[EP4] [Social] Proposal: Creation of Foundational Working Groups and Working Group Rules

[alisha.eth]

Status: Passed

Summary

Creates four foundational working groups and establish rules related to the creation, management, and dissolution of working groups within the ENS DAO.

Abstract

The work-related activities of the ENS DAO will take place within working groups. Each working group will have a specific focus area and mission, aligned with the constitution and needs of the DAO.

This proposal establishes four foundational working groups:

1. Meta-Governance: providing governance oversight and support of the management and operation of the ENS DAO and working groups;
2. ENS Ecosystem: continuing development and improvement of the ENS protocol and ecosystem, with a focus on all technical matters related to ENS;
3. Community: supporting the people and organizations that are users of ENS, with a focus on non-technical matters; and
4. Public Goods: amplifying ENS as a public good and funding public goods within the ENS ecosystem, and more broadly within web3.

This proposal also sets out rules related to the creation and dissolution of working groups and outlines how working groups will be managed within the DAO.

Motivation

Establishing working groups to manage DAO-related work will allow decisions to be made, and action to be taken, without the need for every initiative or decision of the DAO to be passed as a proposal.

The creation of working groups will streamline the management of the DAO into core areas that will persist, irrespective of changes in activities or contributors. A working group system will promote stability and encourage long-term thinking and planning.

The working group structure will provide new and existing community members clear onboarding pathways for meaningful participation and engagement in the DAO.

Specification

Create four foundational working groups and establish rules related to the creation, management, and dissolution of working groups within the ENS DAO (‘DAO’).

