision.
It is my opinion, and the opinion of other who believe ENS governance balance can be achieved with the 5.4 unclaimed tokens.
The document is attached. Thank you again for your time and consideration.
What are your thoughts on people trying to game the system? For example, it’s written:
“users must have set an ENS record for their Ethereum address by an agreed-upon date, along with other factors”
I assume this agreed-upon date is in the future, right? Not a date in the past. In this case, what stops someone from getting a million ENS names, setting ENS records for them, and claiming a big portion of the tokens without fulfilling any of the benefits you stated?
In the original airdrop it was prevented since the cut-off date was in the past, and (almost) no one knew about it. There was one effort to gamify the system, and ENS decided then to leave the accounts related to this effort out of the airdrop.
I’m sorry, but it’s your responsibility as the person proposing an action to provide “data, supporting documentation and historical evidence” to demonstrate the value of the action, not anyone else’s responsibility to do research to refute it.
Your proposal relies on vaguesness around “balance” but fails to convey any compelling reason why this would be beneficial for ENS or the DAO.
Further, any such airdrop, with advance notice of criteria, would be farmed extensively.
Adding to @nick.eth’s points, it is not possible to use a proposal to compel a third party to take a course of action simply because they have been arbitrarily named and assigned responsibilities.
ENS Labs is not going to contribute any time or resources towards a second airdrop.
If you would like to put forward a proposal for another airdrop, you are solely responsible for every part of that proposal, from the process and mechanics, to the execution.
I’m not exactly sure why but this idea that continuously keeps coming up about an airdrop to reward the ENS community offends me. I do know that I am one of very few people who on boarded immediately after the drop and has consistently been active to as much as I am able to put forth almost daily. So to suggest people who aren’t contributing to the DAO should be rewarded before those who are is completely offensive.
There will not be another airdrop. Period. The DAO will never vote for it.
Personally, suggestions of such should be muted. That’s my opinion though,
Would be interesting to see an audit of how the proceeds were used from the unclaimed tokens. Definitely something that will be kept for as long as possible.
I don’t think anyone should be expected to volunteer their time to check such questions. ENS Labs don’t volunteer as well to do nothing, they are being financed by the DAO.
If the data the proposal requires is interesting for the DAO, then the DAO should pay for this research.
Is there a community accessible repository where I can access the financial information needed? (financial statements, P/L, agreements, etc) If you can point me in the right direction or provide link to where the information is stored, I can look into performing the cost/benefit analysis. Are you on board with sharing everything with me upon request?
I think I know what you’re asking for here, but it would help if you were more specific. The only real formal voice the DAO has is the voting results from proposals. There’s not a “DAO leadership” group to respond to you the way you’re asking. If you want specific feedback from specific delegates, just seek them out politely or tag them and ask for their feedback.
As for the “financial statements, P/L, agreements, etc”, everything the DAO does is on-chain and often discussed here in the forum. Can you be more specific in the ask?
Last thing, what Nick mentioned is important, it’s really your responsibility as the proposer to craft something that can be potentially put to a vote, and you have every right to do that within the constraints of the governance procedures. But the criteria of who/how/when, etc, will all have to be included in the proposal. You’ll need to work that out before you’ll be able to get the kind of specific feedback you’re looking for.
So how do you imagine a meaningfully decentralized governance will emerge here? Should people buy their right to vote on the ENS token secondary market which isn’t even “supposed” to exist? Is that the plan going forward? Admins of ENS Labs have an overwhelming majority of ENS tokens and if the target users supporting the protocol wish to vote, they are encouraged to purchase tokens via uniswap which creates exit liquidity for the ENS Labs team to continuously dump their ENS “governance” tokens on the target users. How is this not a centralized ponzi scheme. At least corrupted IRL governance does not demand citizens purchase their right to vote.
I appreciate the response. This “Temp Check” was created and submitted based off my initial research. If there is a similar “Temp Check” template, considered to be the gold standard, please point me in that direction.
The “draft” submitted wasn’t to be viewed as perfection. Keep in mind, I am exercising my membership and this is my first go at this. I only know the goal I am trying to achieve here, but I am often told it’s wrong, with no similar successful examples to reference. Is it because this is the first of its kind and not comparable to anything in the past?
Any additional guidance would be greatly appreciated.
He was asking about " DAO leadership", I think the Meta-governance stewards are the leaders in this matter, no?
I expect a bit of a more practical response from the MG stewards. Something along the lines of
“At the moment, the MG WG is not interested in working on a second airdrop, so we won’t be able to dedicate the resources to get this data”, or
“The MG WG might be interested to work on a second airdrop, depending on the missing data, contact us for information on how to get it!”, etc.
I can’t imagine anything like this happening without the MG stewards’ support. I also think that if the person does indeed ends up promoting this proposal (with the blessing of the MG stewards), they should be compensated for the effort. Why should we expect anyone to volunteer to do this?
But telling someone who volunteers “heh, you didn’t volunteer enough! work more first!” is not encouraging imo.
The framing here is incorrect; this is to ensure proper decentralisation of the tokens for voting and governance not for reward.
There have been numerous threads written on twitter that is not discussed here in the forum on the current tokenomics and distribution of tokens between holders and delegates. It is not resilient or robust from the perspective of most observers except people who have been in the DAO from early on.
Also, it’s very tough to justify the time that the larger community has spent for just a few tokens.
The larger community is focused on the core issue which is to ensure that the governance vote is as decentralised as possible ensuring the DAO is resistant to capture.
I agree with the proposal’s assertion that using the 5.4m unclaimed tokens can help achieve ENS governance balance, which is essential for a healthy and functioning ecosystem.
I urge you to carefully consider the proposal and take into account the concerns and feedback of the community.
Is it a possibility on a technical and lawful level to somehow interact with the ENS token and alter the contract / permissions etc.
Basically, whereby the dynamics and function of each token can be changed to serve a better purpose. ie, none tradable or have an expiry (use by) date written into the contract?
I ask this with the hopes that through creative and intellectual innovation we can potentially evolve and adapt to traverse the inevitable unpredictable nature of crypto markets, and to offer even greater ways to encourage participation and governance from the ever expanding diverse community.
Lastly, I would like to vouch for the ENS CT community from where this proposal has been birthed.
Please try to have more faith and trust towards all of us. Remembering that it is our differences that make us stronger by understanding our strengths and celebrating each other for what we can bring to the table. After all, “ENS is for everyone”, is it not?
We all need each other to coexist in this ecosystem. Because that is after all the true meaning of decentralisation.
for as long as possible.