True — which is why I advocated for that hypothetical mechanism I mentioned above. However, since ENSv2 is pursuing a pursuing a based rollup architecture, there won’t be sequencers that you can stake with or operate independently in order to enable this.
I think there should be a way for dedicated builders to capture upside through securing the protocol, however. It’s something that I’ve begun to explore with others in this discussion re: ENS Research: Namechain, ENSIP-19 & Multichain Interop - #5 by estmcmxci
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Another idea: we can borrow a framework that already works — the validator set. Validators stake and perform duties each epoch to earn rewards from the protocol.
In this model, delegates are like validators, but they validate proposals instead of blocks. To make this possible, we’d introduce two new voting primitives: (1) a Delegate Registry and (2) a Governor Escrow.
By bonding governance tokens into the Governor contract, delegates become Secured Delegates, performing defined duties each epoch (reviewing, endorsing, and voting on proposals) to help secure the protocol.
The Governor rewards active delegates from this registry from an ENS pool, while inactivity or misconduct triggers penalties, leaks, or slashing.