1. Working Groups
   1. Four foundational working groups will be established within the DAO:
      1. Meta-Governance Working Group;
      2. ENS Ecosystem Working Group;
      3. Community Working Group; and
      4. Public Goods Working Group.
2. Formation of Working Groups
   1. To create a new working group, a social proposal, as defined by the ENS governance documentation (‘Social Proposal’), must be put forward and passed by the DAO.
   2. A Social Proposal to create a new working group must demonstrate that the new working group is needed and the work cannot be undertaken within an existing working group.
3. Dissolution of Working Groups
   1. A working group can be dissolved by passing a Social Proposal requesting the dissolution of a working group or working groups.
   2. If an active proposal is put forward to dissolve a working group, all working group funds, including outgoing payments, within that working group, are to be frozen with immediate effect, pending the outcome of the vote.
   3. Upon the dissolution of a working group, any and all unspent working group funds from that working group, at the time of dissolution, must be immediately returned to the DAO treasury, without delay.
4. Working Group Stewards
   1. Each working group shall be managed by five stewards (hereafter a ‘Steward’ or ‘Stewards’).
   2. Stewards will be elected, unless otherwise stated in these rules, to serve within working groups for a set period of time (hereafter known as a ‘Term’ or ‘Terms’).
   3. There are two Terms each calendar year:
      1. The first Term commences at 9am UTC on January 1 each year and ends immediately prior to the commencement of the second Term (‘First Term’); and
      2. The second Term commences at 9am UTC on July 1 each year and ends immediately prior to the commencement of the First Term of the following year (‘Second Term’).
   4. Stewards are responsible for managing the operations of each working group.
   5. The responsibilities of Stewards include, but are not limited to:
      1. Managing operational tasks related to the administration of a working group;
      2. Maintaining a description that sets forth the focus and intent of the working group;
      3. Developing working group goals for the Term and providing a clear road map for achieving those goals, to be published in the ENS governance forum within the first 30 days of a Term;
      4. Approving the creation and dissolution of sub-groups or workstreams within a working group to undertake work and/or carry out specific projects or tasks;
      5. Requesting working group funds from the DAO; and
      6. Approving and making funding available to sub-groups, workstreams, or contributors within a working group.
   6. To request working group funds, Stewards of all working groups will collaborate to submit an active executable proposal, as defined by the ENS governance documentation (‘Collective Proposal’), to the DAO within the final 15 days (inclusive) of the months of January, March, July, and October each calendar year (each a ‘Funding Window’).
      1. In order for a working group to have a funding request included in a Collective Proposal submitted to the DAO during a Funding Window, the funding request must have passed as a Social Proposal in the same Funding Window.
      2. In the case of an emergency, where working group funds are needed by a working group outside of a Funding Window, an Executable Proposal may be submitted at any time by a Steward of a working group to request funds from the DAO.
5. Steward Eligibility and Nominations
   1. Any individual is eligible to nominate themselves to be a Steward of a working group within the DAO (‘Eligible Person’ or ‘Eligible Persons’).
   2. To be eligible to be included in the ballot for First Term elections of a given year, Eligible Persons must nominate themselves between 9am UTC on December 6 and 9am UTC on December 9 (‘First Term Nomination Window’).
   3. To be eligible to be included in the ballot for Second Term elections of a given year, Eligible Persons must nominate themselves between 9am UTC on June 6 and 9am UTC on June 9 (‘Second Term Nomination Window’).
   4. An Eligible Person may nominate themselves to become a Steward of a working group or working groups during the First Term Nomination Window or the Second Term Nomination Window (each a ‘Nomination Window’), by meeting the requirements set out in a call for nominations posted in the relevant working group category of the ENS governance forum.
   5. An Eligible Person who completes the steps outlined in rule 5.4 above during a Nomination Window and receives 10,000 signed votes to support their nomination will be included in the ballot as a nominee in the election for Stewards that takes place following that Nomination Window (‘Nominee’).
6. Steward Elections
   1. Elections for working group Stewards for the First Term of a given year will take place by a ranked-choice vote of governance token holders using signed messages and will be open for 120 hours, commencing at 9am UTC on December 10 each year (‘First Term Election Window’).
   2. Elections for working group Stewards for the Second Term of a given year will take place by a ranked-choice vote of governance token holders using signed messages and will be open for 120 hours, commencing at 9am UTC on June 10 each year (‘Second Term Election Window’).
   3. The top-ranked Nominees from each working group vote held during a First Term Election Window or a Second Term Election Window (each an ‘Election Window’), will fill any available positions for the role of Steward for those working groups for the Term immediately following an Election Window, based on the order in which they are ranked in each working group vote.
   4. A Nominee elected to serve as a Steward may not take up the role of Steward for more than two working groups during a single Term.
7. Delay of Nominations or Elections
   1. In the event that nominations or elections for Stewards take place after a Nomination Window or after an Election Window, the nomination process or elections shall take place, as otherwise prescribed in rules 5 and 6 above, as soon as is practicable after the missed Nomination Window or missed Election Window.
   2. In the event that an election takes place outside of an Election Window and after the commencement date of a new Term, outgoing Stewards from the previous Term shall stay in their positions as working group Stewards until immediately prior to 9am UTC the day following the end of the election, which, for the avoidance of doubt, is 120 hours after voting in those elections commenced.
   3. In the event that an election takes place outside of an Election Window and after the commencement date of a new Term, newly elected Stewards will assume the responsibilities of stewardship within working groups at 9am UTC the day following the end of the election, as defined in rule 7.2 above, for the remainder of that Term.
8. Core Team Stewards
   1. For the First Term, commencing January 1 2022 at 9am UTC, each working group will include two Stewards who are core team members of True Names Limited (Singapore) (‘TNL’), as selected by TNL and not subject to the Steward nomination and election process outlined in rules 5 and 6 above.
   2. For the Second Term, commencing July 1 2022 at 9am UTC, each working group will include one Steward who is a core team member of TNL, as selected by TNL and not subject to the Steward nomination and election process outlined in rules 5 and 6 above.
   3. For the First Term of the following year, commencing January 1 2023, and for all Terms thereafter, all Stewards must be elected and appointed in accordance with the rules set out in rules 5 and 6 above.
9. Removal and Replacement of Stewards
   1. Stewards may be removed at any time by:
      1. a Social Proposal passed by the DAO; or
      2. a simple indicative majority vote among the Stewards of a given working group, with the outcome of the vote communicated in the relevant working group category of the ENS governance forum.
   2. Stewards may step down from their position at any time by communicating their intention to step down in the ENS governance forum.
   3. In the event that a Steward is removed, steps down, or is unable to continue as a Steward, for whatever reason, prior to the end of a Term, any vacant positions will be filled for the remainder of a Term by the next highest ranked Nominee(s) in a given working group from the most recent working group vote in the most recent election for Stewards.
   4. In the event that a Steward steps down or is removed prior to the end of a Term and is a member of the core team of TNL in accordance with rule 8.1 or 8.2 above, the vacant position(s) will be filled by a core team member or team members of TNL, as selected by TNL.
   5. Any Steward selected by TNL in accordance with rule 8.1 or 8.2 above, can be removed by TNL at any time prior to the end of a Term, for any reason, and replaced by another core team member for the remainder of that Term.
10. Compensation for Stewards
    1. Elected Stewards are eligible to receive fair compensation for their work as a Steward.
    2. All requests for Steward compensation must be detailed in a Collective Proposal for working group funds submitted to the DAO in accordance with rule 4.6.
    3. Stewards may not receive compensation for their role as a Steward outside of that compensation expressly provided for in a Collective Proposal submitted to the DAO in accordance with rule 10.2.
    4. Stewards selected by TNL are not eligible to receive compensation from the DAO or working groups for their work as a Steward.
11. Amendments
    1. These rules may be amended at any time by passing a Social Proposal.

