[6.42] [Social] SPP3: Program Authorization and Committee Model

Abstract

The Service Provider Program funds teams that provide defined services to the ENS ecosystem. This proposal authorizes a third season, specifies the objectives SPP3 should advance, names the committee that will execute it, and caps the budget at 20% of trailing protocol revenue.

The program parameters and budget are ratified in a single Snapshot vote alongside the named committee; the committee then returns to the DAO with a final cohort recommendation ratified via on-chain executable.

SPP3 requires two votes from delegates:

  1. The first approves the program, budget, and committee;
  2. the second ratifies the cohort.

This removes the burden on delegates of rating and ranking every service provider themselves, a structural problem SPP2 exposed.

The committee reports to the DAO directly through standard governance channels. SPP3 is not contingent on the outcome of any ongoing governance discussions; the two tracks proceed independently. The SPP3 provider cohort shall not be unwound or restructured mid-cycle by an incoming foundation or working group.

Specification

Part I: Program Authorization

Authorization

SPP3 is authorized as a one-cycle program. Renewal requires a new DAO vote. Nothing in this proposal commits the DAO to future seasons.

The program funds teams that provide a defined service to the ENS ecosystem in exchange for payment. The primary deliverable must be a service to ENS. Projects whose primary value accrues outside the ENS ecosystem are not eligible.

Ecosystem Objectives

SPP3 applicants must map their proposed work to one or more of the following objective categories.

Across all categories, growth in ENS registrations and integrations is a primary outcome the program is desires to advance.

  • ENS Infrastructure. Work that improves ENS as a protocol: smart contract development, frontend and client library improvements, resolver infrastructure, L2 support, and any engineering that increases the utility or reliability of the naming system.
  • Outreach and Integrations. Work that increases adoption and usage of ENS: integration support for wallets, dApps, and exchanges; developer relations; documentation; marketing; and partnership development.
  • DAO Infrastructure. Work that improves the operation of the DAO itself: governance tooling, transparency and accountability tools, voting infrastructure, communication platforms, and process automation.
  • General Ecosystem Benefit. Work that broadly benefits ENS without fitting into the first three categories. Applicants claiming this category must demonstrate why their work does not fit and provide a concrete theory of value, including measurable outcomes. Category 4 is a narrow residual; the committee should prefer placing work into the first three categories where a reasonable mapping exists.

The committee may define subcategories and weights when it publishes the rubric, but may not create new top-level categories. Different objectives in a future cycle require a new Program Authorization vote.

Budget

The SPP3 budget shall not exceed 20% of gross protocol revenue (registrations and renewals).

The 20% formula is applied to trailing 12-month protocol revenue as measured at the time of the original draft (February 2026): approximately $16.9M, producing a binding budget cap of approximately $3.4M for SPP3. The cap is not recomputed at ratification.

For comparison, SPP2 was $4.5M; the decrease reflects a year-over-year decline in protocol revenue, not a policy decision to reduce program funding. Proportionally to last year it remains the same.

Committee compensation totals $150,000 USDC across the three compensated seats (one Chair at $45,000 and three compensated Members at $35,000 each). The ENS Labs Technical Representative seat is non-compensated. After overhead, approximately $3.25M is available for service provider funding. Funds are transferred to the accountability body’s multisig upon cohort ratification and disbursed to providers via stream from there. Unspent funds return to the DAO treasury.

The committee will not consider applications requesting less than $200,000. This floor exists to keep evaluation workload proportionate to program value; the committee should focus its effort on providers whose scope and funding represent a meaningful contribution to the ecosystem.

Revenue source: dune.com/steakhouse/ens-steakhouse

Relationship to SPP2

SSPP3 is independent of SPP2. SPP2 streams continue on their original terms. SPP3 does not modify, terminate, or extend them. SPP2 providers whose agreements are concluding may apply to SPP3 on the same basis as any other applicant. Work delivered on schedule during the final weeks of an expiring SPP2 stream carries no negative weight in the SPP3 evaluation; the committee will assess delivery timing fairly.

Part II: Committee Model

Model Justification

Throughout this proposal, ā€œthe accountability bodyā€ refers to the body the DAO designates as the SPP3 accountability counterparty. At the time of this proposal, that body is the Meta-Governance Working Group.

A standing committee addresses accountability gaps without removing the DAO from the decision. The DAO ratifies the committee in this proposal, approves the cohort recommendation by on-chain vote, and holds removal authority throughout.

The primary improvement over SPP2 is structural. Under SPP2, delegates were asked to rate and rank each provider proposal individually. That placed a heavy evaluation burden on the DAO and produced cohorts shaped more by aggregated voter sorting than by deliberate composition. SPP3 moves that work to a named, accountable committee whose recommendation the DAO ratifies as a single cohort.

SPP2 also surfaced smaller structural questions this model addresses:

  • Program scope wasn’t formally ratified by the DAO ahead of selection
  • Some disagreements landed mid-cycle, after applications had opened
  • The fixed budget wasn’t tied to protocol revenue

Compensation reflects 12 months of accountability: reading every application, conducting interviews, negotiating service agreements, voting on the cohort, defending the recommendation publicly, and remaining the DAO’s contact point for the funded providers across the year.

