Understood.
I personally agree that it makes sense (for now) for the Security Council to act as a fail-safe against bad-faith proposals, but I know others disagree, arguing that it effectively becomes a de facto guard.
The Security Council is temporary by design.
I don’t think the issue should be punted; we should be actively seeking ways to supersede the need for a Security Council.
I voted “for,” with a reservation: my honest feeling is that the program is more than likely to attract mercenary capital, not active, durable governance participation.
The optimal strategy in this game scenario then becomes: delegate to a known active delegate → collect ENS → ignore governance.
Perhaps token incentives can increase mechanical participation, but civic participation needs different levers.
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Echoing @clowes.eth: ENS DAO should make an effort to identify and reward developers and builders who have already been contributing to the protocol, demonstrating their value add over time.
There are two approaches I have previously posited here:
- Build a class of stakeholders whose upside is tied to protocol health, not yield by rewarding contributions with wENS backed by ENS buybacks.
- Delegates become proposal validators: delegates stake their ENS as bonds into the Governor contract and become Secured Delegates; the Governor then rewards active delegates from this registry using an ENS pool.
The former solution is more long-term—think a 10-year horizon—while the latter could be implemented for near-term governance security.