Next Steps

This proposal will be open for voting on Snapshot for five days. This vote will be a single choice vote. You may vote ‘for’ or ‘against’ the proposal, or choose to abstain from the vote.

By voting ‘for’ this proposal, you are voting in favor of creating four foundational working groups and establishing rules related to the creation, management, and dissolution of working groups within the ENS DAO, as provided in this proposal.

Given the time of year, Steward nominations and elections for the First Term of 2022 will be delayed until the beginning of 2022.

The Nomination Window for the First Term of 2022 will be open between 9am UTC on January 5, 2022 and 9am UTC on January 8, 2022. Any individual is eligible to nominate themselves to be a Steward of a working group or working groups during this Nomination Window. All Eligible Persons who satisfy the requirements set out in rule 5.4 and 5.5 will be included on the ballot for the First Term elections. More details about the nomination process will be available in the call for nominations released prior to the Nomination Window opening.

The Election Window for the First Term of 2022 will be open for 120 hours, commencing at 9am UTC on January 10 2022. Following the election, in accordance with rule 7.3, newly elected Stewards will assume the responsibilities of stewardship within working groups at 9am UTC on January 16, 2022, for the remainder of the First Term.

To stay up to date on developments regarding working groups, please follow the DAO-Bulletin channel in the ENS Discord Server and follow @ens_dao on Twitter.

[Ginge.eth]

@alisha.eth

• For the First Term, commencing January 1 2022 at 9am UTC, each working group will include two Stewards who are core team members of True Names Limited (Singapore) (‘ TNL ’), as selected by TNL and not subject to the Steward nomination and election process outlined in rules 5 and 6 above.
• For the Second Term, commencing July 1 2022 at 9am UTC, each working group will include one Steward who is a core team member of TNL, as selected by TNL and not subject to the Steward nomination and election process outlined in rules 5 and 6 above.
• For the First Term of the following year, commencing January 1 2023 and for all Terms thereafter, all Stewards must be elected and appointed in accordance with the rules set out in rules 5 and 6 above.

Would you mind expanding on this section? What is the TNL? Does this mean the first batch of leaders wouldn’t be elected?

[zadok7]

This is amazing work! I’d like to continue the discussion here now that a proposal is out. I want to refer back to a post from @James here: ENS DAO Working Groups. I think important points were left there, and I’d like to see that discussion continue some here.

From here, we can assign the ‘genesis squads’ for each WG and begin pushing forward on more detailed structure for each including:

• Number of members
• Responsibilities
• Comms channels
• Incentives
• Short, med, long term goals

Questions that spring to mind:

• What is the optimal number of people to assign to each working group?
• How are group members decided initially?
• What kind of remuneration can be expected for participation?
• Where will comms for these groups live?
• What kind of responsibility/reporting duties will each group have back to the wider community?
• How will the groups collaborate and cross-pollinate with each other
• How will the groups interact with other teams/people working towards similar goals?

---

I think much of the questions are answered about membership by @alisha.eth :

Participation in Working Groups is open to all. Community members who are not Delegates are most welcome to participate. I expect that it will be community members outside the Top 10 Delegates who are most involved in Working Groups on a day-to-day-basis. It is also important to note that in order to participate in a Working Group you DO NOT need to hold any $ENS.

There will be some sort of leadership group within each Working Group responsible for coordinating guilds/squads. Any proposal put forward relating to the creation of Working Groups will not include details on the internal structure within each Working Group. Establishing the best structure for leadership within each Working Group, along with any processes for the creation of guilds and squads, can be discussed within each Working Group once they are created. I am hopeful that the community will be very involved in this discussion.

Thinking about this however, in the proposal, in section [2.2] we have:

1. A Social Proposal to create a new working group must demonstrate that the new working group is needed and the work cannot be undertaken within an existing working group

To respond to this, none of the initial 4 Working Groups need to submit anything to form? They will be passed by this proposal in its final form, once voted upon?

I bring this up because as I understand it, “Stewards” will basically be the “managers” of the working groups. In this proposal, the structure for voting on them, and the specifics about their terms, processes for removal, processes for second in line, etc is well thought out.