Roles

Committee Chair. Owns the full lifecycle of SPP3: timeline, interview calendar, forum updates, primary DAO contact for the 12-month term, post-cycle retrospective, and the point of contact for the funded cohort post-ratification. The Chair is a neutral process owner during selection and votes or ranks only as a tiebreaker.

Committee Member. Reads every qualifying submission in full, participates in structured interviews, votes on allocation, and approves the cohort rationale before publication. No Member has unilateral authority to disqualify applicants.

ENS Labs Technical Representative (non-compensated). A Labs-designated voting Member seat (currently gregskril.eth). Brings protocol-level technical judgment. This seat is bound by the same CoI requirements as all other members. Not eligible for promotion to Chair.

Composition

Role Count Compensation
Chair 1 $45,000 / cycle
Member (compensated) 3 $35,000 / cycle
Member (ENS Labs Rep) 1 Non-compensated

Named seats:

Seat Name Profile
Chair coltron.eth Long-standing ENS DAO contributor and steward and current steward.
Member sovereignsignal.eth Current steward and experienced grants administrator. Cross-ecosystem experience in Gitcoin, ENS, and Uniswap.
Member austingriffith.eth Long-standing Ethereum builder, mentor, and educator. Founder of BuidlGuidl and creator of Scaffold-ETH. Currently working with the Ethereum Foundation.
Member abdullahumar.eth Former co-president and head of governance at Michigan Blockchain. Active across Arbitrum, Lido, and Uniswap DAO’s with a broad context on DAO operations and grants programs.
Member gregskril.eth ENS Labs technical representative providing protocol-level engineering judgment. Non-compensated

The committee is named in this proposal and ratified by the DAO in the same Snapshot vote that authorizes the program. No separate election is held. Naming constitutes tacit acceptance of the role.

Term and Payment

Term aligns with the SPP3 funding cycle (12 months).Term aligns with the SPP3 funding cycle (12 months).

Compensation: 20% paid upon on-chain submission of the cohort recommendation; 80% streamed over the remainder of the 12-month term, beginning on cohort on-chain ratification. The accountability body initiates the upfront payment and the stream; the committee holds no funds directly. If the accountability body changes during the cycle, responsibility passes to the successor body without interruption.

Dissolution. Each member receives only compensation earned to that point. The 20% upfront tranche is owed if the cohort recommendation has been submitted on-chain. Any portion of the 80% stream that has elapsed is owed; the remainder returns to the treasury.

Vacancies

If a compensated Member seat becomes vacant, it is filled by mutual agreement of the remaining members, subject to eligibility and DAO notification within 7 days. The replacement receives the remaining unpaid compensation of the member they replace. If the ENS Labs Rep seat becomes vacant, ENS Labs designates a replacement.

If the Chair seat becomes vacant, the remaining Members promote one of the three compensated Members to Chair by simple majority. The promoted Chair receives the Chair stream from the date of promotion forward; the outgoing Chair retains anything vested. If the vacancy occurs before or during cohort selection, a replacement Member is also appointed and the published timeline may be extended by up to 14 days. The ENS Labs Rep is not eligible for promotion to Chair.

Quorum and Voting

Voting or ranking of the cohort requires 3 of the 4 Member seats to be active and participating. Decisions require a simple majority of participating Members. The Chair votes only as a tiebreaker.

Conflict of Interest

A ommittee Member or Chair may not:

  • Be a current or pending SPP3 applicant
  • Be employed by, contracted to, hold stake in, or serve in any advisory capacity to any current or pending SPP3 applicant
  • Have received direct compensation from any SPP3 applicant in the 3 months prior to nomination
  • Acquire any of the above interests after ratification

Breach triggers automatic suspension pending a removal vote. Self-disclosure is required at nomination, and any new potential conflict must be disclosed as it arises. Failing to disclose a new conflict after ratification is grounds for removal.

CoI disputes are handled within the committee. In the absence of a functioning accountability body, the guardrail is social coordination among delegates or an executable DAO vote.

No Backchanneling

Once the application window opens, committee members must not meet privately with applicants to discuss SPP3. All program discussion happens through the structured interview process. Providers who attempt to gain advantage by pressuring individual members may be considered for disqualification.

Removal

A committee member may be removed by unanimous vote of the remaining members with documented cause (persistent non-performance or material CoI breach). Upon removal, any unpaid compensation is forfeited.

Committee Accountability

The committee is expected to complete the following across the cycle. These are generally pass/fail obligations; the program depends on all of them being met.

