Preparing to chat with DAO about rebalancing policy, have been doing regular swaps
Q: As ETH appreciates what is the strategy?
A: Swaps are something that are handled regularly. Aiming for 25% stables, lower now due to ETH price appreciation
2. General DAO Updates
EthDenver Recap
Great conference! Lots of noise to sift through, but amazing conversations.
Really nice to meet people IRL
Working Group Funding Requests
Budgets are formed at the start of the term, funding requests follow ~2 months later
Will post funding requests to Forum this week for Meta-Gov and Public Goods (Ecosystem not requesting)
Funding as a social vote followed by funding as a payment vote will take place over next few weeks. Also, voting on litigation payment will occur
3. Klaus Bravenboer from Hack Hummanity
Wanted to create hackathons for more than just technical people, talent exists outside of developers
Have run 11 hackathons for numerous different types of organizations, also have background in brand design
Q: How to engage with ENS about running something like this?
Spence: Processes to engage with ENS DAO: Create proposal, run temp-check, have flow we can help you with. Success for previous proposals: Outline a problem and demonstrate how you propose to fix the problem. Don’t want a solution looking for a problem.
@avsa.eth: How get new people to engage and understand ENS DAO? Engage in voting, understand grants etc.? These are the biggest issues IMO
Q: What relationship between ENS and Arbitrum?
A: Many developers and ecosystem leaders are connected, connections always being made
ENS Labs sponsoring the Oxford University Conference an ENS sponsoring ETHGlobal hackathon
Refund Policy
Refunding to addressess who sent funds to the ENS contract
Happens to people unfamiliar with systems
Excluded exchanges such as Coinbase
Governance Incentives
Looking at how to reduce costs of voting
Might not reach quorum because gas costs of voting are so high and turn people away from placing votes
Talking to voting providers to discuss options and their future plans/ roadmap
Since ENS names on mainnet, makes L2 voting more difficult
Discussion around private voting, want transparency in voting (prevents bribery etc.), but whom one delegates to could be a good use case for privacy
3. Upcoming Funding Request
Working Group Funding
Public Goods and Metagov to post funding tomorrow
Need to decide on value and distribution of ENS for compensation, possily more for developers and contributors
Asking for 100K ENS to support current budget
4. Bylaws update: Gap Analysis
As part of the RFP by the Meta-Governance working group, Lemma has conducted a GAP analysis as a starting point before commencing with the creation of the first draft of the Bylaws
Need feedback to see what missed and to gather sentiment
Not in emergency situation as plan for the future and prepared
Possible path for next voting in April, break voting into separate issues (from @avsa)
a. Budget in USDC and ETH
b. Distribution of ENS
c. Vesting and vesting period
Push-back primarily around amount requested in budget for steward comp
DAO Rules state that rules can be changed at any time
Eduardo: Need policy around when changes apply, so can’t retroactively affect people’s income, swaying governance as a result of 7 people’s opinion feels weird
ENS Punks: Proposals should have an effective date. (e.g. term 5 or term 6), recommend take conservative approach and not materially alter policy
James:
Multi-choice approval voting not a good way to do voting
Have 9 months for compensation conversation for next term (shouldn’t be in terms of strict token amount, should consider price of ENS token)
Have to rush as budget didn’t pass (issue of token voting is that 7 people can influence the direction of a vote)
Given last compensation conversation was reasonable rushed and not a by-law, reasonable to have this conversation
Lively discussion around how/when/why compensation can be changed/updated, especially as price of ENS fluctuates and stewards are making $200k-$300k in compensation
Have 9 months to figure out sticky compensation issues
Working Group will figure out best way to bring funding to another vote
Preparing a post to share on the forum: analysis of endownment and how it funds the DAO in different scenarios.
Will help shape future plans. Want to set monthly transfer from controller to endownment to cover runway.
2. General DAO Updates
Two executables upcoming
Public Goods funding executable vote
Safe Permissions Executable
Working with Tally to make executables gas free. DAO pays fee to Tally, Tally covers gas fees for voters. Hoping to have working by the next vote. Will invite Tally to next call
This proposal outlines a strategic shift allowing the Endowment to autonomously finance its operations. Specifically, it grants the Metagov stewards the authority to withdraw up to 30 ETH monthly from the Endowment, designated for payments to karpatkey and @steakhouse for their services in managing the Endowment.
