According to the Foundation proposal, SPP would continue through SPP3 and then be folded into a Foundation-run grants program, with administration shifting to the Executive Director and Foundation staff.
In parallel, it was suggested that SPP3 funds could be ringfenced in a separate multisig so they are protected and already accounted for, avoiding both a later top-up and the need to leave SPP3 funding to the Foundation’s discretion.
That may help preserve continuity, but it also raises a governance design question: if Meta-Gov stewards, SPP committee members, or eventual recipients control that multisig, would that create a real or perceived conflict of interest?
Potential overlap may exist among current Meta-Gov WG nominees, including:
@netto.eth of Blockful.eth (current Service Provider)
So the process question is: if SPP3 funds are moved to a multisig, who should control it, and what guardrails would be needed to avoid conflicts or the appearance of conflicts?
The cohort is nominated by the current SPP3 committee and then goes to the DAO for a vote.
Once the cohort is ratified, there’s little surface area for conflict of interest. From that point on the work is monitoring and reporting, and all of it is public. A stream only stops if a provider stops reporting or abandons the work, which is unambiguous. Additionally, every provider signs a service agreement that sets out the terms in writing. There’s little subjectivity.
I think the scenario you’re suggesting is a rogue actor may disregard a passing proposal and modify the stream. That’s possible, but working group multisigs already hold and move funds on signer trust, so this isn’t a new or unique concern.
The stream management pod guardrails I suggest are:
Any signer with a conflict recuses from decisions touching their own or a related stream.
Every stream suspension is documented publicly, which the committee is already obligated to do.
ZRM clawback is the DAO’s backstop.
I wanted to keep the payments separated from the committee, but with the absence of a secretary and to achieve n/4 I’m happy to sit on the stream multi-sig as a collateral duty of the chair.
Edits: Added link to previous stream proposal for clarification.
Thanks for the clarification — I think it makes sense for the SPP chair to sit on the n/4 multisig to strengthen procedural neutrality re: funds custody.
“Funds are transferred to the accountability body’s multisig upon cohort ratification and disbursed to providers via stream from there.”
And
“The accountability body refers to the body the DAO designates as the SPP3 accountability counterparty. At the time of this proposal, that body is the Meta-Governance Working Group”
So in practice, the accountability body would presumably deploy that Safe, seat the relevant signers, and configure the ZRM clawback mechanism.
Am I right to infer that the accountability body would configure the ZRM on setup?
And if so, what exact powers would the DAO have through it, and who could later amend or revoke that configuration?
To correct myself, a ZRM isn’t really necessary and clawback is the wrong phrase since:
the funds are streamed from the timelock in this configuration
the backstop is already upstream… if the stream pod acts in bad faith, governance can cut or throttle the whole flow into it by executable proposal.
On this discussion, I still re-affirm we’re aren’t doing anything radically different here than what exists, and the surface area for CoI on the stream management is really limited because the parameters for stopping a stream are unambiguous.
In reality the streams will be set, and the most likely modification will be a stoppage. This will require public notification and discussion.
I think the 3 stewards plus the SPP Committee chair would be fine for the multisig. Even if the stewards are also recipients of SPP funds, there isn’t really any opportunity for abuse.
The idea is to get everything set up in advance so it runs itself, to avoid the work of requesting/justifying a top-up in the future when we know now that the funds are already committed.