  • Read every qualifying submission in full
  • Conduct structured interviews with each qualifying applicant
  • Publish cohort selection rationale alongside the recommendation
  • Publish a mid-cycle update in Q4 2026
  • Publish an end-of-cycle retrospective within 30 days of cycle close (May 2027)
  • Document any stream suspension or termination decision with public rationale
  • Chair serves as primary point of contact for the funded cohort for the full 12-month term

At mid-cycle and end-of-cycle, the committee will report on:

  • Provider milestone completion rate, with a target of 80% of milestones delivered by end of cycle
  • Any indicated movement in name registrations, renewals, or integrations attributable to funded work

These metrics provide sufficient signal to assess whether funds were effectively deployed and whether the program structure warrants continuation in the same form after SPP3.

Part III: SPP Application Process

The committee sets and publishes the full process timeline before the submission window opens. The committee may extend the submission or review windows if more time is needed to ensure a thorough evaluation. Any extension must be announced publicly before the original deadline passes.

Pre-Submission Work

Before the provider submission window opens, the committee is responsible for preparing the infrastructure that makes the cycle run. This work begins immediately upon committee seating and includes:

  • Developing and publishing the evaluation rubric based on the suggested criteria below
  • Drafting and publishing the standard service agreement template
  • Publishing the application format and required fields
  • Building or configuring the submission system (intake form, confidential storage, interview scheduling)
  • Posting the full process timeline with binding dates
  • Setting up internal scoring and rationale-tracking tools

All pre-submission artifacts (rubric, service agreement template, application format, timeline) will be posted publicly to the forum before the submission window opens.

Cohort Composition

The committee determines the number of funded providers. There is no minimum or maximum number of providers; the only binding constraint is that total funding fits within the ratified budget envelope. The $200,000 application floor in Part I applies.

The committee has discretion within the following principles:

  • Category coverage: The cohort should advance the program’s objectives across all relevant categories, but the committee is not required to fund every category. If the applicant pool in a given category does not meet the evaluation threshold, the committee may decline to fund it.
  • Award sizing: The committee may negotiate tfund providers at amounts smaller than requested, with rationale, and may negotiate scope or milestone adjustments.

The committee will make best efforts to construct a cohort that fits well as a whole, reducing funding overlaps and avoiding duplicative work across funded teams.

Process

Submission window and committee context-building (concurrent, ~14 days). The submission window and committee context-building period run simultaneously. While providers are preparing and submitting applications, the committee is building shared context on the current ecosystem, existing integrations, and ongoing work. The rubric, service agreement template, and application format are published before this window opens. The committee filters spam and erroneous submissions concurrently. Pre-qualification is a basic screen, not a quality judgment.

Committee review (~14 days). The committee reads every qualifying application in full and conducts a structured interview with each team in a consistent format. Scoring begins on pre-qualified applications before the submission window closes. The committee may negotiate scope, objectives, or award amounts during this period. The committee may extend this window if more time is needed for a complete evaluation, with public notice.

Week 3: Recommendation and ratification. The committee submits a cohort recommendation publicly to the DAO. Selected applicants, individual award amounts, total program cost, and a public rationale on the forum. Internal working documents may be shared with the accountability body or the ENS Foundation upon request.

The committee then submits the recommendation as an executable proposal. Delegates vote on the cohort as a whole; the recommendation is a take-it-or-leave-it and cannot be amended on-chain.

If rejected, the committee may revise and resubmit a maximum of two additional times. If no cohort is ratified within 30 days of the first failure, or if the committee voluntarily steps down, the committee is dissolved.

Evaluation Criteria

Eligibility (Ecosystem Objective category fit) is established in Part I.

The criteria below evaluate the quality and likely impact of eligible applicants and are ratified as the floor of the rubric. The committee may expand on these criteria, define sub-criteria, or set weights, but the criteria themselves are binding.

Prior Delivery History within ENS. Has the team shipped what it committed to in previous ENS work? Incomplete or abandoned prior grants are weighted negatively. New teams without ENS history must demonstrate comparable delivery elsewhere.

Scope Clarity. Is the team’s intended work clearly defined? The committee looks for a coherent problem statement, a credible approach, and a clear articulation of what success looks like. Flexibility in execution is expected; the committee evaluates whether the team can credibly deliver meaningful outcomes, not whether they have followed a prescribed format.

Milestone Structure. Are deliverables broken into realistic and verifiable checkpoints with dates? Each milestone should answer: what is being delivered, how completion is verified (a metric, a deployed contract, a published report, or a link), when it is expected, and what an on-track quarterly update looks like. Proposals with lump-sum outputs and no interim milestones score lower.

Adoption, Revenue, and Ecosystem Utility. Does this work expand ENS’s reach or usage? Covers direct user adoption metrics, name sales and renewal revenue attributable to the work, integrations, and broader ecosystem health. As stated in the program objectives, registration growth is a first-order outcome; the committee should weigh contributions to registration and revenue growth alongside non-revenue forms of adoption.

Service Provider Obligations

Individual service agreements are negotiated by the committee and specified per provider before cohort submission, within the following constraints:

Payment structure. Funded providers are compensated via stream, not lump sum. Streams are optimistic and continue by default. The committee negotiates schedule, duration, and milestones with each provider individually.