I would maybe like to think about adding some type of amendment for initial duties of Stewards to propose by say, 4 weeks into the term, the working group pass a vote on a very loose set of goals/focuses for the term. For instance, after the Stewards’ term begins, a proposal must be submitted to the community about what the general direction of the Work Group they envision for that term. This would get everybody on the same page, as well as having some measurable outcomes the Working Group is trying to achieve. I understand the specifics may not be available. But let’s say the Stewards of the Public Goods Working Group submits in their “forecast” that one area to focus on is to nurture Gitcoin integrations and relationships. I guess the proposal would be “Areas of focus for Term 1, 2022 - Public Goods Working Group” The “Areas of focus for Term 1, 2022 - ENS Ecosystem Working Group” might include focusing on updating documentation with more L2 specs/guides/examples. This way the community at large can see what the Working Group will be striving to achieve in that term.

This is in response to @James question of:

• What kind of responsibility/reporting duties will each group have back to the wider community?
• How will the groups collaborate and cross-pollinate with each other

This would allow community to have say so in other Working Groups, and allow for “reporting” on the progress of those term focuses, along with some minimal accountability for the Stewards to accomplish what was “campaigned” for as they were voted in as leaders of the Working Groups.

[vegayp]

Thanks for sharing.

Regarding accountability and basic responsabilities for the already proposed WG. Are these aspects going to be defined by the WG or there will be certain boundaries and expectations sets by the organization?

[alisha.eth]

@Ginge.eth

Would you mind expanding on this section? What is the TNL? Does this mean the first batch of leaders wouldn’t be elected?

As it is currently drafted, there will be five Stewards in each working group (rule 4.1). In the First Term commencing 1 January 2022, three of the five Stewards from each working group will be elected according to the process outlined in rules 5 and 6. The remaining two Stewards in each working group will be core team members from True Names Limited.

In the Second Term commencing 1 July 2022 four of the five Stewards in each working group will be elected according to the process outlined in rules 5 and 6 and one Steward in each working group will come from True Names Limited.

For all Terms thereafter, there will be five Stewards in each working group, all elected according to the process outlined in rules 5 and 6.

True Names Limited is a non-profit based in Singapore responsible for the development of ENS. All the core team members are contractors of True Name Limited. Most of the core team members are listed on this page: https://ens.domains/about.

[neiman]

Sorry for coming late! It seems I didn’t notice the previous discussion on time. Are there any more discussions I should be reading to get the background?

This is a very impressive proposal, where anyone can see how much thought and effort was put into it. Well done!

I have two questions/comments though.

1. What exactly will the working groups do? Request budget from the DAO and then will decide how to further distribute it?

2. This proposal is huge! It’s almost like 10 proposals in one. It makes it very difficult, for me, to comment on it all at once.

   Maybe it will be easier for people to break the discussion into several separate posts? One about which groups are needed, one about which power they have, one about the structure of the group, one about the election process etc.

Once again, I know I’m late to the party, so if these questions were already asked and answered I apologize in advance:-)
,

[Coltron.eth]

@zadok7

For instance, after the Stewards’ term begins, a proposal must be submitted to the community about what the general direction of the Work Group they envision for that term.

I’m in favor of a working group forecast. You mentioned that it would provide a level of minimal accountability. A mechanism for enforcing accountability is provided in Rule 9.1, but this creates a measure of accountability. A forecast also pushes the working groups to focus on a set of objectives.

My criticism is that this could be taken advantage of or misused. Some plans will inevitably fail or meet unforeseen challenges. Additionally, any accountability enforcement shouldn’t promote factions or allow one delegate to swing the entire vote. The language of “A simple indicative majority vote”, as stated in Rule 9.2 is important for this reason.

I would be hesitant to remove a Steward based upon the sole justification that a forecast failed.

[alisha.eth]

@zadok7

To respond to this, none of the initial 4 Working Groups need to submit anything to form? They will be passed by this proposal in its final form, once voted upon?

Since there are currently no rules around the creation of working groups, this proposal would create the four foundational working groups. Once these rules are established by passing this proposal as an active proposal, any proposal to create working groups in the future would need to follow these rules.

Within working groups, there will be a lot more flexibility and change, but the working groups themselves as a basic organizational unit should be static and long-lasting. There shouldn’t, for instance, be a situation where there are a lot of working groups established or dissolved in the future. What happens within the working groups will be much more fluid and dynamic.

I think it makes sense to include the creation of the foundational working groups in this proposal. Otherwise, there would have to be two proposals: the first proposal creating the working group rules and then, once passed, a second proposal establishing the foundational working groups. I am just conscious of voter apathy here and feel that it is better to get everything passed at once so we can get the working groups up and running.

@zadok7

I would maybe like to think about adding some type of amendment for initial duties of Stewards to propose by say, 4 weeks into the term, the working group pass a vote on a very loose set of goals/focuses for the term.

This is a great point. I will draft some wording that can be included in rule 4.5 to cover this. Without being overly prescriptive here, I think we can say that there is an expectation that within the first 30 days of a Term, incoming Stewards will work closely with working group participants to develop goals for the Term and provide a road map for achieving those goals. It will be a great way to hold Stewards to account and be able to judge whether the Stewards were able to achieve what they set out to achieve at the start of a Term.

