The constitution permits spending excess funds on grants; it doesn’t require it. Not issuing grants is still permitted by the constitution, though I agree it’s not a long-term strategy if ENS remains revenue-positive.
‘DAO’ applies to the organisation as a whole, not to individual components of it. If the proposed admin panel isn’t decentralized, then neither are the current working groups.
My largest concern going forward, as I’ve stated before, is our diminishing talent pool as more and more veteran contributors step down due to burnout and politics. I’m very concerned that this next election cycle may see the DAO electing from a very shallow pool of candidates, and thus result in it being inefficiently or poorly run.
It’s difficult to assess the risk of that in the abstract, though, without knowing who will be standing and who may be elected. Perhaps a more sensible proposal would be to amend the next WG elections to allow people to select ‘wind this WG down’ as an option when voting, with the result that we can evaluate the actual slates of candidates for viability rather than voting against a hypothetical.