Milestone accountability. Milestones are targets, not gates. A provider is in good standing as long as they have not abandoned the work and are maintaining their reporting cadence. Stream continuation is tied to continued engagement and reporting, not milestone completion. The committee may recommend suspension or termination of a stream if a provider stops reporting or abandons the work, subject to a written notice and response period defined in the agreement. Disputes may be raised to the accountability body for resolution.

Treasury return. Unspent funds from terminated agreements return to the DAO treasury at the conclusion of the cycle. They do not roll over without a new DAO vote.

Service Agreement. Selected providers will be required to sign the ENS Foundation Terms of Use before funding begins. The Terms establish the legal relationship between the Foundation and funded providers, covering conditions of fund use, open-source licensing requirements, sanctions and OFAC compliance, AML obligations, quarterly reporting, and the right to suspend or terminate streams for material breaches or reputational harm.

The standard service agreement template will be published to the forum at the time the application window opens. Material per-provider deviations will be noted in the cohort recommendation.

Voting

This proposal will be submitted as a Snapshot vote.

  • For: Authorize SPP3.
  • Against: Do not authorize SPP3.
  • Abstain: Abstain from this vote. Counts toward quorum but not approval.

Quorum: 1% of total $ENS supply.
Approval: Simple majority (>50%) of For vs. Against votes.

Next Steps

  1. All five committee seats confirmed publicly during forum discussion (5–7 days)
  2. Proposal submitted to Snapshot upon close of forum discussion
  3. Committee seated upon Snapshot passage
  4. Rubric and service agreement template published within 7 days of seating
  5. Provider submission window opens (minimum 5 days after rubric publication); committee context-building runs concurrently

Timeline

Phase 1: Forum Discussion + Snapshot

Step Dates Notes
Forum discussion Apr 25 – May 2 Named seats declared publicly
Program + committee Snapshot May 2 – May 7 Single proposal, 5 days
Committee seated ~May 7 Rubric due within 7 days

Phase 2: Provider selection + Executable

Step Dates Notes
Committee context-building + Provider submissions May 19 – Jun 2 14-day window; rubric publishes ≄5 days prior; committee context-building runs concurrently
Committee review Jun 2 – Jun 16 14-day review
Recommendation posted Jun 16 – Jun 19 Forum publication
On-chain ratification Jun 22 – Jul 1 7-day vote + 2-day timelock
  • The timeline posted in this proposal may be adjusted by the committee if a change reasonably improves the process. Examples cases may be to allow more time for submissions and review, or shortening window if a step is completed (rubric/review). Changes will be communicated on the forum.
15 Likes

I drafted SPP3 while observing conversations from temp check on expanding the ENS Foundation Board, the findings from the MetaGov retrospective, and even the recent post [Temp Check] Working Group Restructure.

I’m hoping to move forward a SPP program that improves on previous iterations, brings real oversight to provider work, and aligns provider scope with where the DAO needs to grow. I also want whatever we do here to remain forward compatible with however the DAO evolves organizationally.

I’m sure there are improvements to be made to this draft, and questions. Feedback on the budget, the committee model, or anything else in the proposal is welcome.

It’s clear that a lot of effort and thought has been put into this proposal for SPP3. It is something, where before there was nothing. Sincerely respect that.

Also appreciate how there’s an urgency to get the next steps for SPP3 confirmed, and confirmed in a way that will be best for the future of ENS. We all want this.

It’s past 1:30am here now and need to get up extra early tomorrow morning, so will keep this very brief.

There’s red flags in this proposal and it should not proceed as written. The described process here is also framed to ram this proposal through without appropriate opportunities for DAO feedback or discussion. For example, it’s already framed as a ā€œ[Social]ā€ vote, rather than as a temp check. This post also calls to be put to a social vote in under a week. That seems to suggest a take-it-or-leave-it approach before DAO feedback is collected, taken into appropriate consideration, and accounted for in what is ultimately put to vote.

An alternate proposal for SPP3 is needed.

Once again, it’s past 1:30am here now. Will follow up with more detailed and specific thoughts. Let’s have a healthy debate on the future of the ENS SPP. No, this isn’t about stalling. This is an important time in the arc of ENS. A new ENS Foundation board is being assembled with a big new mandate, restructured working groups, SPP3, ENSv2, pricing changes, and more — let’s not take destructive shortcuts by ramming through the first proposal on SPP3 when better options are well within reach. More to come on that soon.

1 Like

Thank you for working so hard on this, I really appreciate you running with this.

I will say that I feel a time pressure here and I would like to see us move forward with this sooner rather than later, and I’m willing to be pragmatic to see that happen.

I agree with a cap, but this kind of formula will result in potentially large swings year by year. Would Labs accept a percentage cap based on the last year? Probably not because they’d say it would lead to too much annual uncertainty, adding and cutting positions, etc. I’d recommend a percentage on a longer time horizon.

All good people. Not sure I like the precedent this sets, particularly for things like the Board composition (which is higher stakes). But I also understand time constraints here.

Greg’s great but I lean against this, since I think this program should be detached from Labs. Although maybe just one is fine for coordination purposes.

Eh, things like this could bite us in the future, I’d delete.