In my mind, within the Meta-Governance working group there should be a sub-group that helps other working groups with things of this nature. For instance, this subgroup could provide advice on structuring and naming subgroups, drafting working group funding proposals, and managing conflict within working groups. A subgroup like this will be particularly important during the first Term as norms are established and communications and management systems are put in place within working groups. I have some ideas about how this might work. I’ll try to structure my thoughts in the next day or so and create a diagram to make it easier to visualize how this might work.

[alisha.eth]

@vegayp

Regarding accountability and basic responsabilities for the already proposed WG. Are these aspects going to be defined by the WG or there will be certain boundaries and expectations sets by the organization?

I think it makes sense for the working groups themselves to set these boundaries and expectations internally. These will look different in each working group and will likely change over time as the working groups mature.

On the recommendation of zadok7 I will draft wording to include in rule 4.5 that establishes the expectation that Stewards will develop goals at the start of a given Term and provide a road map for achieving those goals.

To ensure that there is some cohesion between working groups, I would recommend the creation of a subgroup within the Meta-Governance working group that will work across working groups to help working groups in establishing norms and creating the appropriate structures. I touched on this here:

@alisha.eth

In my mind, within the Meta-Governance working group there should be a sub-group that helps other working groups with things of this nature. For instance, this subgroup could provide advice on structuring and naming subgroups, drafting working group funding proposals, and managing conflict within working groups. A subgroup like this will be particularly important during the first Term as norms are established and communications and management systems are put in place within working groups.

As an aside, requests for working group funds, as outlined in rule 4.6, will force working groups to establish structure and have effective processes in place to manage each working group. A poorly thought out working group budget request, lacking in detail, is unlikely to be approved. Equally, if there are signs that a working group is not functioning well, it will likely be difficult for that working group to attain funds from the DAO until those issues are resolved.

[zadok7]

Agree with you @Coltron.eth. Simple forecast/goals.

[daylon.eth]

I wasn’t able to get my mic to work in the discord meeting, but I just wanted to echo some of the things that were already touched on. First like @slobo.eth said, it is important to get started so I think we should go ahead with this despite it not being 100% bulletproof.

That said, we need to work out two main unknowns:

1st - The continuity issue. I feel like it is absolutely a must to have some type of overlapping terms, and/or ability to be re-elected, because each of the four working groups will be working on projects that could vary widely in scope of how long is needed to complete them. There should never be more productively leaving than coming into a group. I propose we could start with four quarter terms per year, starting with a steward serving a one quarter term, with the potential to be re-elected to serve an additional term, up to four consecutive quarters, based on the needs of the group and as determined by the elections.

2nd is the issue of accountability that was briefly brought up. Seeing the fallout from what happened at Sushi is pretty scary, so I am a bit concerned about how to best maximize transparency of what is actually going on in the working groups, perhaps like @Coltron.eth suggested, with some type of public ongoing project calendar.

[alisha.eth]

@neiman

What exactly will the working groups do? Request budget from the DAO and then will decide how to further distribute it?

The working groups will be responsible for managing and undertaking work within the DAO. Without working groups, or some sort of basic organizational structure, almost every decision would have to be passed as a social proposal and it would be very hard to get any work done.

A lot of other DAOs have adopted an ad hoc approach to managing workflow. This can get very messy and is hard to rein in if left unchecked. The working groups just provide structure for work within the DAO. Within working groups, the Stewards will likely create subgroups to manage different workstreams. Within subgroups there might be squads that actually undertake the work.

The working groups will request funds from the DAO that will be distributed within working groups. These requests will have to be very detailed in order to pass a DAO-wide vote. I am confident that there will be complete transparency in this process and strong reporting requirements established.

@neiman

Maybe it will be easier for people to break the discussion into several separate posts? One about which groups are needed, one about which power they have, one about the structure of the group, one about the election process etc.

I am reluctant to break this proposal up because it needs to be passed as a single body of rules. I could have separated the foundational working groups into a separate proposal, but I don’t want token holders to have to vote twice if it is not required.

@daylon.eth

I feel like it is absolutely a must to have some type of overlapping terms, and/or ability to be re-elected, because each of the four working groups will be working on projects that could vary widely in scope of how long is needed to complete them. There should never be more productively leaving than coming into a group. I propose we could start with four quarter terms per year, starting with a steward serving a one quarter term, with the potential to be re-elected to serve an additional term, up to four consecutive quarters, based on the needs of the group and as determined by the elections.

