I agree with @katherine.eth ‘s distinction that decentralization of the protocol and decentralization of operational decision-making are not the same thing.
But the first-order governance question is still the ownership layer, not the executive layer. ENS can tolerate a fairly concentrated execution structure if it is being supervised by a strong, independent, and diversified delegate body. Without that, changes to the executive layer will keep looking like second-order redesigns on top of a weak foundation.
This is also why I agree with @SpikeWatanabe.eth ‘s broader point. ENS keeps revisiting top-level structural changes, while the more fundamental problem remains underdeveloped delegate market formation. Delegate Incentives Program matters here not just as a security measure, but as governance infrastructure for building a real and competitive delegate body.
So my concern is less about whether this exact board design is acceptable in the abstract, and more about sequencing. If ENS does not seriously strengthen the delegate layer first, then new executive structures are likely to remain fragile, contested, and less reliable than they appear on paper, especially while more than 90% of circulating ENS remains inactive in governance.