Very important! I support.

Asking the team to explain how they can held accountable is right and good. Requesting checkpoints with specific dates I think is not how real software development works and will lead to applications having lots of fake dates just to fulfill this requirement. I recommend replacing this with a more open-ended request for teams to define how their work will be measured (which the committee can respond to and probe, or request more).

1 Like

To be clear, my previous post encourages feedback and I welcome yours.

The timeline is provided to add clarity. If there is demand to extend the discussion process this can easily happen. In the same spirit, the committee review phase after provider submission can be extended.

I reformatted the title. I don’t think I’ve demanded any rush here.

I appreciate the feedback, @brantlymillegan. Some of my thoughts on the points you raised:

Budget formula

I’m actually very open to discussion on the budget. If a 24-month or 26-month trailing formula makes more sense and adds more stability it is an easy change.

That said, my perspective is that I want to see a balance of growth-oriented spending while delegates engage in honest talks about the state of the treasury. Revenue and registrations are down. I understand that ENSv2, changes in name prices, and the broader market could significantly affect our current position, but I’m going off what we know now.

I also concede that trailing revenue calculation (of any duration) isn’t a perfect solution, but my goal is that this is an incremental improvement on the process last year which didn’t seem rooted in the protocol’s performance.

(Earmarking for revision, will consider 24/36-mo calculation.)

Milestone dates (Earmarking for revision)

We’re aligned. I want milestones to show there is a plan, not be rigid checkpoints. I meant for the current language to frame milestones as targets not gates, with stream continuation tied to reporting and not abandoning work. As long as providers have not abandoned work and are reporting, I consider them in good standing.

(Earmarking for revision, my language is unclear)

Term limits

Easy to drop, maybe over engineered there.

(Earmarking for removal unless there is support)

Named seats precedent

I recognize that this is a massive change from the previous process. I wrestled with it.

I ultimately decided to put forward named committee because although it removed a possible democratic process, I think providing a named committee adds simplicity and transparency for delegates choosing to ratify the program. There is no high-stakes election for large delegates to jockey: what you see is what you get. I also stand behind every name on that list

Nothing in this proposal binds future versions of the SPP, so I agree with you that if the program proceeds this way it should be evaluated and not considered precedent.

Labs Rep Seat

My take is the seat provides real value. Protocol-level technical judgment is hard to source elsewhere without creating a conflict. If we can find another protocol-level expert without an SPP application or conflict of interest, happy to discuss.

No backchanneling

Glad we agree.

2 Likes

Supportive. I appreciate the work and thought that went into creating this temp check.

One addition to consider is having a minimum funding amount of $200k.

I’d be against this. Agree with @brantlymillegan this could create issues later.

1 Like

Very well-thought-out proposal — no glaze, fr!

+1 a scoped ask incentivizes problem clarity, disciplined execution, and measurable accountability.

—

Any rationale to offer? My concern is that a hard floor can incentivize budget inflation and bundled scopes, rather than sharper problem statements, scoped delivery, and measurable outcomes.

1 Like

Trying to avoid a situation where this committee has to judge 50k projects against 200k+ projects. This increases work burden for unclear value.

1 Like

What, in your view, is commensurate LOE with compensation?

A well-defined evaluation rubric should filter proposals with unclear value.

The cost of implementing a proposal should be derived from scope and priced against comparable market rates. Smaller, high-quality asks should remain viable when well-scoped.

1 Like

I am adding my comments from the grant manager perspective, the rest of the proposal will be good for me.

This doesn’t provide enough window. Assuming this is linear and immediately one after the other (as it is stated in the phase 2 explanation). If project A submits a proposal, and within 7 days gets a review, suggest changes or request more information, for the amount of money distributed some projects will need more than 7 days to adjust. Same goes for the review, as we have seen before, a lot of things can be discovered during the review phase, and clarifications/research may be needed, so 7 days feels also tight. I’d suggest a buffer in between submission phase and review phase.

I’d agreed with this names, but as it was suggested even for the foundation board, there should be a seat that the DAO oversees and suggests. I wouldn’t understand why one board/committee follows one system and other (this one or any other) should be treated differently.

For the context of the previous quote, I’d suggest adding few things: 1. Member of the committee can’t and shouldn’t vote in any of the snapshot related to the SPP3 election. 2. When a tiebreaker occurs, the Chair should make it publicly when it happenned and why it voted as it did.

Love this, but find it hard to reinforce. If this moves forward, the mechanism in which a ā€œprotestā€ or ā€œcontestā€, or ā€œconflict resolutionā€ should be in place. This I guess would fall into the Chair responsibilities, which should be the one receiving formal complains (x project meet with x member, x project lied about x, etc). The accountability body should be the one dealing with them, but since we don’t have a clear understanding of who that will be, at least we can clarify that the chair should be the one receiving and validating those complaints.

This is where I think, the contest or disputing the recommendation could occurr, my only argument here is that disputing it publicly can harm people without anything being verified. Hence my recommendation that disputing the results should be done in private for internal checking.