There are no restrictions on being reelected. The only restriction is that a Nominee cannot serve as a Steward on more than two working groups in a single Term. A Steward could, in theory, be reelected at each election and serve as a Steward within a working group indefinitely.

Staggering the Terms of Stewards for continuity purposes is definitely a good idea. This is an amendment I think the DAO should consider implementing after the First or Second Term. I am reluctant to do it now without having any context for how working groups will actually function once established. I have many ideas, but I know it may be different in reality.

I also think that having some of the core team members as Stewards in the first two Terms will help for continuity purposes. After the Second Term there is also nothing precluding team members from putting themselves forward as Nominees and being elected as Stewards within working groups.

The reason I haven’t included quarterly Terms is because I am very conscious of voter apathy. Even with two Terms per year, we are asking token holders to vote for Nominees and Stewards twice a year. There will also be four budget requests from each of the four working working groups as well as votes for collective working group funding proposals that take place four times per year.

Even with staggered elections, I don’t think elections could take place more than twice a year. If the role of Steward proves to be effective at managing work within working groups, I think we would be more likely to see requests for longer terms for Stewards. While longer terms are less desirable from an accountability standpoint, they are much more desirable from a continuity and planning standpoint.

Stewards should be able to receive fair compensation for their work and plan their lives accordingly. If a person wanted to put everything into their role as a Steward and treat it like a full time job, they should be able to. Having a 12 month term would effectively give them a 12 month contract that they can rely on. I don’t know if six month terms provide enough certainty in that respect. It is important that we are always conscious of the real life consequences of decisions within the DAO and how those decisions affect the lives of participants in the real world.

@daylon.eth

Seeing the fallout from what happened at Sushi is pretty scary, so I am a bit concerned about how to best maximize transparency of what is actually going on in the working groups, perhaps like @Coltron.eth suggested, with some type of public ongoing project calendar.

Many of the problems facing Sushi are historical and related to decisions that were made early on. I am confident that transparency will not be an issue. If it does become an issue, it can be addressed by removing Stewards if necessary, according to these rules, or denying working group funding requests as a DAO. We can also set expectations and behavioural norms by creating sub-groups within the Meta-Governance working group that assist the other working groups in creating precedents, reporting back to the DAO, and drafting proposals.

[alisha.eth]

@zadok7

Agree with you @Coltron.eth. Simple forecast/goals.

I have drafted wording and included it at 4.5.3. Let me know if this is what you were thinking.

@alisha.eth

Developing working group goals for the Term and providing a clear road map for achieving those goals, to be published in the ENS governance forum within the first 30 days of a Term;

I have also added additional rules at 3.2 and 3.3 to cover what happens with working group funds upon the dissolution of a working group.

@alisha.eth

• If an active proposal is put forward to dissolve a working group, all working group funds, including outgoing payments, within that working group, are to be frozen with immediate effect, pending the outcome of the vote.
• Upon the dissolution of a working group, any and all unspent working group funds from that working group, at the time of dissolution, must be immediately returned to the DAO treasury, without delay.

[Coltron.eth]

@alisha.eth

I have drafted wording and included it at 4.5.3. Let me know if this is what you were thinking.

“3. Developing working group goals for the Term and providing a clear road map for achieving those goals, to be published in the ENS governance forum within the first 30 days of a Term;”

That language looks sufficient to me!

[neiman]

@alisha.eth

I am reluctant to break this proposal up because it needs to be passed as a single body of rules. I could have separated the foundational working groups into a separate proposal, but I don’t want token holders to have to vote twice if it is not required.

I meant to break the discussion of the proposal into parts, not the proposal itself. But it’s ok, I will just comment on everything at once.

1. Is ENS protocol development (like L2, name wrappers etc.) is part of the DAO responsibilities, or is it done purely by TNL? If it’s part of the DAO responsibility I’d suggest having a 5th working group for it.

2. I’m not sure I understand why does the period is sometimes denoted in specific hours and dates (e.g, in 5.2 it says “between 9am UTC on December 6 and 9am UTC on December 9”), but sometimes by amount of hours (e.g., in 6.1. it says “will be open for 120 hours, commencing at 9am UTC on December 10”)? Sorry to be a nitpicker

3. Maybe we can extend the nomination period in 5.2 and 5.3 to be longer?

   There are plenty of justified reasons for persons to be unavailable to nominate themselves during 3 days (sickness, holiday, religious holidays where no computer is allowed or personal emergencies).

   Is there a harm from making the nomination period as long as two weeks?

4. In 5.4 it’s written “by meeting the requirements set out in a call for nominations posted in the relevant working group category of the ENS governance forum” → who makes this call for nomination and sets the requirements?

