It’s a disastrous idea to assign a centralized admin to oversee ENS service providers. This defeats the entire purpose of having a DAO, where a decentralized group of delegates is supposed to serve as the sole authority. Otherwise, the structure becomes no different from a traditional company. Unfortunately, even the largest DAOs still struggle to fully adopt on-chain governance principles.
To make the decentralized delegate set function efficiently, we need to minimize the oversight burden placed on them. Expecting delegates to oversee each individual WG steward is not scalable. Delegates should only oversee the main funded entities and have the power to wind them down if necessary. That is how accountability is maintained.
A simple structure works best: choose two entities (individuals or companies) for the Ecosystem and Metagov WGs, and merge Public Goods into Ecosystem. Keep the supervisory responsibilities minimal.
Term limits are completely unnecessary. If the delegate set is satisfied with the performance of a SP, what is the point of replacing them? It would be equivalent to removing ENS Labs and replacing it with a brand-new entity that has no experience or understanding of how the work is done.
Indeed, this is already the biggest problem. To strengthen decentralization, improve scalability, and maximize the effectiveness of the delegate set, the discussion needs immediate priority. The solution lies in valuing delegators and the delegate set above all other considerations.
You’re right, that’s why there is a delegate set. It’s more centralized than the full tokenholder set, but in a way that is still decentralized and far more scalable.
Recently, I’ve noticed people in this ecosystem increasingly forgetting the importance of decentralization and focusing solely on scalability and efficiency.