We have had a long tradition of repeated people in positions that lead to the situation we are currently in. Since that system led to this (political concentration of power, lack of oversee, or just an ego-maniac) I’d suggest we give the opportunity to change it and try out this. We aren’t drafting the constitution here, doing a hands down after two cycles to someone new isn’t something hard and bring different perspectives to the committee.

But maybe am not seeing the whole picture, can you develop what kind of issues?

That only happens when there is not a real structure, accountability nor transparency when choosing projects. I think a well structure program like this won’t have an issue to evaluate wether a project has a clear or unclear value.

1 Like

Thanks for taking the initiative, Coltron! I know very well how much responsibility this program carries and how difficult it is to facilitate it!

I’m supportive, and I agree with almost everything here. Some comments/questions below.

–

  • I agree with all Brantly’s points around 20% fixed budget from the protocol revenue. Too much anual uncertainty and teams/people lost simply due to market conditions. Though I don’t understand how longer time horizon fixes this? I may be supportive of a 20% fixed allocation if it were fixed for 5 years because it would give teams long-term incentive to build revenue-generating products, but at the same time it might be putting infra work, research, ENSIPs, and others at a disadvantage.

  • I like that the Milestones are earmarked for revision. I’ve always advocated for flexibility here. There are many teams who expended their inital SPP2 application scope and delivered everything they wrote in their application, and built even more products, started new initiatives they couldn’t have predicted would appear, but at the same time had to let some things go (for different reasons - timing, market-conditions, ensv2, etc.). Flexibility in uncertain environments is important.

  • Pulling 150k from an already reduced SP program instead of treating it as a separate DAO expense is misaligned (unless I misunderstood this). Also, if there is a minimum threshold like last year (300k), that leaves 50k in the air.

  • Q: ETH Limo and Blockful last year secured a 2-year grant, I believe 700k each (though I may be off) - would those commitments come out of the SPP3 pool, or are they accounted for separately?

3 Likes

Thanks for putting this all together, I really appreciate the amount of detail you’ve added! I strongly support the the intent and goal of this initiative, but I have some reservations about execution.

I think it’s important for committee members to have relevant domain expertise over what they are assessing. You’ve outlined 4 main categories that the committee will be focused on funding; the ENS infrastructure category is extremely technical, and the remaining 3 categories seem to be a 50-50 split between requiring deep technical knowledge and strong product vision/community leadership.

Therefore, I would expect to see the committee composition intentionally defined to follow a similar split. The proposed committee members are all high quality, but technical expertise seems to be underrepresented. On top of being able to assess if a proposed project is technically feasible or not, technical experts would also be able to assess applications for novelty, expected impact, future upgrade paths, and quality of execution. I would hate to see all of that land on the shoulders of just one committee member!

Similarly, I would expect to see some sort of plan for accountability, and how service providers would be assessed on delivering what they promised. This accountability should be more than a quarterly report where the provider can just say ā€œyes, we ticked that boxā€ and should include actual code reviews and/or technical assessments.

2 Likes

Thanks for putting this together Coltron.

I agree with Brantly on not tying the budget to the past year gross revenue, but a longer window. Maybe instead of ā€œ20% of the last year revenueā€ it could be ā€œ4% of the last 4 years of revenue combinedā€.

I agree that updating SPP3 is urgent. I would normally object to a proposal that contains already the members, but in interest of time (and the fact I approve the proposed members) I will not object.

I think we should not necessarily need explicit rules on how the new committee will do in SPP4, either they can be reelected and such, because I think ideally moving forward that could be the main job of the board of directors of the foundation. I don’t see why we would need two overlapping boards.

I would even go further and say that, once the new board of directors for the ENS foundation is in place I would argue that budget should be their main responsibility: they should cap ALL spending at something like 80% of the average revenue of the last 4 years (by revenue this would include yields from the endowment), and have a yearly budgeting session for everything, including their own compensation, any steward compensation, grants, service providers, Labs Budget, conference sponsorships etc.

5 Likes

Can include language about a minimum budget.

(Earmarking for edit)

I agree. I intended to keep this tight, but will adjust for more time on both the submission and review phases. Probably fair to include language that the committee can reasonably extend the review timeline to ensure the review isn’t rushed.

(Earmarking for edit)

To be upfront, I think the DAO should have an elected seat on the Foundation Board. I went a different direction here because I think the discussion is different: with the Foundation Board, the argument is that the DAO is seeking to maintain parity in representation with ENS Labs. The concern is that ENS Labs would control the board. Aside from the single ENS Labs representative, I don’t see that power dynamic at risk here.

The Foundation Board will also have very broad influence, decision-making authority, and budget. This committee, by contrast, is limited in scope. The budget is large, but the committee can’t make unilateral spending decisions. The DAO needs to approve the final cohort via an executable proposal.

I’ll try to clarify this better in a revision if possible. For the no-back-channelling, my goal is to prevent private pitching to committee members or providers attempting to gain unfair advantages over one another. The enforcement mechanism on the provider side is disqualification; on the committee member side it’s forfeiting unpaid compensation.