5. Regarding 5.5: the election process is not completely clear to me.

   In 5.2 it’s mentioned that nomination happens “between 9am UTC on December 6 and 9am UTC on December 9”, and in 6.1 it’s written that the election will be “commencing at 9am UTC on December 10 each year”. But in 5.5 it’s required that “An Eligible Person who … receives 10,000 signed votes to support their nomination will be included in the ballot”.

   Does this mean nominees have 24 hours to collect 10K signed votes? Or do people need to collect the 10K signed votes beforehand in order to nominate themselves?

6. Regarding 6.4. Maybe we can consider that a person can be nominated for at most two working groups in a single election?

   I’m basing this on Arrow’s impossibility theorem that claims that having more alternatives affects the results. In this case, it means that strong candidates that is nominated to all working groups, affects the results even of the group they were not elected to.

   Moreover, reducing the amount of working groups persons can be nominated for solves the problem of selecting two groups if a person is elected to three.

7. Regarding 4.6: What happens if the group doesn’t submit the “active executable proposal” in the periods specified in 4.6?

8. Regarding “Dissolution of Working Groups” (article 3) and transition of working groups after an election period.

   In my experience the process of getting funds from a working group is slow. It often happens that funds are promised based on future milestones or future work.

   My question is what happens if a working group made a promise for future payments, but then was either dissolute or simply changed due to election?

   Should we specify that their promises should be kept by the new members of the working group? To avoid corruption we can give the DAO an option to cancel the working groups promises upon dissolution (but not make it default).

[alisha.eth]

@neiman

Is ENS protocol development (like L2, name wrappers etc.) is part of the DAO responsibilities, or is it done purely by TNL? If it’s part of the DAO responsibility I’d suggest having a 5th working group for it.

Work of this nature that is undertaken by the DAO would fall within a the purview of a subgroup of the ENS Ecosystem working group, so there is no need for another working group.

@neiman

I’m not sure I understand why does the period is sometimes denoted in specific hours and dates (e.g, in 5.2 it says “between 9am UTC on December 6 and 9am UTC on December 9”), but sometimes by amount of hours (e.g., in 6.1. it says “will be open for 120 hours, commencing at 9am UTC on December 10”)?

The different wording was chosen because I felt it provided more clarity in each of the circumstances.

@neiman

Maybe we can extend the nomination period in 5.2 and 5.3 to be longer?

The nomination process will likely be very simple and should take place within a short window. In the event that a person is unable to submit their nomination during a nomination window because of religious reasons or holiday, they could have a friend do it on their behalf or otherwise reach out to a core team member in advance who will do it for them.

@neiman

In 5.4 it’s written “by meeting the requirements set out in a call for nominations posted in the relevant working group category of the ENS governance forum” → who makes this call for nomination and sets the requirements?

I will draft some wording for this and circulate it in advance of the first nomination window opening. As I mentioned above, the process will be very simple.

@neiman

Does this mean nominees have 24 hours to collect 10K signed votes? Or do people need to collect the 10K signed votes beforehand in order to nominate themselves?

Token holders will vote during a nomination window. A person needs to receive 10,000 votes during a nomination window to become eligible for the election. The process is as follows: a person declares their nomination during a nomination window and people vote during the same nomination window. At the end of the nomination window, eligible nominees will be included in the ballot for election in the relevant working group elections that will start 24 hours after the nomination window closes.

@neiman

Regarding 6.4. Maybe we can consider that a person can be nominated for at most two working groups in a single election?

I have certainly considered this. If this does become a problem, it would definitely make sense to add an amendment in the future. Having spoken to many of the top delegates, most indicated they would only be interested in being nominated as Stewards for a maximum of two working groups.

I was hoping to leave the wording as is for the first election so as to allow anyone to express an interest and nominate themselves for as many working groups as they choose to increase their chances of becoming eligible in at least one working group. My thinking is that limiting nominations is unlikely to make much of a change in solving the issues you identified.

@neiman

Regarding 4.6: What happens if the group doesn’t submit the “active executable proposal” in the periods specified in 4.6?

There is a two step process for accessing working group funds. The first step is that Stewards of each working group must pass a social proposal requesting working group funds. The second step is putting all of the working group funding requests together and submitting them as an active executable proposal.

There are unlikely to be issues with the submission of the Collective Proposal. Issues are, however, more likely to arise with the first step. If a funding request is not prepared with enough detail, for instance, it might not get passed as a social proposal, which would mean it couldn’t be included in the Collective Proposal. What happens then is up to the DAO. I would suspect that in that instance one or more of the Stewards in that working group would be removed and replaced.

