Phase 2 - Fulfill ENS Tokenomics (Draft Proposal)

[flossin.eth1]

Shouldn’t this be accessible if ENS is truly “decentralized”
Last I checked all this information is made public for publicly traded companies (which are not decentralized)

[accessor.eth]

@neiman

The MG WG might be interested to work on a second airdrop, depending on the missing data, contact us for information on how to get

Nobody is forcing you to do anything in the first place. I think anyone who has tenure in this project has volunteered their time at one point or another. Compensating person(s) for creating a proposal and because they take the time to push it doesn’t seem feasible. That would mean anyone could just come on to the forum and write up some ridiculous unachievable proposal, go pretend to push the agenda behind it and then expect to get paid.

@neiman

I expect a bit of a more practical response from the MG stewards. Something along the lines of

• “At the moment, the MG WG is not interested in working on a second airdrop, so we won’t be able to dedicate the resources to get this data”, or
• “The MG WG might be interested to work on a second airdrop, depending on the missing data, contact us for information on how to get it!”, etc.

I can’t imagine anything like this happening without the MG stewards’ support. I also think that if the person does indeed ends up promoting this proposal (with the blessing of the MG stewards), they should be compensated for the effort. Why should we expect anyone to volunteer to do this?

But telling someone who volunteers “heh, you didn’t volunteer enough! work more first!” is not encouraging imo.

All of these points were have been addressed

[Temp Check] ENS Token 2nd Airdrop

To even vaguely consider any kind of second airdrop, there’d need to be a clearly defined goal, and a clear explanation of how the airdrop would achieve that goal - and how it would avoid being gamed. None of those are present here, and “getting more people involved” and the like are too vague to be meaningful goals.

@accessor.eth

Also please be mindful that; right now – in Q12023, an airdrop is not the main focus of the DAO, people are very busy working on projects that have been discussed for months, people are traveling to conferences and networking with other Ethereans. ETH Denver is coming up, the name wrapper is about to launch.

What you are presenting is a much larger project than most of the DAO would care to focus on right now.
That’s my take on it and I think many people would agree with that.

In the meantime if you feel super strong about this, maybe presenting some questions to the forum like this to start…

1.) What incentive to the community will second airdrop provide?

2.) Looking at the first airdrop, what are some challenges that were faced? What was successful?

3.) How many tokens were sold by recipients immediately after? How was the market affected by that?

4.) How many ENS Governance token recipients still have all or percentage of their tokens today?

5.) How many of those who are still holding are actively taking part in governance discussion on forum ?

6.) What percentage of token recipients have voted at least one time in the past year?

7.) What is the incentive for another airdrop ? Why are the tokens wanted?

8.) Will another airdrop stimulate more people to build or will builders who dont receive them feel left out again?

9.) Should a token claim be open to all .eth holders? Or should we look and measure discussion forum
contribution statistics to use as a weighted reference.

After all the token is for the DAO Governance voting and is not by any means a security.

So who would benefit from a drop more? Individuals who are already contribution daily, weekly and for the past year or allowing someone to claim the tokens and then sell them off into the market without considering contributing to DAO

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@833.eth

I agree with the proposal’s assertion that using the 5.4m unclaimed tokens can help achieve ENS governance balance, which is essential for a healthy and functioning ecosystem.
I urge you to carefully consider the proposal and take into account the concerns and feedback of the community.

based off what articulate facts?

[thenftverse.eth]

@accessor.eth

After all the token is for the DAO Governance voting and is not by any means a security.

Quick Question for research purposes: First, I applaud your consistency with engagement. I can respect that. With confidence, are you confirming that the token has ONLY been used for voting and in no other reward mechanism?

[nick.eth]

@meta8.eth

Is it a possibility on a technical and lawful level to somehow interact with the ENS token and alter the contract / permissions etc.

Basically, whereby the dynamics and function of each token can be changed to serve a better purpose. ie, none tradable or have an expiry (use by) date written into the contract?

No.

[accessor.eth]

The governance token has one purpose. That purpose is that 1 token is weighted to 1 vote.
The token being distributed to ‘as a reward’ is not a mechanism of the token itself and isn’t defined in the contract or anywhere else.

Each working group has requested ENS tokens to distribute at their discretion in their budget proposals. However the stewards decide to distribute them is up to them.

Is there some further context about research/reward regarding ENS tokens ?

[thenftverse.eth]

This response helps. Duly noted.

[thenftverse.eth]

@accessor.eth

Each working group has requested ENS tokens to distribute at their discretion in their budget proposals. However the stewards decide to distribute them is up to them.

Can anyone assist with pointing me in the direction where I can obtain the ENS distribution data from the above response?

I am not sure what wallets were used to execute these types of distributions.

Thanks,

[gregskril]

The only way funds can leave the DAO’s wallet (0xFe89cc7aBB2C4183683ab71653C4cdc9B02D44b7) is via an on-chain proposal, which gets voted on by owners of $ENS and their chosen delegates.

Delegations happen on the $ENS token contract, 0xC18360217D8F7Ab5e7c516566761Ea12Ce7F9D72.

The creation of proposals and casting of votes is done via 0x323a76393544d5ecca80cd6ef2a560c6a395b7e3, the ENS Governor contract.

There are a number of websites that make on-chain governance data easier to follow, one of which is Tally. The latest request of $ENS from Working Groups can be found here.