For removal, I’m fine arbitrating any CoI claims within the committee if they arise. I agree it would be helpful to know whether the committee will have a meta-governance working group or Foundation involved, but that certainty isn’t there yet. In the event there is no accountability body and delegates lose faith in the process or committee, the guardrail is social or executable votes.

(Will clarify language)

A longer time frame would certainly expand the budget. My gut feeling is that the underlying concern is the budget won’t be big enough to accommodate every request, and there’s a desire to find a number where everyone expects to be included. My view is that we need constraints and this is a competitive process.

I’m hoping to have examples of what a longer timeframe for this calculation would look like for the meta-gov call tomorrow.

I specifically wanted to contain the entire budget within the program itself to enhance transparency on what the full program costs.

I don’t expect the total paid to providers to land on a round number. Based on provider requests, it’s possible the total available for provider requests ($3.25M) won’t be fully utilized.

They would not come out of the SPP3 pool. My understanding is that this was already committed via the SPP2 vote. I’m unsure whether those funds have been set aside, but in my view they should not come out of this budget and I haven’t expected them to. Good question for @Meta-Gov_Stewards.

Assembling a committee with both technical expertise and no conflict of interest for this program is genuinely difficult. Several of the first names that came to mind were already working with or as service providers and wouldn’t fit the conflict of interest requirements. My priority was to eliminate bias while ensuring adequate technical experience.

Technical skills aren’t underrepresented here though. Both Austin and Greg write code for a living; Greg works on ENS full-time and Austin is a long-standing contributor to the Ethereum ecosystem. Although Sov and Abdullah are not software engineers, both are highly diligent and analytical and will have no problem assessing novelty, expected impact, and quality of execution. The technical weight is evenly distributed and the committee is well-rounded.

If there is an extenuating circumstance where the committee has a knowledge gap that prevents them for accurately reviewing a provider, I’m confident they will identify it and escalate it to the DAO rather than push through a review they’re not equipped to make.

Feedback on implementations during quarterly reviews is a reasonable expectation and should naturally happen. That said, I don’t want to increase cadence or micromanage providers to any degree. The committee will use the quarterly reporting period to probe implementations where needed and flag concerns to the DAO."

Thanks for the feedback. Looking into a longer timeframe and other calculations.

(Working some alternatives for a revision)

I agree, and this program authorization will not impose requirements on an SPP4. I’d also like to see a more consolidated approach to budgeting. Whether that’s a working group or a Foundation board, looking at all the DAO’s spending more holistically would be a meaningful improvement over the DAO’s track record of disconnected budgets.

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Overall FireEyes supports this initiative to drive the SPP program forward. Big fan of the Ecosystem Objectives section giving more definition to the program’s goals, obviously these can continue to be improved and +100 to yesterdays MetaGov call where @Premm.eth (as well as the retro results) highlighted the need for more foundational documentation for ENS generally (and specifically for the SPP program). One goal of the SPP Committee could be to create further documentation around program goals and objectives.


Re budget; Having a budget linked to revenue is a pragmatic option in the current market however we do resonate with sentiment shared that 1. Declining revenue shouldn’t necessarily mean declining budgets given the size of the ENS DAO treasury, and 2. cc Brantly and Avsa’s comments, we agree that linking last year’s revenue so directly to the program’s budget could lead to volatility. 4% of revenue from the last 4 years, 10% for the last two, or similar is something we support.


Re the named seats; Although naming all of the seats in this proposal might look like whats being proposed in the ā€œExpanding the ENS Foundationā€ proposal, the key difference is the selection method for these seats. Where as it stands the Foundation proposal is ENS Labs choosing ENS Foundation Directors that will be responsible for ENS Labs’ budget. In this case the SPP committee is being proposed by a delegate/steward who is not requesting funding and none of the proposed members have existing conflicts of interest within ENS DAO.

In addition cc Coltron’s reply - the SPP committee has a well defined, narrow scope and budget whereas the ENS Foundation has a much broader purview. It is natural for the SPP Committee selection process to be less stringent / decentralised than the Foundation process.

We’re supportive of each named committee member and think @gregskril is a great ENS Labs representative who will be a through-line from Labs to Service Providers without Labs having a disproportionate voice in who receives funding.


Just to address this comment; this depends massively on how the ENS Foundation is selected. Under the current proposed ENS Foundation expansion structure; ENS Labs would have a overwhelming level of direct and political control over the ENS Foundation, meaning if ENS Labs viewed a service provider in a negative light that would likely be an opinion also held by the Foundation. Having a separate SPP committee (perhaps with some overlap with the ENS Foundation in the future) means Service Providers can be evaluated based on their merit alone rather than their synergy with ENS Labs.

Again, strongly disagree here, under what is currently proposed the ENS Foundation will be strongly aligned with Labs. If this Foundation was to manage all of the DAO’s yearly budget it would mean ENS Labs have significant control over what is/isn’t funded from the DAO. Having two seperate committees with some overlap with ENS Labs is significantly better for the credible neutrality of ENS DAO’s funding initiatives.