3. Open Discussion
Frisson from Tally.xyz
Current executables on Tally don’t require gas fees to vote, huge improvement
Looking into batching, but relayer casts vote immediately, batching requires a delay for votes to be cast
Multichain governance: Usually if put DAO on a chain, DAO is stuck on that chain. Tally just introduced multi-gov where user can vote and delegate on any chain through Tally
Over time amount of delegated power has been decreasing despite same number of delegates, need to increase amount of delegated tokens
Anyone who closely watches Agora or Tally will have noticed a new ‘delegate’ shooting to the top of the delegate list, veto.ensdao.eth, presently holding over 3.8M delegated tokens. Please don’t be alarmed - this isn’t a governance attack, in fact it’s quite the reverse
@avsa recently disclosed to a small group of delegates the existence and practicality of highly concerning governance attacks that could be used to target DAOs including the ENS DAO. Given the viability of these attacks (has happened before!) and the urgency with which they need to be addressed, @nick.eth devised a simple contract that makes it possible for a small group of trusted DAO participants to exercise a large number of “no” votes to veto proposals that risk the integrity of the ENS DAO. To put some weight behind this, ENS Labs has delegated all of its ENS tokens - most of which are being held on behalf of Labs staff - to this account
This contract only permits individuals who have been granted permission to use it, it only allows them to vote “no”, and before exercising this power, individuals must agree to a pledge to only use this power to veto proposals that constitute a governance attack on the DAO, or would violate the ENS constitution
Proposal for an executable that would grant the role of Canceller to a multisig, controlled by the same people that currently hold the Veto power. This would be a multisig of at least 2 accounts. We take this very seriously and understand that once this multisig has such power it’s hard to reverse it since they can veto any attempt to remove it. In order to have a balance of power the members would sign a pledge to only use the cancel power in an event of an attack or to protect the spirit of the constitution and we are open to discussion on any other measures that can be enacted
Other preventive measures to protect from the attack
The profitability of such attack is simply calculated by the amount of total assets in the DAO / (amount of delegated tokens * price of ENS tokens). So any attempt to improve the situation would have to change one of the factors:
Assets: The DAO should consider ways to protect the Endowment from any single transaction that takes over. This isn’t as simple as it appears.
Delegated tokens: the Metagovernance group has been considering ways to improve the amount of active delegates and will continue to propose new methods of both direct ENS distribution and ENS delegation.
Token price: while the DAO’s responsibility is to the ENS system and not the token, it would be healthy if there were ways in which the value of ENS was more tied to the amount of values in it’s management and the present and future revenue of the name system
3. Open Discussion
Discussion around upgrading the governance contract, will bring to the agenda next week
Next week will have spending report for all the Working Groups
Zodiac RM v2: https://kit.karpatkey.com/ Drafting proposal, will share overview before goes to a vote. Makes auditing much simpler through the UI and lessens need for manual changes
Tech team finishing ZRM v2 Migration Proposal, will post when complete during a voting window
2. General DAO Updates Section
Upcoming Proposals
Alex Netto proposing giving the allow contract to call the cancel function on the timelock for a social proposal tomorrow
This is the next step in safeguarding the DAO against a cryptoeceonomic attack whereby malicious users would take advantage of a lack of voting to pass issues against the best interests of the DAO
Will allow DAO to remove the veto contract (DAO using voting power to vote against attacks) which was a temporary solution for a cryptoeconomic attack against the DAO. Con of this solution relies on voting power, which can be overriden by malicious user with more votes
Jengajojo: While have reliable contributors today, want to create a DAO that outlasts contributors. Need to put measures in place that decentralize power, current proposal might not accomplish that with a security council
Netto: Security council is a short-term solution to security issue
Spike: Seems like a step backward in decentralizing the DAO
@avsa.eth: Need to stop malicious attempts to hijack the DAO, want to evolve in the future so we can get rid of this proposal
@5pence: All security council can do is stop a proposal, can’t create or remove proposals. Just to cancel a malicious activity
Jengajojo: Any discussions around delegating tokens in DAO?
@5pence: Yes discussions and thoughts about right way to do it are in the forum threads
Please bring discussions to the forum when it is posted
Another social proposal may be posted tomorrow related to ENS vesting requirements
Bylaws update
Have received bylaws proposal, working group will review before posting on the forum for feedback
Spike: What were key considerations when deciding between streaming payment services for paying stream providers? @avsa.eth: Superfluid allowed an open-ended stream that could just be topped-up and put more money in it, others didn’t