Under rule 4.6.2 it is possible for a working group to submit an active executable proposal outside of a funding window in the event of emergency. All of the circumstances will need to be reviewed at the time, but the DAO will then be called upon to make a determination as to whether this amounts to an “emergency” and would justify the passing of a seperate executable proposal.

@neiman

Should we specify that their promises should be kept by the new members of the working group? To avoid corruption we can give the DAO an option to cancel the working groups promises upon dissolution (but not make it default).

Under 3.2, working group funds will only be frozen for the duration of a proposal to consider the dissolution of a working group. A social proposal is active for five days. I don’t feel it is unreasonable to freeze working group funds for five days, pending the outcome of a vote.

I feel that it should be a default that working group funding promises are cancelled on the dissolution of a working group. Any people or parties that feel they should still receive any monies owed or promised to them can put forward a social proposal requesting those funds. It is very likely that the DAO would honour such a request.

It makes sense to immediately freeze funds upon the dissolution of a working group, as the DAO would not have enough information to make a determination on whether certain promises are valid and others are not. In the time it takes for the DAO to make such a determination, outgoing stewards may be able to misappropriate working group funds.

The continuity point is valid. Payment promises come from working groups which persist irrespective Steward elections. New Stewards within a working group will have the ability to review and change working group promises. We can obviously set expectations as a DAO that incoming Stewards should honour previous promises, but we can’t stop them from making changes.

I raised this in another comment but it might make sense to move to year-long terms for Stewards in the near future to overcome some of these continuity issues. The presence of TNL core members within working groups in the first two Terms is meant, in part, to help in establishing norms and behavioural expectations.

[zadok7]

This all looks great. I do feel one sticking point still emerging is to get clearer consensus on the term lengths. I personally am in favor of smaller terms, but I do get that might present difficulty in working/continuity. In the DAO Voice meeting, some good points were brought up about the volatility in the market/web3 space in general as one variable that could impact Steward roles.

Unforeseen Variables in Longer Terms.

As an example, let’s say a Steward is selected, and the crypto market goes to half it’s worth for some reason. Let’s definitely hope not, but it is possible. This Steward may be able to stick it out to finish the last 2 months of a 6 month term, but if there were another 8 months ahead of them maybe this person would need to step down for whatever personal reasons. In other words, an honest commitment from a Steward for a 12 month term has a lot more variables to consider, than for a 6 month term.

Any Rules on Reelection Count?

This brings up the question of if we should cover any bases regarding reelection? I assume one person can keep getting reelected over and over. Should there be in place term limits per working group per Steward?

The thinking behind this is that maybe a Steward may be doing a great job, and would be for many terms in the future. However, if they are able to keep just getting reelected without limit, that may keep out someone new, fresh, from jumping in. Maybe two terms is not lifetime, but two terms in a row is the limit? Then they have to sit out the next election. Maybe they are able to be voted in for an alternative Working Group, or none and just wait until they can be on the ballot for the same one.

Additionally, I like the idea of being able to vote again for the same Steward(s) if they desire to run again and did a great job with the Working Group in their first term. Would love to see what they could do with more time, and I would vote for them again. Maybe in the voting UI we put the current Stewards who want to run for their second term at the top. This way they have more chance to continue into the second term. In this case, at least there is an option to elect again, without waiting for a 12 month term to end. I suppose someone being removed would be rare. But somebody doing a mediocre job may not be as rare, and they will have secured that for 12 months.

I hope this doesn’t happen, and the Stewards elected push forward with passion and promises. I just think of worse case scenarios when thinking about these things to try to cover all bases of what might happen.

What’s Everyone Think?

I’d like to know some other opinions on the lengths of terms, because I think this might be pretty critical to plan correctly. Want to say again, great work @alisha.eth, we can see so much thought and foresight has gone into this proposal. Glad we are all able to contribute in our own ways. Exciting!

[alisha.eth]

@zadok7

I do feel one sticking point still emerging is to get clearer consensus on the term lengths. I personally am in favor of smaller terms, but I do get that might present difficulty in working/continuity.

Unless there are any objections, I think we can see how two Terms per year work. As I mentioned in another comment, I am reluctant to have more than two terms each year because it would require significantly more proposals and votes from token holders in a given year — I think there is a very strong chance this will lead to voter apathy.

@zadok7

This brings up the question of if we should cover any bases regarding reelection? I assume one person can keep getting reelected over and over. Should there be in place term limits per working group per Steward?

I haven’t included any limits on the number of times a Steward can be reelected. I think if it becomes clear that someone is just getting reelected over and over and there might be a need for change within a working group, we should definitely consider passing an amendment that places a Term limit on Stewards.

[nick.eth]

This is now up for vote on Snapshot!

[Alex-moore2021]

Excellent work on this proposal @alisha.eth Thank you