Re no backchanneling; as everyone else has commented +1 to this being explicit in the proposal.

One final idea that was discussed on yesterdays MG call (cc @Premm.eth) was ENS token incentives/distributions to SPP recipients. These distributions have been ad hoc in the past, meaning service providers have zero clarity around potential token incentives for their work. Given the amount of ENS tokens that the DAO holds and the real need to continue to distribute this governance responsibility. Our only amendment to this proposal would be the upfront discussion (rather than retroactive) about ENS tokens for SPP providers. There are clear arguments around why distributing ENS tokens to Service Providers is net positive so the question then becomes what are the specifics around this type of amendment. We would be supportive of an upfront number of 10-20% of SPP budget being distributed in ENS tokens to Service Providers.

Overall stoked to see the SPP program continue to evolve and shoutout to everyone who has contributed to this initiative!

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Would push back on this framing. Payment for Services vs Gov Tokens for Contributions are separate streams in my view.

Additionally evidence suggests that historical distributions paired with this narrative did not have the intended effect.

Would advocate that we probably need a more diverse set of smaller focused experiments to better understand which mechanic achieves the desired outcome.

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Appreciate the effort to get this moving given the time constraints. Not ideal, but understood.

A few things feel slightly undercooked:

The committee composition stands out. There’s a lot of domain familiarity, but not much in the way of negotiation or business strategy, which for something like SPP feels pretty imp.

This isn’t just evaluating grants - it should be negotiation, shaping deals, understanding leverage and pushing toward actual outcomes with providers who should also be evaluated on the capability to deliver not just category alignment…

Very happy we got Austin Griffith involved, it gives me some confidence re a builder and operator lens there, but the above still feels like a gap overall.

+1 to the earlier point on the review period. If it’s too short, this effectively becomes rubber stamping. Given the amounts, the importance of potential negotiations given the budget and implied responsibility, it’s probably not the bar we want to be setting so happy to see extension be noted as something to be changed.

Also aligned with concerns above around the comments re Foundation Board and full budgetary authority. That should not happen especially given the current stance re board selection and overall attitude contained in the proposal and subsequent conversations.

Coming back to SPP, totally get the urgency and definitely frustrating that we’re forced to compress something like this due to lack of activity on it in the past months.

Would strongly also suggest baking in:

  • a retro/review, not just at the end of SPP3 but maybe midway also
  • clear KPIs for both the committee and the program itself
  • more specificity on milestones. What does progress actually look like? Right now, it’s a bit too easy to imagine updates defaulting to ā€œstill working on itā€ rather than something measurable. Can there be a milestone template with points to include etc or something better the committee should come up with.

Two cents delivered.

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I am appreciative of the effort @Coltron.eth has put into this.

I still believe that the DAO should be defining what it needs and then seeking out teams to deliver those needs. I think this committee could be the authority that decides what the DAO needs (based on discussion and input from DAO participants), and then conducts an appropriate RFP process to find entities to service those needs. Accountability becomes a formality when the DAO is explicitly defining what it expects.

I am supportive of the proposed committee but do think it lacks ENS specific technical expertise.

Whilst there is an argument that this is last minute, or is being rushed we have had over a year to discuss this and come up with an appropriate solution. This was highlighted by me last year and the consensus seemed to be that whilst SPP2 wasn’t perfect, it was good enough and would be improved upon over the year that followed. This never happened. If ā€˜we’ get a suboptimal outcome, it is because ā€˜we’ didn’t do the work.

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Appreciate the feedback.

Retro/review: I will include a mid-program update posted near the end of Q4 2026 and a full retrospective due within 30 days of cycle close in May 2027. (Earmarking for addition)

KPIs and milestones: This can be achieved from the existing language and outcomes already in the proposal without over-engineering or micromanaging providers.

The committee is expected to:

  • Read every qualifying submission in full
  • Participate in structured interviews with applicants
  • Publish cohort selection rationale alongside the recommendation
  • Publish a mid-cycle update in Q4 2026
  • Publish an end-of-cycle retrospective within 30 days of cycle close in May 2027
  • Document any stream suspension or termination decisions with public rationale
  • Serve as the primary point of contact for the funded cohort for the full 12-month term (for chair)

Evaluation of the committee will be very easy as these are generally pass/fail and the program falls apart without well-performing commitee.

For provider milestones, it is up to the provider to determine what they will work on and pitch to the committee. For each milestone, the provider should be able to answer:

  • What are you delivering?
  • How will you prove it is done? (a verifiable metric, a deployed contract, a published report, a link)
  • When is it expected to be delivered?
  • What does an on-track quarterly update look like?

To hold the program accountable, the committee will report on the following at mid-cycle and end of cycle:

  • Provider milestone completion rate (target: 80% of milestones delivered by end of cycle)
  • Any indicated movement on name registrations, renewals, or integrations attributable to funded work

These are lean but provide sufficient signal to understand if the money was effectively spent and whether there is reason to continue SPP in the same format after SPP3.

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